Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-12-066 CHT.
Submitted: September 11, 2007.
Decided: December 7, 2007.
On Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
DENIED.
On Defendant's Motion for New Trial on Liability and Damages.
GRANTED.
On Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest.
DENIED AS MOOT.
Bernard A. Van Ogtrop, Esquire, Seitz Van Ogtrop Green, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Michael A. Pedicone, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.
Dear Counsel:
A jury trial in this underinsured motorist automobile accident case resulted in a verdict of $2,000,000 for Plaintiff Antoinette A. Chilson. Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, has filed two motions seeking 1) judgment as a matter of law on liability pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 50(b) and, alternatively, 2) a new trial on liability and damages pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59. Plaintiff has filed a motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 2301(d). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED, Defendant's motion for a new trial on liability and damages is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest is DENIED AS MOOT.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from an automobile accident occurring on the night of February 10, 2003. Plaintiff was involved in two accidents that night, both taking place on Lorewood Grove Drive, a two-lane country road located near Middletown.
The first accident occurred at approximately 8:30 p.m. when Plaintiff ran off the road and struck a tree. Plaintiff testified that it was "really cold outside," and that her car slid on ice on the road. Plaintiff's car became stuck in a snow bank by the road. Plaintiff called her husband, William R. Chilson, to ask him to bring his truck so he could tow her car out of the snow bank. Mr. Chilson quickly arrived, and was able to extricate Plaintiff's car. The airbag in Plaintiff's car had deployed, and Plaintiff testified that she felt "tingling on the right side of [her] face and on [her] right inner arm near [her] shoulder." Nonetheless, her car was still operable, and Plaintiff felt comfortable to drive. The Chilsons decided they would drive the vehicles back to their home, which was located near the accident. They made it safely back to their home, but then decided that Plaintiff should go to the hospital.
Trial Tr. at 45 (May 29, 2007).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 79.
At about 9:00 p.m., while on their way to the hospital in Mr. Chilson's truck, driven by Mr. Chilson, the Chilsons were struck on Lorewood Grove Drive by a vehicle driven by Joseph W. Lloyd, Sr. The collision caused the Mr. Chilson's truck to run off the road and hit a tree; Mr. Chilson's truck was "totaled" in the accident, and Plaintiff was taken to the hospital in an ambulance.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
In Plaintiff's deposition of Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Lloyd testified that, immediately after the accident as he got out of the car, he realized that the road was covered in "black ice" (which was also stated in a police accident report), and that Mr. Lloyd had hit this black ice while going around a curve in the road, had crossed the middle line, and had fishtailed into the Chilsons' truck. Mr. Lloyd testified that he had driven on the road before, and that there had been a "mist" that night, but that he had been unaware of any black ice on the road. Mr. Lloyd testified that as he "slowed down to make the turn, [he] hit the gas again, [and] that's when [he] started sliding." He did not receive a ticket from the police for the accident.
"Black ice" is a "thin, nearly invisible coating of ice that forms on paved surfaces." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th Ed. 2004).
Delaware State Police Corporal Eric T. Lochstoer Dep., at 2.
Lloyd Dep., at 6-7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4-6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 9.
Plaintiff sought medical attention for the injuries she suffered that night. Immediately after the second accident, she complained of right shoulder, right hip, right knee pain, chest, and neck and back pain. In the emergency room, medical staff performed a "Glasgow Coma Scale," a test designed to determine whether Plaintiff had a concussion. The test returned a "normal score," indicating that she did not have a concussion. An MRI of Plaintiff's neck, taken on September 24, 2003, showed a "minute central protrusion" of one of Plaintiff's disks. Plaintiff later complained to her physician, Dr. Alan Fink, a neurologist, of neck and back pain that "waxed and waned," and also of a greater frequency and severity of the migraine headaches she had suffered before the accidents. Mr. Chilson apparently suffered no physical injuries in the accident.
Trial Tr. at 51 (May 29, 2007).
Fink Dep., at 36.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 22-23.
Mr. Chilson originally brought a claim for loss of consortium, but he abandoned it prior to the submission of the case to the jury.
Plaintiff made a against Mr. Lloyd's insurance carrier, Dairyland Insurance Company, for the injuries she suffered in the second accident. The claim against Mr. Lloyd's insurance carrier was resolved upon the insurance carrier's payment of $15,000, the policy limit available to Mr. Lloyd.
Plaintiff had an insurance policy with Defendant Allstate Insurance Company at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's insurance policy with Allstate included underinsured motorist coverage for up to $100,000. Plaintiff claimed that the $15,000 paid to her by Mr. Lloyd's insurance carrier was inadequate to compensate Plaintiff for her damages. She presented an uninsured motorist claim against Defendant, which claim Defendant rejected.
In December 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant seeking payment of the underinsured motorist claim in an amount sufficient to compensate her for her damages, together with interest and costs.
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to exclude testimony from Dr. Fink that in Dr. Fink's opinion the second accident was more significant than the first accident in contributing to Plaintiff's injuries. Defendant argued that the Court should exclude this testimony because it conflicted with the evidence and, as a result, could not have been within a reasonable medical probability. The Court denied Defendant's motion, holding that Defendant's objection went to the weight of the evidence, and not its admissibility.
The two day trial began on May 29, 2007. Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law as to liability at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case and at the conclusion of all of the evidence, asserting that Mr. Lloyd had not been negligent because he was unaware of the black ice, and that there had been otherwise no negligent conduct on his part. In opposition, Plaintiff noted that it was a cold February night, and that it had rained earlier that day. Plaintiff asserted that weather conditions should have put Mr. Lloyd on notice that the roads were likely to be icy that night. Plaintiff pointed to Mr. Lloyd's testimony that he "hit the gas again" as he rounded the curve as additionally evidence of Mr. Lloyd's negligence. The Court denied Defendant's motion, stating that, while there was "not the strongest amount of evidence in the world of negligence in this case," the negligence issue nevertheless was for the jury to determine.
Trial Tr. at 134 (May 29, 2007).
The jury deliberated for about an hour and fifteen minutes, and awarded Plaintiff $2,000,000. Defendant filed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and its alternative motion for new trial on damages and liability. Plaintiff filed a motion for prejudgment interest.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), or, in the alternative, a new trial on liability and damages under Rule 59. Defendant again asserts that there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find negligence on the part of Mr. Lloyd, and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. In its motion for a new trial, Defendant contends that the award of $2,000,000 was disproportionate to the evidence presented, and "submits that it is a for[e]gone conclusion that this award must shock the conscience of the court." Defendant does not request a remittitur, but rather a new trial, claiming that the issues of damages and liability cannot be separated. Defendant also argues that it was error to permit Dr. Fink to testify that the second accident was more significant in causing Plaintiff's injuries.
Def. Mot. for New Trial on Liability and Damages, at ¶ 25.
Plaintiff contends that there was sufficient evidence that a jury could find Mr. Lloyd negligent to survive judgment as a matter of law. In response to Defendant's motion for a new trial, Plaintiff argues that if the Court should find the verdict excessive, the proper remedy is remittitur, and that since "there is no evidence that the jury's decision on liability was related to a decision on damages," the Court should order remittitur without granting a new trial. Plaintiff states that she is "prepared to accept policy limits [of $100,000] to satisfy the judgment."
Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. for New Trial on Liability and Damages, at ¶ 4.
Plaintiff cites Smith v. Lawson, 2006 WL 258310, at *8 (Del.Super.) to support this proposition. In Smith v. Lawson, this Court held that, where the issues of damages and liability are not "inexorably intertwined," a new trial on the issue of damages alone is appropriate.
Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. for New Trial on Liability and Damages, at ¶ 4.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When determining a motion for a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), the court does not weigh the evidence, but rather views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, determines if a verdict may be found for the party having the burden.
McCloskey v. McKelvey, 174 A.2d 691, 693 (Del.Super. 1961).
In contrast, when considering a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, the court weights the evidence in order to determine if the verdict is one which a reasonably prudent jury would have reached. A motion to grant a new trial on the ground of an excessive verdict is directed to the sound discretion of the court. The court has the authority to grant a new trial if the verdict was so out of proportion to the injury that the verdict shocks the court's conscience and sense of justice, or if the verdict was based upon passion, partiality, prejudice, mistake, or misapprehension on the part of the jury.
Id. at 693.
Lurie v. Montana, 2005 WL 3007801, at *1 (Del.Super.).
Mills v. Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1975); Storey v. Castner, 314 A.2d 187, 193 (Del. 1973).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The Court holds that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there was sufficient evidence for a finding of negligence against Mr. Lloyd; thus, Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Mr. Lloyd lost control of his car, crossed into the other lane, and hit Mr. Chilson's truck with enough force to knock it from the road and into a tree. Mr. Lloyd testified that he had known the road curved since he had driven on it before, that it was a cold "misty" night, and, notably, as he "slowed down to make the turn, [he] hit the gas again, [and] that's when [he] started sliding."
Id. at 13.
Absent the fact that Mr. Lloyd admitted that he "hit the gas," the Court would have had a more difficult time deciding this motion; however, the evidence, especially coupled with Mr. Lloyd's apparent acceleration, supports the jury's finding of negligence.
See, e.g., George v. Graham 561 A.2d 1361 (Vt. 1989) (affirming the trial court's holding that there was sufficient (though "not abundant") evidence to find a driver negligent, despite the fact that the defendant, a motorist, was going the speed limit. The evidence showed that it had rained the previous day in the area of the accident, that temperatures had been below freezing at the time of the accident, and that the defendant had entered into another motorist's lane and had caused the accident). Cf., e.g., Monahan v. Devaul 706 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant's, a motorist, skidding on ice did not, in and of itself, require a finding of negligence, and upholding a verdict in favor of defendant. The evidence showed that defendant had skidded on ice through a stop sign, and had run into a guardrail, which had caused injury to the plaintiff, his passenger).
Therefore, Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
B. Defendant's Motion for New Trial on Damages and Liability
The Court holds that the jury's award of $2,000,000 "shocks the conscience" of the Court, and, since the issues of damages and liability are "inexorably intertwined," a new trial should be granted instead of remittitur.
The award of $2,000,000 is grossly disproportionate to Plaintiff's alleged injuries. Immediately after the accident, Plaintiff complained of right shoulder, right hip, right knee pain, chest, and neck and back pain. She also complained of continuing neck pain and increased frequency migraine headaches, and an MRI revealed the slight protusion of a disk in her neck. The Court cannot conclude that her injuries were significant enough to warrant a $2,000,000 award. The award is so disproportionate as to "shock the conscience" of the Court, and the Court must take remedial action as a result.
That Mr. Chilson chose not to pursue his loss of consortium claim suggests further that the injuries suffered by Plaintiff were not so severe as to warrant the jury's award.
Plaintiff urges that, instead of granting a new trial, the Court should grant remittitur, and reduce the award to $100,000. Plaintiff also asserts that "there is no evidence that the jury's decision on liability was related to a decision on damages." The Court disagrees. At trial, the parties vigorously contested the issue of which of Plaintiff's injuries were attributable to which accident. Since Mr. Lloyd could not have been held liable for the first accident, the jury had to determine whether Mr. Lloyd was liable for the second accident, and, if so, which injuries were the result of the second accident and not the first. Thus, the issues of liability and damages relating to Plaintiff's injuries were inexorably intertwined. The Court has held that when issues of damages and liability are "inexorably intertwined," a remittitur or a new trial for the issue of damages alone cannot be granted.
Pl. Opp. to Def. Mot. for New Trial on Liability and Damages, at ¶ 4.
See Smith v. Lawson, 2006 WL 258310, at *8 (Del.Super.).
Furthermore, the size of the verdict, contrasted with the nature of the claimed injures, creates some uncertainty in the Court's mind as to the diligence undertaken by the jury in considering the negligence issues in this case. A new trial should be granted instead of remittitur. For example, in Wells v. Dallas Independent School District, a jury awarded a school district superintendent $1,900,000 after finding that his due process rights had been violated when he was terminated by the school district. The district court reduced this award to $250,000 on remittitur. On appeal, reversing and remanding the case for a new trial, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opined that "at some point on the scale an excessive award becomes so large that it can no longer be considered merely excessive. At that point, when an award is `so exaggerated as to indicate bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive,' . . . remittitur is inadequate and the only proper remedy is a new trial." The Court has similar concerns about the disproportionality of the award in the present case.
Wells v. Dallas Independent School District, 793 F.2d 679, 683 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 684 (quoting Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983).
Additionally, the short length of time the jury took in its deliberations added to the Court's concerns about the carefulness of the jury's consideration of the negligence issue. The jury deliberated for about an hour and fifteen minutes, and awarded what the Court has found to be an excessive award. In Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co., the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, while
brief jury deliberation is not, in itself, sufficient basis to support a new trial motion[,] . . . [w]hen brief jury deliberation is coupled with a verdict that is contrary to the great weight of evidence . . . it creates a situation where the [ ] court has an affirmative duty to set aside the verdict.
Kearns v. Keystone Shipping Co., 863 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1988).
In Kearns, a jury deliberated for one hour and eighteen minutes before awarding the plaintiff, a former employee of a shipping company, $99,000 in back pay in an age discrimination case, where there appeared to be little evidence of age discrimination.
Id. at 178.
The Court has also taken into account the brevity of the original trial. A second trial will presumably be equally short.
For these reasons, Defendant's motion for new trial on damages and liability is granted.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest
Given the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion for new trial on damages and liability, Plaintiff's motion is denied as moot.
V. CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED, Defendant's motion for a new trial on liability and damages is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest is DENIED AS MOOT.