Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-650
July 28, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff asserts that the defendant Laborers' District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund (hereinafter "the Fund") is violating the ERISA statute 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA") by paying him a smaller pension than he is entitled to. Both parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The parties agree that plaintiff became a vested participant in the pension plan as of May 1, 1998, has retired, and is entitled to benefits. The disputed issue is whether the defendant has properly calculated the amount of plaintiff s pension, and this in turn depends upon whether plaintiff was properly denied credit for certain periods of service preceding various breaks in service.
Under the terms of the Plan, plaintiff was entitled to credit for each year in which he performed at least 500 hours of credited service, but a break in service which lasted longer than the term of previous employment resulted in the forfeiture of credit for those earlier years. Plaintiff does not dispute that the various breaks in service occurred, and that the defendant is properly applying the terms of the Plan itself in denying him the credits he seeks. Plaintiff contends, however, that the Plan, as interpreted and applied by the defendant, violates ERISA. According to plaintiff, the statute requires that once a participant becomes vested, all previous periods of employment must be taken into account in calculating the amount of the benefit, even though such periods are not credited for length-of-service purposes in determining whether vesting has occurred.
Plaintiff was credited with one-half year of service in 1963 and 1964, followed by a five-year break in service until 1969. Since the time he was not working exceeded the amount of time he had worked, he forfeited those credits and, when he returned to work in 1970, started over again. Plaintiff was credited with four years of service from 1970 to 1973, but then suffered another break of service until 1978, a five-year loss which resulted in the forfeiture of the previous four-year credit. Plaintiff obtained one year of service credit in 1979, but experienced another break in service during 1980. Between 1981 and 1982, he earned one and one-half credits. Plaintiff earned no credits from 1983 through 1985, but has consistently earned at least partial credit each year since 1986. (Plaintiff has been on worker's compensation disability since 1995, but received one-fourth year credit each year until he retired).
In essence, plaintiff argues that when he became vested in 1998, all of his previous service should have been included in the calculation of his benefits, and that he is being wrongfully denied credit for the seven and one-half years preceding breaks in service. Plaintiff finds some support for this argument in a recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, McDonald v. Pension Plan Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2003) but, as noted by that court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a different approach. In H aas and Cass v. The Boeing Company, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1992), aff'd without opinion, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993), the court upheld a district court's decision which flatly rejected an argument similar to that now advanced by plaintiff. See also Shawley v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 989 F.2d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1993); Jones v. UOP, 16 F.3d 141 (7th Cir. 1994).
§ 203 of the ERISA statute sets forth vesting requirements, ( 29 U.S.C. § 1503), and § 204 establishes the statutory requirements for the accrual of benefits ( 29 U.S.C. § 1054). As the cited cases demonstrate, there is nothing in these statutory provisions to suggest that the attainment of vesting results in the revival of credits previously extinguished. Vesting means that the participant cannot thereafter be deprived of entitlement, it does not result in the enlargement of entitlements.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
An Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of July 2003, IT IS ORDERED:1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
3. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.