Childers v. Paul

8 Citing cases

  1. Realty Mortgage & Sales Co. v. Oklahoma Employment Security Com.

    197 Okla. 308 (Okla. 1946)   Cited 16 times

    By an amendment, S. L. 1941, ch. (6) ยง 3(f), p. 139, insurance agents and solicitors were expressly excluded. This amendment may be considered by us in arriving at the intent of the Legislature. Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. Section 19(g)(1) of said law defines employment as follows:

  2. State ex rel v. Dinwiddie

    95 P.2d 867 (Okla. 1939)   Cited 13 times

    The question here presented is one of first impression in this court although section 6946, supra (with changes by amendment to authorize the establishment of high schools) has been a part of the statutory law in this jurisdiction since 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 244, R. L. 1910, sec. 7869). It depends for its solution upon an interpretation of the statutes involved, and we may with propriety resort to the rules of statutory construction to resolve doubt or uncertainty. Determining the legislative intent is the primary consideration in ascertaining the meaning of any law. Board of Com'rs of Creek County et al. v. Alexander, State Treas., 58 Okla. 128, 159 P. 311; Grayson v. Thompson, 77 Okla. 77, 186 P. 236; Wagner v. Swan, 162 Okla. 95, 19 P.2d 555; Bryan Son v. Vernor, 172 Okla. 382, 45 P.2d 468; Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. In ascertaining the legislative intent, the purpose intended to be accomplished claims a degree of consideration.

  3. May v. Covington

    185 Okla. 576 (Okla. 1939)   Cited 1 times

    The previous statutory provision, cited supra, and upon which plaintiff relies to impose primary liability upon the defendants, was considered in the case of Sohner v. Welliver, 95 Okla. 73, 218 P. 1069, and therein it was held that the liability imposed was a statutory one which by its terms extended to all debts due to mechanics, workers, and laborers employed by the class of corporations therein designated. It is a fundamental rule that in construing a statute, the legislative intent should be ascertained and given effect. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Cooper, 184 Okla. 153, 86 P.2d 61; Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. Such intent is to be ascertained by considering the evil which the Legislature intended to prevent or correct and the remedy which it intended to provide. When so considered, it will be noted that the statute, supra, which imposes liability upon the stockholders of corporations, of a certain class, was enacted to correct the evil which was occasioned by nonpayment of wages and salaries to mechanics, workmen, and laborers employed by such corporation and to provide them with an additional source to which they might look for payment of such wages.

  4. Spurrier v. Mallouf

    86 P.2d 995 (Okla. 1939)   Cited 1 times

    We are of the opinion the Legislature intended the added requirement it expressed, and we believe such construction is reasonable and proper as expressing the intent of the Legislature. As this court said in the recent case of Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872, in construction of statutes, legislative intent must govern, to be determined from consideration of the entire act. For the reasons stated, we hold the trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial.

  5. Champlin Refining Co. v. Cooper

    184 Okla. 153 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 21 times

    Section 9006, supra, has not been altered by amendment. The fundamental rule of construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute under consideration. Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. Considering the foregoing statute in the light of the above rule, as well as the date of enacting the same, it is obvious the statute was enacted for the purpose of protecting agricultural crops from the ravages of straying domestic animals rather than motorists upon the highways.

  6. Sheridan Oil Co. v. Superior Court of Creek County

    82 P.2d 832 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 20 times

    of operation of any general statute, in this case the general statute (section 3873, supra) defining the jurisdiction of the superior court, even though that statute be (as we have determined) broad enough to otherwise include the matters within the comprehension of the special legislation. The rule of statutory construction thus invoked is one of general acceptation and frequent application (Muskogee Times-Democrat v. Board of Commissioners of Muskogee County, 76 Okla. 188, 184 P. 591; Gardner v. School District No. 87, Kay County, 34 Okla. 716, 126 P. 1018; Murrow Indian Ophans' Home v. Featherstone, 85 Okla. 150, 204. P. 1110), but it is only one of several aids in determining the legislative intent, which is the primary consideration in ascertaining the meaning of any law. Board of Com'rs of Creek County v. Alexander, 58 Okla. 128, 159 P. 311; Grayson v. Thompson, 77 Okla. 77, 186 P. 236; Wagner v. Swan, 162 Okla. 95, 19 P.2d 555; Bryan Son v. Vernor, 172 Okla. 382, 45 P.2d 468; Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. The purpose intended to be accomplished by the act also claims a degree of consideration (Brown v. Woods, 2 Okla. 601, 39 P. 473; In re Cleveland's Claim, 72 Okla. 279, 180 P. 852; Blevins v. Graham Co., 72 Okla. 308, 182 P. 247), and resolution of doubt as to the meaning of a statute may be accomplished by reference to its history (Pure Oil Co. v. Cornish. 174 Okla. 615, 52 P.2d 832; Ramsey v Leeper, 168 Okla. 43, 31 P.2d 852), and to the history of the times or contemporary circumstances existing at the time of the passage of the act and presumed to have been considered at the time of its enactment. De Hasque v. Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co., 68 Okla. 183 173 P. 73

  7. Ex Parte Higgs

    97 Okla. Crim. 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953)   Cited 29 times

    Furthermore, if the proviso was standing alone as an independent statute, we might well conclude that the words "for consumption either on or off the premises" had been inadvertently omitted and this court could supply such words as necessary to complete the obvious sense and to express the legislative intent. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, ยง 344, p. 689; Ex parte Houston, 93 Okla. Cr. 26, 224 P.2d 281; In re Blain, 197 Okla. 459, 172 P.2d 795; Curtis v. Registered Dentists of Oklahoma, 193 Okla. 233, 143 P.2d 427; Keck v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 188 Okla. 257, 108 P.2d 162; Childers v. Paul, 177 Okla. 111, 57 P.2d 872. But here we have no such situation.

  8. Opinion No. 76-226

    Opinion No. 76-226 (1976) AG (Ops.Okla.Atty.Gen. Jul. 7, 1976)

    In construing a statute, legislative intent, when ascertained, must control. J. S. Bryan Sons v. Vernor, 45 P.2d 468, 172 Okl. 382; Childers v. Paul, 57 P.2d 872, 177 Okl. 111. It is, therefore, the opinion of the Attorney General that your question be answered as follows: The basis for the security on a property bond written by a licensed property bondsman is fixed under the provisions of 59 O.S. 1324 [ 59-1324] (1971), as four (4) times the market value of the property. The market value is defined to be four (4) times the assessed valuation of the property as recorded on the tax rolls, less any encumbrances. Once the basis has been established, subsequent undertakings are subtracted from the original basis.