Rules restricting the secondary employment of public employees have been interpreted and their enforcement has been upheld in a number of cases. (See Phillips v. Hall (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 409, 447 N.E.2d 418; Weisenritter v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 799, 385 N.E.2d 336; Chigaros v. Murphy (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 545, 327 N.E.2d 12; Hayes v. Civil Service Com. (1952), 348 Ill. App. 146, 108 N.E.2d 505.) However, in none of those cases was the express authority of the rulemaking body at issue.

• 4 Our review of the Illinois law makes apparent that in those cases dealing with the enforcement and promulgation of secondary employment rules, the propriety of promulgation of such rules is recognized. (See Weisenritter v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 799; Chigaros v. Murphy (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 545.) Under Illinois statutory law, the corporate authorities of each municipality may prescribe the duties and powers of all police officers (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, par. 11-1-2), and, absent manifest and palpable abuse of discretion, the wisdom, necessity and propriety of any action regarding the administration of its police force is a matter for the municipality to decide. ( Cook County Police Association v. City of Harvey (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 147, 149.)