As we have explained, the licensing agreement does not interfere with the public's rights under the act because copyrighted records are exempt under the federal exemption from the copying provisions of the act that conflict with federal copyright law, which the licensing agreement embodies. The commission also relies on this court's decision in Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000), to support its position. In that case, the commission ordered the plaintiff to disclose certain records that were the subject of discovery proceedings in a separate federal action, to which the plaintiff was also a party.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief of Policev.Freedom of Information Commission , 252 Conn. 377, 387, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000). This court also has explained that "[t]he exemptions contained in [various state statutes] reflect a legislative intention to balance the public's right to know what its agencies are doing, with the governmental and private needs for confidentiality.... [I]t is this balance of the governmental and private needs for confidentiality with the public right to know that must govern the interpretation and application of the [act]."
Several years later, this court expressly disavowed Gifford's discovery dictum with respect to § 1–213. See Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 392, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000) (describing dictum as “ill-advised”). Although the legislature subsequently changed the word “affect” to “limit”; see Public Act 94–246, § 15; this court held in Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, at 395–96, 746 A.2d 1264, that this change did not alter the meaning of the statute.
We have concluded, however, that the rules of discovery and the provisions of the act operate "separately and independently" of each other. Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 396, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000). In Chief of Police, we addressed the "scope of General Statutes § 1-213 (b), which provides in relevant part: `Nothing in the . . . [a]ct shall be deemed in any manner to: (1) . . . limit the rights of litigants, including parties to administrative proceedings, under the laws of discovery of this state.
As to the images, FOIC rejected the respondent's contention that the Federal Copyright Act protects the images from mandatory disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 1-210(a) which exempts all records "as otherwise provided by any federal law." FOIC found that such records are protected by the Federal Copyright Act. FOIC, however, citing Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 399, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000) and Venetian Casino Resort v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 453 F.Sup.2d 157, 166 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd, 530 F.3d 925, 382 U.S.App. D.C. 12 (2008) FOIC found that time Federal Copyright Act is not a `federal law' that provides for the explicit confidentiality of records or some other similar shield from public disclosure. FOIC also noted the exceptions to the Copyright Act for affirmative disclosure requirements, which allow full public inspection of registered copyrighted documents and permit fair use of copyrighted material.
However, Connecticut FOIA does not affect or limit discovery rights. See C.G.S. § 1-213; Chief of Police, Hartford Police Department v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377 (2000). Lastly, the documents requested are likely to lead to admissible evidence and are not foreclosed from discovery under the statute of limitations, given the allegations of a continuing violation.
The plain language of § 1-210 (a) provides that records that fall within the otherwise provided by law exception are not "public records" for purposes of FOIA. This court has held that this exemption applies to "federal and state laws that, by their terms, provide for confidentiality of records or some other similar shield from public disclosure." Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission , 252 Conn. 377, 399, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000). Because § 52-146e (a) expressly provides for confidentiality of records, the exemption to disclosure in § 1-210 (a) applies and the hospital police reports are not public records pursuant to FOIA.
bject to an order by the commission requiring the agency or official to comply with the act in the future. See Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission, 256 Conn. 764, 769 and n.9, 775 A.2d 981 (2001); Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6, 8-9, 688 A.2d 314 (1997); Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 707 n.3, 663 A.2d 349 (1995); Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 648-49 and n.9, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); Kelly v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 300, 306, 312-13, 603 A.2d 1131 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 647-50, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 500-502, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 52 Conn. App. 12, 14-15, 724 A.2d 554 (1999), aff'd, 252 Conn. 377, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000); Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 51 Conn. App. 100, 102 n.5, 720 A.2d 268 (1998). The courts concluded in each case that the plaintiff was aggrieved
ect to an order by the commission requiring the agency or official to comply with the act in the future. See Director, Retirement & Benefits Services Division v. Freedom of Information Commission, 256 Conn. 764, 769 and n. 9, 775 A.2d 981 (2001); Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6, 8–9, 688 A.2d 314 (1997); Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 707 n. 3, 663 A.2d 349 (1995); Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 648–49 and n. 9, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); Kelly v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 300, 306, 312–13, 603 A.2d 1131 (1992); Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 647–50, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989); Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 500–502, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 52 Conn.App. 12, 14–15, 724 A.2d 554 (1999), aff'd, 252 Conn. 377, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000); Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 51 Conn.App. 100, 102 n. 5, 720 A.2d 268 (1998). The courts concluded in each case that the plaintiff was aggrieved by such a prospective order, and that the appeal was not moot, but did not consider whether the commission had authority to issue such orders.
We conclude that, although the addresses of the employees sought in this case already have been disclosed, the appeal is not moot. We previously have held that where orders issued by the commission are prospective in nature, an appeal of a commission order is not moot. Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 648-49, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); see also Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 384, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000). In the present case, the commission order stated: "Henceforth [the director] shall strictly comply with the provisions of [General Statutes §§ 1-212 (a) and 1-210 (a)]. . . ."