Opinion
No. 7446
October 20, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages and injunctive relief relating to tobacco farmland located in Enfield, Connecticut, hereinafter ("Farm").
On May 12, 2006, the plaintiffs served the defendant with a Writ, Summon, and Complaint and an Application for Temporary Injunction. The plaintiffs seek the following injunctive relief:
(1) Enjoining the defendant from removing additional structures from the Farm until and unless the defendant agrees to restore the Farm to its former status as tobacco farmland; and/or
(2) Requiring the Defendant to restore the Farm to its former status as tobacco farmland following its removal of its structures.
The defendant opposes the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the following grounds:
(1) The plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law;
(2) The plaintiffs have not proved that irreparable injury would result if an injunction is not issued;
(3) The plaintiffs have not shown that they will prevail on the merits; and
CT Page 19487
(4) Clearly, the balance of equities do not favor an injunction being issued.
The matter was heard on July 19, 2006, August 9, 2006 and October 4, 2006.
II FINDINGS OF FACT
"The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005).
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to their testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. "That determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 763 A.2d 199 (2001).
"[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what — all, none, or some — of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996).
The trial court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1986).
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this case.
The plaintiffs own farmland (Farm) in Enfield, Connecticut. The Farm is used for the growing, curing and storage of tobacco. In 1996, the plaintiffs entered into a joint venture with third parties to raise shade tobacco. In 1998, the defendant became involved with the joint venture. The plaintiffs and defendant agreed that the Farm would be leased for the benefit of the joint venture. The defendant financed the operations, with an annual budget of approximately $6 million. On January 1, 2005, the plaintiffs and defendant executed a new lease agreement for the Farm, hereinafter ("Lease"), that expressly named the defendant as the tenant.
On behalf of the joint venture, the defendant agreed to fund the construction of several structures necessary to increase production. Mr. Chickosky, hereinafter ("Chickosky"), supervised the operations and the construction, including where the new structures would be located. In 1998, thirteen tobacco sheds were built on the Farm to be used for storing and curing tobacco. In 2003, nine greenhouses were constructed. A labor camp was later built to house migrant workers.
During the construction, large quantities of soil were removed with the approval of Chickosky and the defendant. In 1998, soil removed during the construction of the tobacco sheds was traded by Chickosky to Plaza Excavating for material used in the parking and service areas. Soil removed for the greenhouses and labor camp was initially stored on the Farm. In 2003, a large quantity of the soil was sold by Chickosky to Wood Construction for $41,000, or $8 per cubic yard. Wood Construction had been hired to help build the greenhouses and labor camp. In April 2006, Chickosky traded $1,000 in soil to Wood Construction for a dump truck. He also gave friends and relatives small quantities of soil. Chickosky testified that the joint venture benefited from the transactions with Plaza Excavating and Wood Construction. However, the defendant contested that the joint venture received all the benefits from these sales/trades.
The relationship between the parties deteriorated after a third party, Brian Kogut, filed a lawsuit seeking damages relating to the joint venture. Following the commencement of the lawsuit, the defendant decided to end the joint venture and operate instead as Altadis Shade Company, LLC. The plaintiffs eventually became employees of Altadis Shade Company, LLC. However, in April 2005, the plaintiffs resigned their positions.
In August 2005, the Kogut lawsuit was resolved. As a result, the plaintiffs and the defendant executed a number of documents, including the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, dated August 23, 2005, which amended and/or referenced the Lease. Under the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, the defendant had the right to remove the structures funded by the defendant "at its sole and exclusive option and at its sole expense." Section IV, paragraph 2.
After the agreement was signed, the parties' relationship continued to deteriorate. The parties engaged in a number of disputes relating to equipment, electricity, water, and yard care. Chickosky sent several contentious e-mails to the defendant.
The defendant has now begun to remove its structures from the Farm. The defendant has removed all of the greenhouses and one of its tobacco sheds. Chickosky testified that the defendant has not done anything yet to restore the property to its former status. He contends that the defendant has a duty to restore the property to its original condition. The defendant's position is that it plans to restore the property after its structures are removed but wants to use the soil that was stored on the Farm. The defendant holds Chickosky responsible for the soil not being available for use in restoring the farmland.
At trial, both parties offered expert testimony regarding the restoration issue.
The plaintiffs' expert, Harvey D. Luce, was qualified as an expert in soil science, including the growing of tobacco. Dr. Luce testified about the special qualities of the soil found on the Farm. Based on his observations, a significant amount of soil was removed when the structures were built. In order to restore the areas to grow shade tobacco, he was of the opinion that approximately twenty-five inches of the top layers of the disturbed soil had to be replaced with good soil. The process would involve carefully laying down approximately twenty inches of sandy loam, and then putting on top of that approximately six inches of good top soil, preferably silt loam, while adding necessary organic matter. According to Dr. Luce, the soil that was removed and stored could be used to restore the farmland, although it would not be ideal for a restoration project because of the tendency of the silts to compact upon disturbance. In order to use the soil, it would have to be mixed with some sand and organic materials to make sure the final product had good aeration.
The defendant called Michael Gragnolati as an expert in soil science. Based on his observations, Gragnolati believed that lesser amounts of soil were actually removed when the structures were built. It was his opinion that the stockpiled soil could be used after proper soil tests were done to determine what nutrients had to be added. He was also of the opinion that soil from the Baraniuk Farm could be used to restore the Chickosky Farm with proper testing and fertilization.
III DISCUSSION A Application for Temporary Injunction
"The principal purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits . . . Our Supreme Court has consistently held that absent an applicable statutory rule to the contrary, a ruling granting, denying or dissolving a temporary injunction is not a judgment from which an appeal may be taken." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 655 A.2d 814 (1995).
The standard for granting a temporary injunction is well settled. "In general, a court may, in its discretion, exercise its equitable power to order a temporary injunction pending final determination of the order, upon a proper showing by the movant that if the injunction is not granted she will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law . . . In exercising its discretion, the court, in a proper case, may consider and balance the injury complained of with that which will result from interference by injunction." Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 569 n. 25, 660 A.2d 742 (1995).
"A party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that: (1) it has no adequate remedy at law; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; (3) it will likely prevail on the merits; and (4) the balance of equities tips in its favor. Waterbury Teachers Ass'n. v. Freedom Of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446, 645 A.2d 978 (1994)." Midstate Medical Center v. Doe, 49 Conn.Sup. 581, 587, 898 A.2d 282 (2006).
"The plaintiff seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of proving facts which will establish irreparable harm as a result of that violation . . . injunctive relief may not lie where it is predicated on the fears and apprehensions of the party applying for it or where it would be incompatible with the equities of the case; . . . and likewise the power of equity to grant such relief may be exercised only under demanding circumstances . . . The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction is not granted. Although an absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm." Karls v. Alexandra, 179 Conn. 390, 401-02, 426 A.2d 784 (1980).
In reaching a decision in this case, the court must consider the following factors.
Whether the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law must be examined. The plaintiffs have a pending action in damages. The complaint alleges that the defendant has breached the lease agreement by failing to pay rent, failing to use reasonable farming practices in the course of growing tobacco on the Farm causing damage to property and other financial losses, and expressing an intent to remove greenhouses and tobacco sheds from the Farm without fully restoring the Farm to its former state as land suitable for growing tobacco. If the court does not grant injunctive relief, the plaintiffs can still seek damages from the defendants.
The court must consider whether the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. At this time, the defendant has only removed the greenhouses and one of the tobacco sheds. Both parties agree that the Farm can be restored following the removal of the structures, although they disagree as to how to do it. The evidence does not demonstrate that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury.
The plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits must be evaluated. The plaintiffs have cited several authorities regarding a tenant's duty of good husbandry relating to farmland. These authorities may be distinguishable from the instant action; however, on the basis that the structures were built by and for the benefit of the joint venture. It is unclear whether the role of the joint venture would impact any duty of good husbandry.
"A joint venture is a special combination of two or more persons who combine their property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge to seek a profit jointly in a single business enterprise without any actual partnership or corporate designation . . . The relationship between contracting parties cannot amount to a joint venture unless the parties so intend . . . As a matter of law, parties to joint ventures undertake fiduciary duties to each other concerning matters within the scope of the joint venture." Electronic Associates, Inc. v. Automatic Equipment Development Corp. 185 Conn. 31, 35, 440 A.2d 249 (1981).
"The relations and obligations in a joint venture are generally governed by the principles of common-law partnership . . . and an adventurer is accountable to his coadventurers under the same equitable principles as require an accounting between partners at common law . . . At common law, a partner who has not fully and fairly performed the partnership agreement on his part has no standing in a court of equity to enforce any rights under the agreement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Travis v. St. John, 176 Conn. 69, 73, 404 A.2d 885 (1978).
Finally, the court must assess whether a balancing of the equities favors granting injunctive relief. Both parties have argued that the equities tip in their favor. The court must take into consideration the fact that the Supplemental Settlement Agreement allows the defendant to the remove the structures that it had funded on behalf of the joint venture. Some courts that have discussed the equities involved in regards to settlement agreements have found that the equities tip in favor of enforcement. See Zauner v. Brewer, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 049135 (August 11, 1992, Gill, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 251) ( 1992 Ct.Sup. 7544, 7546-7547).
"It is well recognized that an agreement to settle a lawsuit, voluntarily entered into, is binding upon the parties . . . Once reached, the agreement cannot be repudiated by either party. Rather, such an agreement will be summarily enforced by the court . . . A settlement agreement is a legally enforceable contract to settle, with consideration predicated upon mutuality of agreement . . . Indeed, such agreements are favored by the law . . . Furthermore, a settlement agreement is binding upon the parties even if one party to the agreement subsequently changes her mind and seeks to rescind or repudiate said agreement . . . Additionally a public policy exists by which settlement agreements are advocated . . . It is the duty of the courts rather to encourage than to discourage parties in resorting to compromise as a mode of adjusting conflicting claims; and the nature or extent of the rights of each should not be nicely scrutinized. Courts should, so far as they can do so legally and properly, support agreements which have for their object the amicable settlement of doubtful rights by parties; the consideration for such agreements is not only valuable, but highly meritorious. They are encouraged because they promote peace, and [when] there is no fraud, and the parties meet on equal terms and adjust their differences, the court will not overlook the compromise, but will hold the parties concluded by the settlement . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zauner v. Brewer, supra, 1992 Ct.Sup. 7546-7547."
After due consideration, the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the requirements for injunctive relief.
IV CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the above-stated reasons, the application for a temporary injunction is denied.