Defendant responds that with respect to the remaining issues, they were decided after a trial in which the court made numerous findings of fact. Specifically, the court found that the Cal Sag site was blighted, had not been subject to growth and development through investment by private enterprise, and would not be reasonably anticipated to be developed without the adoption of the TIF redevelopment plan. Moreover, it cites City of Chicago v. Boulevard Bank National Ass'n, 293 Ill. App.3d 767 (1997), for the proposition that the Village's ordinances have a presumption of validity. There, this court stated:
Moreover, the determination of necessity is a legislative function that is entitled to great deference by the trial and reviewing courts. City of Chicago v. Boulevard Bank National Ass'n, 293 Ill. App. 3d 767, 779 (1997). As our supreme court has stated, "[t]he general rule is that where the legislature has delegated to a corporation the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, the corporation has also the authority to decide on the necessity for exercising the right, and its decision will be conclusive in the absence of a clear abuse of the power granted."
Every private owner of property holds her title subject to the lawful exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain. Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corp., 22 Ill.2d 132, 137, 174 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1961); City of Chicago v. Boulevard Bank National Ass'n, 293 Ill.App.3d 767, 228 Ill.Dec. 146, 688 N.E.2d 844 (1997). Article I, section 15, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.