Because the instruction limited damages to those proximately connected to the company's retaliatory discharge, effectively separating losses due, rather, to the plaintiffs' infirmities or inability to work or to other causes, and because it appropriately limited recovery to such losses as were reasonably certain to occur ( Robinson v. Greeley Hansen (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 720, 726), we find no reversible error. A plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages which naturally flow from the commission of the tort, although he must prove them with reasonable certainty and the damage must be the natural result of the wrong inflicted and not speculative. ( Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 458, 471.) We are aware of no reason why plaintiffs who prove retaliatory discharge should not be entitled to the same type of proximate monetary damages as are available in other tort actions ( Sloan v. Jasper County Community Unit School District No. 1 (1988), 167 Ill. App.3d 867, 870), and we find that the instruction here properly limited damages to those proximately resulting from the company's retaliatory conduct. It is for the trier of fact to determine that proximate amount.
• 1 An escrowee must follow the directions of the parties who establish the escrow. ( Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 458, 340 N.E.2d 106.) In this case, however, the escrow instructions did not specify that funds were to be paid to the escrowee.
The courts have reasoned, however, that that part of § 3-305(2) was not meant to be given literal or unlimited application, for UCC § 3-302(2) provides that the holder of a negotiable instrument may, if he satisfies the prerequisites set out in § 3-302(1), be a holder in due course even though he is the payee. NYUCC § 3-302(2); see, e.g., Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh, 34 Ill.App.3d 458, 469, 340 N.E.2d 106, 114 (1975). Further, the official commentary to the latter section notes that such a payee is entitled to holder-in-due-course status regardless of "whether he takes the instrument by purchase from a third person or directly from the obligor."
For this reason, attorneys' fees are only appropriate when they are contemplated by a statute or "some agreement or stipulation specifically authorizing them." Chi. Title & Tr. Co. v. Walsh, 340 N.E.2d 106, 115 (Ill. 1975). Here, Plaintiff does not identify a statute or agreement authorizing attorneys' fees.
Yet, Bloomingdale's would have incurred the Miami-to-Atlanta expenses anyway, and cannot recover these expenses just because they coincided with the flood. See Chi. Title Trust Co. v. Walsh, 340 N.E.2d 106, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). Finally, the remaining expenses are too remote in time or in purpose to have arisen from the flood, and, in any case, Bloomingdale's has failed to show how each of these expenses is related to the flood.
We believe Illinois would follow the discharge for value rule. At least one Illinois appellate court has applied the rule, see Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh, 34 Ill. App.3d 458, 340 N.E.2d 106, 110-11 (1975) (denying restitution because defendants "took payment in exchange for the discharge of a legitimate debt, without misrepresentation by them and without notice to them of [the] fraud];" describing exchange as a "bona fide discharge for value"), and no lower courts in Illinois have rejected the rule. Without much explanation, NBase suggests that Illinois courts do not apply the discharge for value rule in cases involving mistake and cites one case for this proposition, St. Paul Fed. Sav. Loan Assoc. v. Avant, 135 Ill. App.3d 568, 90 Ill. Dec. 250, 481 N.E.2d 1050 (1985).
Id. at 425. In Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Walsh, 34 Ill. App.3d 458, 340 N.E.2d 106 (1975), the court held that a check is lost when a bank, upon dishonoring a check, returns the check to the maker rather than to the payee. 340 N.E.2d at 112.
Damages are legally recoverable under Illinois law if they can be proved to a degree of reasonable certainty. Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh, 34 Ill.App.3d 458, 340 N.E.2d 106 (1975); Cummings v. Chicago Transit Auth., 86 Ill.App.3d 914, 42 Ill.Dec. 159, 164, 408 N.E.2d 737, 742 (1980). Here, the district court found no evidence to relate causally to either John's preoccupation with violence or his night terrors to his abuse while under the Center's care, and no evidence to show that John will need future medical or psychological treatment.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Talty, 376 Ill.App.3d 1082, 315 Ill.Dec. 866, 877 N.E.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Dist.2007); Anvil Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 Ill.App.3d 1108, 41 Ill.Dec. 147, 407 N.E.2d 645, 654 (1st Dist.1980); Glass v. Burkett, 64 Ill.App.3d 676, 21 Ill.Dec. 494, 381 N.E.2d 821, 827 (5th Dist.1978); Chi. Title & Trust Co. v. Walsh, 34 Ill.App.3d 458, 340 N.E.2d 106, 115 (1st Dist.1975). Moreover, there is no evidence of attorneys' fees in the exhibits submitted, and Crim concedes that she has “deferred providing the bills.”
Davenport did not "deal" with the Government with regards to the check because it did not take the check as a payee or an assignee of the payee or as a result of any other immediate transaction with the Government; it took the check by negotiation from Almark. Cf. Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Walsh, 34 Ill. App.3d 458, 468-69, 340 N.E.2d 106, 113-14 (1st Dist. 1975). In Chicago Title, the court reasoned that in order for the payees to have dealt with the drawer-bank within the meaning of the statute, the payees must have participated in the exchange of forged cashier's checks for the bank drafts in dispute; that the payees had dealt with the bank as escrowee was insufficient.