Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Schwartz

4 Citing cases

  1. Colgan v. Sisters of St. Joseph

    604 N.E.2d 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    ( Dunne v. Minsor (1924), 312 Ill. 333, 143 N.E. 842.) A court's primary goal in construing a will is to determine the testator's intent. ( Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Schwartz (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 324, 458 N.E.2d 151.) Conditions subsequent defeating estates are not favored, and courts will not construe a condition subsequent so as to defeat the vesting of an estate under a will, contrary to a general intention of the testator, as may be determined from the instrument itself. ( Wheeler v. Williams (1948), 400 Ill. 438, 81 N.E.2d 175.)

  2. Bank of America v. Carpenter

    401 Ill. App. 3d 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 21 times
    Equating claim of scrivener's error to seeking reformation of the contract based on provision being mistakenly included

    In re Estate of MacLeish, 35 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839 (1976) (the court construed a minor ambiguity caused by a typographical error in order to give effect to the settlor's clear intent). See also Ranger v. Ranger, 379 Ill. App. 3d 752, 754-55 (2008) (two different provisions in a trust instrument conflicted with each other and could not both be enforced, so the court looked for the settlor's intent from the document as a whole); Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Schwartz, 120 Ill. App. 3d 324, 328 (1983) (where two paragraphs of a will created an ambiguity when read together, the court added the phrase "if there be no issue" to one paragraph to reconcile it with the other and thereby effectuated the testator's intent for her grandchildren to receive an interest following the death of their parent); Hampson, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 1062-63 (court permissibly struck a provision that violated the rule against perpetuities because it could be done without affecting the scheme of the settlor). The proposition cited by the remainder beneficiaries, however, is limited to situations where a court is construing an ambiguous or inconsistent instrument and trying to harmonize clauses while avoiding an unreasonable or absurd construction.

  3. In re Estate of Julian

    227 Ill. App. 3d 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Upholding dismissal of complaint containing an undue influence claim where plaintiff failed to allege with specificity how the beneficiary overcame the testator's will and failed to allege that the beneficiary directly participated in the procurement or execution of the will

    When applying the rules of construction, a court may insert or delete words in order to arrive at that intent. Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Schwartz (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 324, 329, 458 N.E.2d 151, 154. In this appeal, petitioners rely primarily on two cases.

  4. Harris Trust Savings Bank v. MacLean

    186 Ill. App. 3d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 4 times
    In MacLean (186 Ill. App.3d 882, 542 N.E.2d 943), which, though a 1989 case, was decided before the amendment became effective, the court addressed the question of whether certain adopted children could properly take under a clause which stated that, upon the termination of the trust the principal "shall go to and be divided between my lawful issue then surviving, per stirpes."

    ( Larison, 117 Ill.2d 444, 512 N.E.2d 1251.) Courts may also resort to rules of construction, or judicial presumptions, to determine the meaning of an instrument's terms, but only where the intent of the testator cannot be ascertained from the language of the instrument. Harris Trust, 118 Ill.2d 1, 513 N.E.2d 833; Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Schwartz (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 324, 458 N.E.2d 151. In 1925, a rule of construction was applied in Smith v. Thomas (1925), 317 Ill. 150, 147 N.E. 788, to interpret a will, silent as to the testator's intent with regard to adopteds, where the testator was not the adopted parent of the adopted child.