Upon grounds of public policy, jurors will not be heard by deposition, affidavit, or other sworn statement to impeach their verdict. C., R.I. P. R. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1116. Error from District Court, Tulsa County; Conn Linn, Judge.

er v. Berne Hardware Co., 64 Ind. App. 473, 116 N.E. 54; Beaubien v. Detroit United Ry., 216 Mich. 391, 185 N.W. 855; May v. City of Atlanta, 9 Ga. App. 391, 71 S.E. 499; Bauwens v. Goethals, 187 Ill. App. 563; Gregory v. Bijou Theater Co., 138 App. Div. 590, 122 N.Y.S. 1085; Messinger v. Antokolitz, 74 Misc. 588, 134 N.Y.S. 555. Noble v. Key Syst., 10 Cal.App.2d 132, 51 P.2d 887; Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578, 54 P.2d 1169; Walter v. Ayvazian, 134 Cal.App. 360, 25 P.2d 526; Bennett v. Nazzaro, 144 Misc. 450, 258 N YS. 828, affirmed 237 App. Div. 866, 261 N.Y.S. 1018; Williams v. Slaughter, 159 Okla. 254, 15 P.2d 27; Bourre v. Texas Co., 51 R.I. 254, 154 A. 82; Corbin v. McCrary, 22 Ga. App. 472, 96 S.E. 445; Johnson v. Smith, 118 Wn. 146, 203 P. 56; Pittsburgh, C.C. St. L. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 168 Ind. 467, 80 N.E. 415; Waltham Piano Co. v. Freeman, 159 Iowa 567, 141 N.W. 403; Broadway Bldg. Co. v. Saladino, 81 Misc. 73, 142 N.Y.S. 1076; Johnson v. Seel, 26 N.D. 299, 144 N.W. 237; Chicago R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161. In the instant case, there is before us nothing — not even the affidavit of counsel for defendant.

This rule is based on public policy and is enforced for the purpose of preventing litigants and the public from invading the privacy of the jury room. This court so held in Baumle v. Verde, 50 Okla. 609, 150 P. 876; Egan v. First National Bank of Tulsa, 67 Okla. 168, 169 P. 621; C., R. I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161; Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273, 292 P. 356. Upon an examination of the entire record, we fail to find any prejudicial error which would affect the result in this case and cause a reversal.

The question of whether or not the property involved was permanently affixed to the building at the time same was purchased by the plaintiff is a question of fact, in this case to be determined by the jury, and the finding of the jury in this regard will not be disturbed if such finding is reasonably supported by competent evidence. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161; Swindler v. Selby, 130 Okla. 294, 267 P. 471, and many other cases to the same effect decided by this court. An examination of the record reveals that the evidence on that point is conflicting, but we have concluded that there is ample testimony in the record supporting the verdict and conclusion reached in this regard.

In support of this ground for new trial, counsel for plaintiff attached to the motion his affidavit in which he stated one of the jurors, after the trial, stated to him that he had seen plaintiff in company with Hopper on numerous occasions; that people of the community knew she was going with him, and it was a rotten deal; that from what he knew he could not render a verdict for plaintiff. The trial court committed no error in overruling the motion on this affidavit, as it was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing misconduct on the part of the juror. In the case of C., R.I. P. Ry. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161, the court said: "Statements made by a juror after the trial of a case to or in the presence of defendant's attorney, tending to show that such juror was an incompetent juror, cannot be shown by the testimony of such attorney."

The jury having found that Ludlow was entitled to recover, it follows that such right was based upon section 5013, or section 5031, supra, and the amount due him would be payable within a reasonable time after the obligation on the part of Stewart arose. In their motion for a new trial counsel for plaintiff in error attacked the manner in which the jury arrived at its verdict and insist that the court erred in rejecting the testimony of one of the jurors offering to show the manner in which the verdict was arrived at. This question has been before this court so often that a discussion of the authorities is useless and we will rest the matter by referring counsel to the following authorities: C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1116; Egan v. First Nat. Bank 67 Okla. 168, 169 P. 621; City of Oklahoma City v. Stewart, 76 Okla. 211, 184 P. 779; Hale v. Streeter, 91 Okla. 107, 216 P. 154. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In reaching this conclusion I have also examined the following cases which bear on different phases of the question involved: Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 614, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, 56 L. ed. 1114; Einung v. Schlopkohl, 129 Minn. 9, 151 N.W. 273; State v. Rand, 170 Iowa, 25, 151 N.W. 1078; State v. Brannon, 133 La. 1027, 63 So. 507; State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 100 S.W. 587; State v. Linn, 223 Mo. 98, 122 S.W. 679; State v. Shearon (Mo.), 183 S.W. 293; State v. OBrien, 35 Mont. 482, 10 Ann. Cas. 1006 (note not on this point), 90 P. 514; People v. Sidwell, 29 Cal.App. 12, 154 Pac. 290; Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okl. 173, 154 Pac. 1161; People v. Kromphold, 172 Cal. 512, 157 P. 599; State v. Long, 93 S.C. 502, 77 S.E. 61; Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 46, 224 S.W. 637; Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1262 (note not on this point), 148 S.W. 543; Douglas v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. 122, 137 Am. St. 930, 124 S.W. 933; Green v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 211 Mo. 18, 109 S.W. 715; Patterson v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 297, 140 S.W. 1128; State v. Aker, 54 Wn. 342, 18 Ann. Cas. 972 (note not on this point), 103 P. 420; People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 11 N.E. 1077; State v. English, 41 S.D. 560, 172 N.W. 116; State v. Lyle, 105 Wn. 435, 178 P. 468; State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41; Phillips v. R.I. Co., 32 R.I. 16, 78 Atl. 342, 31 L.R.A., N.S., 930.

iven in the mortgage held by the First National Bank of Stillwater, and, in view of the evidence that the First National Bank of Cushing, through its employes, was aware of the fact that Bell claimed to have purchased the property mortgaged to plaintiff from McConkey, the description in the mortgage held by the First National Bank of Stillwater was certainly sufficient to put plaintiff upon inquiry. It has frequently been held by this court that in a civil action, triable to a jury, when there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict of the jury, and no prejudicial errors of law are shown in the instruction of the court, or in rulings on law questions presented during the trial, the verdict and finding of the jury will not be disturbed on appeal. National Lumber Co. v. Elred, 77 Oklahoma; Iowa National Bank v. Citizens National Bank of Woodsocket, R. I., 70 Oklahoma, 172 P. 924; First National Bank of Laramie, Wyo., v. Jenkins, 65 Oklahoma, 166 P. 690; Chicago, R. I. . P. R. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161; Critser v. Steeley, 62 Oklahoma, 162 P. 795. The appeal in this cause, in so far as the same affects the Atchison, T. S. F. R. Co., has been heretofore dismissed, and, after consideration of the case and finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

In fact, we are inclined to think that the weight of the evidence, considering all the circumstances in the case is in favor of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this fact, we are not at liberty to disturb the verdict, for it is well settled in this jurisdiction that, if there is competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict of the jury, although it is in direct conflict with all the other evidence in the case that the same will not be disturbed on appeal. Rumbaugh v. Rumbaugh, 39 Okla. 445 135 P. 937; Wade v. Ray, 41 Okla. 641, 139 P. 116; Chicago, R.I. P. R. Co. v. Brown 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161; Proctor v. Capps 67 Okla. 130, 169 P. 894. Counsel for plaintiff in error does not take issue with this rule, but insists in a very earnest argument that the testimony of Mrs Regan is contradicted and impeached by the witnesses for the plaintiff and the other circumstances in the case, and that her testimony is unworthy 'of belief.

The case-made having been amended so as to correct the errors shown by the original case-made, that the petition admitted that there was a credit of $675 upon the note sued upon, and such credit not being shown by the case-made as amended, and there being no evidence of any admission on the part of the plaintiff admitting such credit, the contention and argument of the defendant that the plaintiff is bound by the admission made upon said petition of said credit is without force. The evidence being in conflict as to all the issues in the case, and there being sufficient evidence to support the judgment rendered by the trial court, we are powerless to disturb it. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 55 Okla. 173, 154 P. 1161; Thompson v. Vaught, 61 Okla. 195, 160 P. 625; Gilkeson v. Callahan, 62 Okla. 45, 161 P. 789. This cause is affirmed.