Illinois courts have repeatedly affirmed the principle that public officials are trustees with a fiduciary duty to the people. ( Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181; Brown v. Kirk (1976), 64 Ill.2d 144, 355 N.E.2d 12; City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane (1976), 64 Ill.2d 559, 357 N.E.2d 452.) A public official owes to his principal duties of absolute loyalty and fidelity, and occupies a position of the highest public trust. See People v. Bordeaux (1909), 242 Ill. 327, 89 N.E. 971; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 623, 344 N.E.2d 540.

Wood, 142 Ill. at 280-81, 31 N.E. at 683, quoting H. Wood, Wood on Limitations § 276 (1882). Wood has been approved of and followed by our supreme court in Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 563, 402 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1980). In Kenroy, the Chicago Park District initiated eminent domain proceedings to acquire a parcel of land owned by the defendants. Kenroy, 78 Ill. 2d at 558, 402 N.E.2d at 183.

As a general rule, mere silence on the part of the defendant and a failure by the plaintiff to learn of the cause of action are not enough to establish fraudulent concealment. Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 561, 402 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1980). However, there is an exception to this general rule when there is a fiduciary or trust or other confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

Equity will assume jurisdiction and impose a constructive trust to prevent a person from holding for his own benefit an advantage gained by the abuse of a fiduciary relationship. ( Perry v. Wyeth (1962), 25 Ill.2d 250, 253.) At the time the tax assessments were reduced on the dealership property, Lavin and Erskine, in their capacities relating to the assessment and levying of taxes, were acting as fiduciaries for the people of Cook County. (See Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 555, 564-65, and cases cited therein.) If a fiduciary acquires title to property by virtue of that relation, equity will regard him as a trustee of the legal title ( Doner v. Phoenix Joint Stock Land Bank (1942), 381 Ill. 106, 113-14; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 623, 628), and the fiduciary responsibility of a public official cannot be considered less than that of a private person ( City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane (1976), 64 Ill.2d 559, 565). Constructive trusts have been recognized as a proper remedy where a public official has breached his fiduciary responsibilities ( Village of Brookfield v. Pentis (7th Cir. 1939), 101 F.2d 516; Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 555; City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane (1976), 64 Ill.2d 559; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 623; cf. Fuchs v. Bidwill (1976), 65 Ill.2d 503), and, considering the allegations, the plaintiff here properly sought relief in equity. That Lavin reduced the tax assess

In Illinois, a five-year statute of limitations applies to an action for constructive trusts. ( Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 555, 560-61; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13-205.) However, the operation of the statute of limitations is tolled if a party can prove that some fraud prevented the discovery of the cause of action.

Cangemi v. Advocate South Suburban Hospital , 364 Ill. App. 3d 446, 461, 300 Ill.Dec. 903, 845 N.E.2d 792 (2006) (" ‘ "[T]he fraudulent concealment must have been that of the party sought to be charged, and a mere allegation of proof that it was the act of his agent will not be sufficient, unless he is in some way shown to have been instrumental in or cognizant of the fraud." ’ " (quoting Wood v. Williams , 142 Ill. 269, 280-81, 31 N.E. 681 (1892), quoting Horace G. Wood, Wood on Limitations § 276 (1882))); see also Chicago Park District v. Kenroy Inc. , 78 Ill. 2d 555, 563, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980) (citing Wood , 142 Ill. at 280-81, 31 N.E. 681, with approval). ¶ 44 This same principle has been applied to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. For example, in Barbour v. South Chicago Community Hospital , 156 Ill. App. 3d 324, 325, 108 Ill.Dec. 862, 509 N.E.2d 558 (1987), the plaintiff sued the defendant hospital alleging that, while she was a patient receiving an abortion, a tubal ligation was also performed, without her consent or knowledge.

735 ILCS 5/13-215. Generally, fraudulent concealment applies where the defendant commits affirmative acts or makes representations designed to conceal the cause of action, Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 555, 37 Ill. Dec. 291, 294, 402 N.E.2d 181, 184 (1980), and the plaintiff exercises due diligence in discovering the cause of action, Marvel Eng'g Co. v. Matson, Driscoll D'Amico, 150 Ill.App.3d 787, 103 Ill.Dec. 631, 636, 501 N.E.2d 948, 953 (1986). However, silence can constitute fraudulent concealment if the defendant owes a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff:

The court held that Burciaga, as a fiduciary, had "a duty to reveal the facts giving rise to the cause of action and that his silence when he ought to speak, or his failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is as much a fraud at law as an affirmative false representation or act." 359 Ill. App. 3d at 551, citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 555, 562 (1980). Though the appellate court believed that Burciaga's failure to disclose the true state of affairs would have been sufficient, alone, to invoke the provisions of section 13-215, the court noted that Burciaga had "affirmatively misled [plaintiffs] in the spring of 1992 by telling them that their case was `going very well'" when in fact the trial court had dismissed their medical malpractice action and this court had affirmed the dismissal in February of 1992. 359 Ill. App. 3d at 551.

¶ 82 However, there is an exception to the rule that silence alone does not amount to fraudulent concealment if a fiduciary, trust or other confidential relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant (alternatively called a "special relationship"). Wisniewski, 406 Ill.App.3d at 1154, 347 Ill.Dec. 753, 943 N.E.2d 43 (citing Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 Ill.2d 555, 561, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980) ). "[W]hen such a relationship exists, the person occupying the position of fiduciary or of confidence is under a duty to reveal the facts to the plaintiff, and his silence is as fraudulent as an actual affirmative false representation or act." Wisniewski, 406 Ill.App.3d at 1154, 347 Ill.Dec. 753, 943 N.E.2d 43 (citing Chicago Park District, 78 Ill.2d at 562, 37 Ill.Dec. 291, 402 N.E.2d 181 ). "Silence by a person in a position of trust concerning the facts giving rise to a cause of action amounts to fraudulent concealment.

Marvel Engineering Co. v. Matson, Driscoll D'Amico (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 787, 796. • 2 As the parties agree, this action for common-law fraud is governed by the five-year statute of limitations (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13-205; Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 555, 560). The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that an injury has occurred and that it was wrongfully caused.