¶ 56 Next, we address whether CRE proved the second factor in section 212(B)'s exemption for independent contractors, that Mr. Park's services were provided outside of all CRE's places of business. Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill.App.3d 101, 292 Ill.Dec. 59, 825 N.E.2d 315 (2005), is instructive. Chicago Messenger Service (CMS) was a messenger delivery service that utilized couriers to pick up, transport, and deliver packages.
The Board, on the other hand, argues that this is the quintessential mixed question of law and fact reviewable under the deferential clearly erroneous standard of review. Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 107 (2005); Carpetland USA, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369 (2002). A reviewing court is to take an administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact as prima facie true and correct, and when examining an administrative agency's factual findings, a reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
A mixed question of law and fact is subject to an intermediate standard of review, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 392 (2001); Manning, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 557; Moss, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 984; Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 106 (2005). The "clearly erroneous" standard of review "is largely deferential to the agency decision."
It is undisputed and beyond doubt that BeavEx's delivery drivers performed work in the usual course of BeavEx's package and delivery business. See AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 198 Ill.2d 380, 406 (2001) (courier companies' usual course of business is delivery of packages); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App.3d 101, 107 (1st Dist. 2005) (undisputed that couriers performed services that were integral to and within the usual course of courier company's business).
client's homes, which resulted in profits for enterprise); Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201 Ill.2d 351, 391, 267 Ill.Dec. 29, 776 N.E.2d 166 (2002) (customers' homes where workers took measurements for floor covering enterprise were places of business because “place of business extends to any location where workers regularly represent its interest,” and, thus, when measurers visit customers' premises to take measurements necessary for quoting prices and closing sales, they represent enterprise's interests); L.A. McMahon Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 392 Ill.Dec. 131, 32 N.E.3d 131, 142 (Ill.App.2015) (customers' homes where workers washed windows for enterprise providing window washing services were places of business because “[a]n employing unit's place of business extends to any location where workers regularly represent its interests,” and window washers represented enterprise interests when they worked at customers' homes); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill.App.3d 101, 115–16, 292 Ill.Dec. 59, 825 N.E.2d 315 (roadways on which workers drove vehicles were places of business for enterprise providing courier service involving pick up and delivery of packages from one location to another), appeal denied, 215 Ill.2d 594, 295 Ill.Dec. 519, 833 N.E.2d 1 (2005); McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Commission, 714 A.2d 818, 823 (Me.1998) (logging sites at which worker harvested timber for timber management and marketing enterprise were places of business because enterprise had “significant and business-related presence at the location” due to its “contractual relationship with the landowner, its interest in the timber on the property, and its physical presence on the property,” and, accordingly, “the property was within [the] business territory [of the enterprise]”); Vermont Institute of Community Involvement, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 140 Vt. 94, 99, 436 A.2d 765 (1981) (offsite locations where adjunct faculty taught courses for educational institution were places of b
Other states with statutes almost identical to § 11-10-210 have addressed the issue of what constitutes a "place of business." In Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 825 N.E.2d 315 (Ill.Ct.App. 2005), the appellate court of Illinois held that an employer's couriers were employees, rather than independent contractors, for the purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Act. THE court stated:
AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 398 ("Because the inability to satisfy any one [section 212] condition will defeat an employer's claim for an independent-contractor exemption," the court found it only necessary to consider one section 212 condition.); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 105 (2005). The burden of proof is on the party seeking the exemption.
¶ 35 The Act sets forth the three Section 212 conditions in the conjunctive and, therefore, all three conditions must be satisfied for the independent-contractor exemption to apply. AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 398 ("Because the inability to satisfy any one [Section 212] condition will defeat an employer's claim for an independent-contractor exemption," the court found it only necessary to consider one Section 212 condition); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 105 (2005). The burden of proof is on the party seeking the exemption.
Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 211 (2008). Under these circumstances, the fact finder examines the legal effect of a given set of facts and the fact-finding is inseparable from the application of law to those specific facts. Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 106-07 (2005). This standard is largely deferential toward the agency rendering the decision and the decision will be reversed only when it is clearly erroneous.
home care for elderly while in client's homes, which resulted in profits for enterprise); Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 391, 776 N.E.2d 166 (2002) (customers' homes where workers took measurements for floor covering enterprise were places of business because "place of business extends to any location where workers regularly represent its interest," and, thus, when measurers visit customers' premises to take measurements necessary for quoting prices and closing sales, they represent enterprise's interests); L.A. McMahon Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 32 N.E.3d 131, 142 (Ill. App. 2015) (customers' homes where workers washed windows for enterprise providing window washing services were places of business because "[a]n employing unit's place of business extends to any location where workers regularly represent its interests," and window washers represented enterprise interests when they worked at customers' homes); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 115-16, 825 N.E.2d 315 (roadways on which workers drove vehicles were places of business for enterprise providing courier service involving pick up and delivery of packages from one location to another), appeal denied, 215 Ill. 2d 594, 833 N.E.2d 1 (2005); McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Commission, 714 A.2d 818, 823 (Me. 1998) (logging sites at which worker harvested timber for timber management and marketing enterprise were places of business because enterprise had "significant and business-related presence at the location" due to its "contractual relationship with the landowner, its interest in the timber on the property, and its physical presence on the property," and, accordingly, "the property was within [the] business territory [of the enterprise]"); Vermont Institute of Community Involvement, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 140 Vt. 94, 99, 436 A.2d 765 (1981) (offsite locations where adjunct faculty taught courses for educational institution were places of business even thou