g evidence and passing upon the question of the preponderance thereof which make his duty in the first instance entirely different from that of an appellate tribunal as a court of review, for at the appellate level we have only the record and briefs exemplified by the cold type before us. Hinds, Executor, etc. v. McNair et al., supra, and cases cited. Re trial courts' duty to weigh conflicting evidence, credibility of witnesses, etc., see also Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Baker (1920), 190 Ind. 633, 128 N.E. 836; The Cincinnati, Hamilton and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Madden (1893), 134 Ind. 462, 34 N.E. 227, at p. 469; State ex rel Conner v. Pritchard, Judge, supra; Christy v. Holmes, supra; George H. Hammond Co. v. Schweitzer (1887), 112 Ind. 246, 13 N.E. 869; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, supra; Borenstein, Admr. v. Uhl, supra; State ex rel. Winslow v. Fisher, Clerk (1941), 109 Ind. App. 644, 37 N.E.2d 280; Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. v. Harrell, supra; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Rans (1927), 86 Ind. App. 300, 154 N.E. 876; Lewis v. The State, supra. "The appellant contends that the trial court failed to state with particularity its specific reasons for granting the motion for new trial under stated reason #1 filed herein which reads as follows:
There are many things the trial judge must take in consideration in determining the weight of conflicting evidence and passing upon the question of the preponderance thereof which make his duty in the first instance entirely different from that of an appellate tribunal as a court of review, for at the appellate level we have only the record and briefs exemplified by the cold type before us. Hinds v. McNair, supra, and cases cited. Re trial courts' duty to weigh conflicting evidence, credibility of witnesses, etc., see also Cleveland, etc., R.R. v. Baker (1920), 190 Ind. 633, 128 N.E. 836; Cincinnati, etc., R.R. v. Madden (1893), 134 Ind. 462, 34 N.E. 227, at p. 469; State ex rel. Conner v. Pritchard, supra; Christy v. Holmes, supra; George H. Hammond Co. v. Schweitzer (1887), 112 Ind. 246, 13 N.E. 869; Borenstein v. Uhl, supra; State ex rel. Winslow v. Fisher (1941), 109 Ind. App. 644, 37 N.E. 280; Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. v. Harrell, supra; Chicago, etc., R.R. v. Rans (1927), 86 Ind. App. 300, 154 N.E. 876; Lewis v. State, supra.'"
ting evidence and passing upon the question of the preponderance thereof which make his duty in the first instance entirely different from that of an appellate tribunal as a court of review, for at the appellate level we have only the record and briefs exemplified by the cold type before us. Hinds, Executor, etc. v. McNair et al., supra, and cases cited. Re trial courts' duty to weigh conflicting evidence, credibility of witnesses, etc., see also Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Baker (1920), 190 Ind. 633, 128 N.E. 836; The Cincinnati, Hamilton and Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Madden (1893), 134 Ind. 462, 34 N.E. 227, at p. 469; State ex rel. Conner v. Pritchard, Judge, supra; Christy v. Holmes, supra; George H. Hammond Co. v. Schweitzer (1887), 112 Ind. 246, 13 N.E. 869; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, supra; Borenstein, Admr. v. Uhl, supra; State ex rel. Winslow v. Fisher, Clerk (1941), 109 Ind. App. 644, 37 N.E.2d 280; Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. v. Harrell, supra; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rans (1927), 86 Ind. App. 300, 154 N.E. 876; Lewis v. The State, supra. "He may know that the particular jury is grossly ignorant and stupid, or that it is bright and capable . . . This same jury is, to us, twelve typewritten names.