Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that “[a] lis pendens is appropriate where ‘there exists a proceeding that may affect good title to the property.'” [471] 2 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 996 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ill. App. 2013)).
“[A]ffirmative matter” is “ ‘in the nature of a defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.’ ” Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510, ¶ 11, 374 Ill.Dec. 597, 996 N.E.2d 44 (quoting In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill.2d 456, 461, 283 Ill.Dec. 707, 808 N.E.2d 995 (2004) ). A forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right.
This argument is underdeveloped. Both sides discuss only one case, Chicago Title Insurance v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 996 N.E.2d 44, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510. In Chicago Title, the Illinois Appellate Court noted that "no Illinois case law * * * provides insight into the nature of a special warranty deed," which led it to rely on other "[j]urisdictions that frequently employ special warranty deeds [to] inform [its] analysis of the issues."
In Illinois,current year real estate taxes are billed and payable in the following year. Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510, ¶ 33. ZFIP's petition for tax deed stated that the "[property] was sold for non-payment of general taxes and/or special assessments for the year 2007 and/or prior years." ZFIP was assigned a tax lien for the 2008 special assessment, i.e., the 2007 taxes that were assessed in 2008 and never paid.
defects arising before it acquired title or require U.S. Bank to extinguish all encumbrances on the property at the time of the conveyance to plaintiff. See Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510, ¶ 17. The special warranty deed provided for an exception to the warranties and limited U.S. Bank's liability for Sakash's claims against the title.
Although we do not condone a party's failure to abide by such requirements, we note that Rule 341 does not limit this court's jurisdiction, and we will thus nonetheless consider the arguments that Zubel raises on appeal in order to ensure a just result. See, e.g., Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510, ¶ 25. We note that section 15-1504's references to facts in support of a shortened redemption period and facts in support of a request for appointment of a receiver are contained in subsections (a)(3)(O) and (a)(3)(R), respectively. 735 ILCS 5/15-1504(a)(3)(O), (a)(3)(R) (West 2010).
Although we do not condone a party's failure to abide by such requirements, we note that Rule 341 does not limit this court's jurisdiction, and we will thus nonetheless consider the arguments that Zubel raises on appeal in order to ensure a just result. See, e.g., Chicago Title Insurance v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2013 IL App (1st) 123510, ¶ 25. We note that section 15-504's references to facts in support of a shortened redemption period and facts in support of a request for appointment of a receiver are contained in subsections (a)(3)(O) and (a)(3)(R), respectively. 735 ILCS 5/15-504(a)(3)(O), (a)(3)(R) (West 2010).