Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-cv-2369.
September 30, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a prisoner incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. For the reasons which follow, the Court recommends that the petition be dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 8, 1986, following a sentencing hearing before the Honorable Angelo Guarino of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, petitioner was sentenced to seven and a half to twenty years for a rape conviction. At sentencing, the court gave petitioner credit for time served prior to the date his sentence was imposed. Philadelphia County Prisons informed the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections that petitioner had been confined on the instant charges before the sentence date, from March 21, 1985 to December 17, 1985, which totaled eight months and twenty-six days. In an effort to ensure petitioner received credit for time served, the Department of Corrections set the effective date of petitioner's sentence as April 12, 1985, which was eight months and twenty-six days before the sentence was imposed. Thus, the minimum sentence was to expire on October 12, 1992, and the maximum sentence was to expire on April 12, 2005. Petitioner did not directly appeal his conviction nor did he file any other type of petition concerning his conviction or sentence.
On June 1, 2004 petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that, with the credit given to him by the sentencing court, his maximum date should have been set at July 22, 2004. Petitioner believes he was given ten months of credit.
Respondents now allege several defects in the current petition. As a primary matter, they assert that the petition is time barred by the one year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Further, they contend that petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and could not do so now, thereby making the petition procedurally defaulted. Finally, they assert the claim raised by petitioner is not cognizable in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court takes each argument in turn.
II. TIMELINESS
Respondents' first argument asserts that the entire petition for writ of habeas corpus is untimely. This Court agrees.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, ("AEDPA"), enacted April 24, 1996:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; . . .
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (1996). If direct review of a criminal conviction ended prior to the statute's effective date, then under Third Circuit precedent, a prisoner has a one-year grace period subsequent to the effective date of April 24, 1996 to commence a habeas action. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998).
The statute also sets forth two other potential starting points for the running of the statute of limitations, as follows:
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; . . .28 U.S.C. sec. 2244(d)(1). As the petition does not allege any facts which indicate that any of these other starting points should be used, the Court does not consider them.
In the case at bar, although this Court was not provided with sufficient information to determine the exact date petitioner's conviction became final, the information available allows us to confidently conclude that petitioner's conviction became final before the federal statute of limitations went into effect. Furthermore, petitioner was aware of his sentence and the credit given to him on or around the date of his sentencing, which was January 8, 1986. As all these events occurred prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, petitioner had a one year grace period, from April 24, 1996, to file his federal habeas petition. He did not do so, however, until May 25, 2004, seven years after this deadline expired. Because petitioner failed to seek habeas relief in an expedient manner, we must deem the instant petition untimely.
Petitioner's sentencing hearing was on January 8, 1996. As petitioner concedes that he neither filed a direct appeal of his conviction nor seek state post-conviction review, his conviction had to be final prior to the AEDPA effective date.
While the statute of limitations in the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling, such relief is proper only when the "principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair." Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). The petitioner "must show that he or she exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims." Id. at 618-19 (internal quotation omitted). Petitioner has not put forth any explanation for the seven year delay in filing his petition, let alone a reason constituting extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, we decline to exercise our equitable tolling powers.
III. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
By way of a second argument, respondents contend that petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted. The procedural default barrier, in the context of habeas corpus, precludes federal courts from reviewing a state petitioner's habeas claims if the state court decision is based on a violation of state procedural law that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553, reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991). "If [a] petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would not find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is procedural default for the purpose of federal habeas . . ."Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1; McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999).
In this matter, respondents correctly note that petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies, as he has never filed any type of state petition for review. Since his time for doing so has long expired under the applicable state statutes, his habeas petition is procedurally defaulted in its entirety and cannot be considered by this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(a).
IV. COGNIZABILITY OF CLAIMS
Finally, respondents contend that even if this Court were to deem the petition timely, the claim raised in the petition is not cognizable in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon consideration of the pertinent jurisprudence, the Court finds merit to this argument.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) a federal habeas court only has jurisdiction to review a habeas claim alleging that a petitioner is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21, 96 S.Ct. 175, 177, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092, 96 S. Ct. 888 (1976). A federal habeas court cannot reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991). Federal jurisprudence is well-established that interpretation of state statutes regarding credit for time served is a matter of state concern and is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Travis v. A.L. Lockhart, 925 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim for failure to receive pre-sentence jail time credit was "not a proper function of a federal court under its habeas corpus jurisdiction") Travis v. A.L. Lockhart, 925 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a claim for failure to receive pre-sentence jail time credit was "not a proper function of a federal court under its habeas corpus jurisdiction"); Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1980) ("the origin of the modern concept of pre-conviction jail time credit upon the term of the ultimate sentence of imprisonment is of legislative grace and not a constitutional guarantee."); Beto v. Sykes, 403 F.2d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 1968) (a federal habeas petitioner's contentions as to when his sentence began to run and the amount of pre-sentence credit he should have received are matters for the state court to consider); Hoover v. Snyder, 904 F. Supp. 232, 234 (D. Del. 1995) (interpretation of state crediting statutes is a matter of state concern and is not a proper function of a federal habeas court).
In the case at bar, petitioner's claim regarding the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' application of his pre-conviction credit requires a determination of state law. No federal constitutional claim is implicated as petitioner is not challenging the legality of the sentence imposed by the court or alleging the unconstitutional deprivation of credit against a term of imprisonment. Rather, he is merely seeking to have the Department of Corrections correct his sentencing records to reflect what he presumes to be actual sentence imposed by the court. Consequently, petitioner's claim concerning the application of jail time credit is not a proper claim for federal habeas review.
A claim of unconstitutional deprivation of credit against a term of imprisonment is a cognizable habeas corpus claim.Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973). Petitioner makes no such claim here.
According to the records before this Court, petitioner did receive the credit originally given to him by the sentencing judge for time served. The sentencing was on January 8, 1986. Petitioner was given eight months and twenty-six days of credit. In order to account for the credit, the Department of Corrections set the effective date back eight months and twenty-six days, which was April 12, 1985. As such, the petitioner's maximum sentence was set at twenty years after April 12, 1985, which is April 12, 2005.
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this day of September, 2004, IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED. There is no probable cause to issue a certificate of applicability.