Mosier v. State, 218 Ga. App. 586, 586(1)(3) ( 462 S.E.2d 643) (1995).Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 13(7) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982). OCGA § 16-13-49(w) provides: "For good cause shown, the court may stay civil forfeiture proceedings during the criminal trial resulting from a related indictment or information alleging a violation of this article."

See Jones v. State, 232 Ga. App. 505 ( 502 S.E.2d 345) (1998) (failure to object when evidence is offered constitutes waiver of objection). Moroever, the trial judge's findings of fact indicate that the presence of animals was not a factor affecting her decision to transfer custody to the father. See Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 11 (3) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982) ("Harm as well as error must be shown before reversal is appropriate"). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.

Moreover, admissions of a party in a civil matter should not be treated as evidence against the party unless shown to have been authorized by him. See Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 13 (7) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982). The complaint for forfeiture did not constitute an admission by Cooper to drug-related activity.

Thus, the search of his room was a prohibited general search. Similar arguments were unsuccessfully made in Daugherty v. State, 171 Ga. App. 95 (4) ( 318 S.E.2d 803) (1984) and Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10 (1) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982). "`The courts of this state have often held that searches of persons not named in a search warrant but found on the premises to be searched are illegal absent independent justification for a personal search.'"

Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by stating on the record the manner in which he instructed the parties as to the terms of the consent order, such error was rendered harmless by the duly admitted, substantially cumulative testimony of appellee regarding such instructions. See Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 14 ( 290 S.E.2d 117); accord Platt v. Nat. Gen. Ins. Co., 205 Ga. App. 705, 710 (1) ( 423 S.E.2d 387). 6. The appellate standard of review of a criminal contempt conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

As the pertinent testimony of appellee's expert conveyed substantially the same information to the jury as contained in the relevant portions of defendant's exhibit no. 10, we are satisfied that had any error occurred in failing to admit the exhibit, such error would be harmless within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-61. Nalley Motor Trucks v. Cochran, 200 Ga. App. 487, 488 ( 408 S.E.2d 501); see Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 14 ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (concurring opinion). 3.

First, such "admissions" are not ipso facto inadmissible. See, e.g., 134 Baker Street, Inc. v. State, 172 Ga. App. 738 (5) ( 324 S.E.2d 575) (1984); Chester v.State, 162 Ga. App. 10 (7) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982); Bell v. State, 129 Ga. App. 783 (6) ( 201 S.E.2d 340) (1973). Second, the statements of counsel objected to here were never allowed in evidence, nor did the court rule that they would be allowed in rebuttal; thus appellant fails to show how he was "improperly pressured" or "indirectly threatened" by the actions of the trial court or the state.

4. Appellant also claims that the search of her purse, in which the marijuana and oxazepam was discovered, was unauthorized because she was not named in the search warrant, and the purse was obviously not a possession of Bankston, the person named in the warrant. A similar argument was unsuccessfully made in Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10 (1) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982). This case, like Chester, can be distinguished from cases such as Hawkins v. State, 165 Ga. App. 278 ( 300 S.E.2d 224) (1983); Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613 ( 281 S.E.2d 349) (1981); and Hayes v. State, 141 Ga. App. 706 ( 234 S.E.2d 360) (1977), inasmuch as the latter cases concerned visitors on the searched premises and not the owner thereof.

As previously stated, defendant made no objection at trial to the admission into evidence of the testimony of the state's handwriting expert. As a court for the correction of errors of law we may not consider defendant's objection to the admission of this testimony raised for the first time on appeal. Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10, 12 (4) ( 290 S.E.2d 117); Brown v. State, 161 Ga. App. 55, 57 (3) ( 289 S.E.2d 9). 4. State's exhibits numbers 8 and 9 were used for comparison purposes during the testimony of the state's handwriting expert.

It is well established that appellate courts may not consider objections to evidence not raised at trial. See Marable v. State, 247 Ga. 509 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 52) (1981); Chester v. State, 162 Ga. App. 10 (4) ( 290 S.E.2d 117) (1982). "If several parties are entitled to make an objection, and it is made by any number less than all, it does not inure to the advantage of the party or parties not joining in it."