Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 P. 640, 35 ALR 872. Terms of elective municipal officers fixed by statute cannot be vitiated by a recall election conducted under a municipal ordinance, but where, and only where, a municipal charter, prevailing over statutes in purely municipal concerns, authorizes recall elections, they are locally permissible under the law. Chesney v. Jones, 31 Okla. 363, 126 P. 715. The City of Comanche being a non-charter municipality they are unable to enact recall elections and therefore the decision of the City Clerk holding the initiative petition invalid is affirmed.
Hence, whenever any board, tribunal, or person is by law vested with authority to decide a question, such decision, when made, is res adjudicata, and as conclusive of the issues involved in the decision as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general jurisdiction. Monroe v. Beebe, 10 Okla. 581, 64 P. 10; Board of Co. Com'rs v. State ex rel. Cobb, 31 Okla. 196, 120 P. 913; Norris v. Cross, Secretary of State, 25 Okla. 287, 105 P. 1000; Roberts v. Marshall, 33 Okla. 716, 127 P. 703; Chesney, City Clerk, v. Jones, 31 Okla. 363, 126 P. 715; Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okla. 619, 143 P. 331, L. R. A. 1915B, 233. In the latter case, which is similar to the case at bar, it was held:
People v. Los Angeles, 133 Cal. 338, 65 P. 749; Bd. Com'rs v. State ex rel. Cobb, 31 Okla. 196, 120 P. 913; Norris v. Cross, 25 Okla. 287, 105 P. 1000; Montgomery v. State Elec. Bd., 27 Okla. 324, 111 P. 447; McKee v. Adair Elec. Bd., 36 Okla. 258, 128 P. 294; Roberts et al. v. Marshall et al., 33 Okla. 716, 127 P. 703. In the case of Chesney v. Jones, 31 Okla. 363, 126 P. 715, wherein a provision of a city charter was involved similar to the provision here, this court, speaking of the duty of the city clerk, said: "Under paragraph B of section 10, he is required to determine whether the requisite number of qualified electors have signed the petition by certain specific means, to wit, by examining the petition, the registration books, and election returns.
HOWEVER, ONE AREA THAT IS FAIRLY WELL UNDERSTOOD IS THAT A CHARTER MUNICIPALITY DOES HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE STRUCTURE AND FORM OF ITS CITY GOVERNMENT. ID, AT P. 176. IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT HOME-RULE MUNICIPALITIES HAVE THE POWER TO REGULATE BY CHARTER PROVISION THE MANNER OF SELECTING THEIR OFFICERS AND THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF SUCH PERSONS. ADLER V. JENKINS, 124 P. 29 (OKLA. 1912). SIMILARLY, IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE GROUNDS AND METHODS TO BE PROVIDED FOR RECALL OF THOSE OFFICERS ARE MATTERS OF PURELY LOCAL CONCERN. CHESNEY V. JONES, 126 P. 715 (OKLA. 1912); DUNHAM V. ARDERY, 143 P. 331 (OKLA. 1914). GIVEN THE DRIFT OF THE PAST RULINGS ON ESTABLISHING BOARD MEMBERSHIP REQUIREMENTS AND RECALL METHODS, PARTICULARLY THE DUNHAM RULING, IT IS MY OPINION THAT A CHARTER MUNICIPALITY CAN LAWFULLY DEVIATE FROM THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF STATE LAW ON THE SUBJECT. ACCORDINGLY, THERE WOULD BE NO INFIRMITY IN THE VALIDITY OF THE LOCAL DEL CITY CHARTER PROVISION IN QUESTION.