Cherry v. Andrews, 229 N.C. 333, 49 S.E.2d 641; Chesson v. Container Co.., 223 N.C. 378, 26 S.E.2d 904; Brown v. Broadhurst, 197 S.E. 738, 150 S.E. 355; Brown v. Buchanan, 194 N.C. 675, 140 S.E. 749; Bradshaw v. Lumber Co., 172 N.C. 219, 90 S.E. 146; Yelverton v. Coley, 101 N.C. 248, 7 S.E. 672; Carr v. Askew, 94 N.C. 194. But a party to a compulsory reference waives his right to a jury trial by failing to take the proper steps to save it. Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 225 N.C. 165, 33 S.E.2d 866; Baker v. Edwards, 176 N.C. 229, 97 S.E. 16; Robinson v. Johnson, 174 N.C. 232, 93 S.E. 743; Drug Co. v. Drug Co., 173 N.C. 502, 92 S.E. 376. In order to preserve his right to a jury trial in a compulsory reference where the referee's report is adverse to him, a party must comply with each of these procedural requirements:

And "a party who would preserve his right to a jury trial in a compulsory reference must object to the order of reference at the time it is made, and on the coming in of the report of the referee, if it be adverse, he should seasonably file exceptions to particular findings of fact made by the referee, tender appropriate issues based on the facts pointed out in the exceptions and raised by the pleadings, and demand a jury trial on each of the issues thus tendered," — Stacy, C.J., in the case of Cotton Mills v. Maslin, 200 N.C. 328, 156 S.E. 484. See also Booker v. Highlands, 198 N.C. 282, 151 S.E. 635; Brown v. Clement Co., 217 N.C. 47, 6 S.E.2d 842; Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 225 N.C. 165, 33 S.E.2d 866; Penland v. Church, 227 N.C. 699, 41 S.E.2d 654; Cherry v. Andrews, 229 N.C. 333, 49 S.E.2d 641, and numerous other cases. In Brown v. Clement Co., supra, on the subject of the requirements of the rule as to preserving right to trial by a jury in a compulsory reference case, Barnhill, J., speaking for the Court, had this to say: "Notwithstanding an order of reference, a determination of the issues of fact raised by the pleadings and the evidence in the case remains as the primary purpose.

New trial. Cited: Richardson v. Cotton Mills, 190 N.C. 874; Kearney v. Thomas, 225 N.C. 165; Perry v. Trust Co., 226 N.C. 670; Supply Co. v. Rozzell, 235 N.C. 634; Elliott v. Killian, 242 N.C. 475.

Anderson, however, has no standing to raise this issue since the case at hand involves the preliminary consideration of Anderson's qualification as administrator of Fairley's estate, not a representation of Fairley's interests by the administrator of her estate. In defending his own status, Anderson did not step "in the shoes of" the decedent, Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 225 N.C. 165, 168, 33 S.E.2d 866, 867 (1945), and thus attain the privity required to argue estoppel, Rich, 256 N.C. at 329, 123 S.E.2d at 815. For the purposes of this proceeding, Anderson remained a stranger to the marriage between McRae and Fairley and McRae's and Fairley's subsequent conduct in relation to this marriage and thus did not have standing to assert estoppel against McRae.