Opinion
A150133
02-22-2017
CHERYL H., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LAKE COUNTY, Respondent; LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Lake County Super. Ct. No. JV-320426)
The juvenile court denied Cheryl H. (Mother) reunification services, pursuant to the bypass provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), and set a section 366.26 hearing for Mother's daughter, Natalie. Mother has filed a petition seeking extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court's order. She argues: (1) substantial evidence does not support the court's finding, made pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) (hereafter section 361.5(b)(13)), that she has resisted court-ordered substance abuse treatment; (2) the juvenile court erred in declining to appoint an expert to assess her amenability to treatment; and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by declining to find that providing services would be in Natalie's best interest (§ 361.5, subd. (c)). We deny the petition.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 361.5 provides, in relevant part: "(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), . . . whenever a child is removed from a parent's . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the child's mother . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (b) Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) That the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability that is described in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the Family Code and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services. [¶] . . . [¶] (13) That the parent . . . has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court's attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan required by Section 358.1 on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible. [¶] . . . [¶] (c)(1) In deciding whether to order reunification in any case in which this section applies, the court shall hold a dispositional hearing. The social worker shall prepare a report that discusses whether reunification services shall be provided. When it is alleged, pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), that the parent is incapable of utilizing services due to mental disability, the court shall order reunification services unless competent evidence from mental health professionals establishes that, even with the provision of services, the parent is unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for the child within the time limits specified in subdivision (a). [¶] (2) The court shall not order reunification for a parent or guardian described in paragraph (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), or (17) of subdivision (b) unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child."
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dependency Petition
In February 2015, the Lake County Department of Social Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on Natalie's behalf. The petition alleged Natalie was at substantial risk of harm (§ 300, subd. (b)) due to Mother's severe and untreated mental health issues. On the day of Natalie's birth, five days earlier, Mother told hospital staff that, if they did not induce labor, she would go home and drink alcohol and had also reportedly stated she would kill herself and her baby. After Natalie's birth, Mother was transported to a psychiatric hospital, on a section 5150 hold, due to her irrational and delusional thought processes. It was further alleged Mother could not come up with a safety plan for Natalie either during her hospitalization, or once she was released from the psychiatric hospital, leaving Natalie without provision for support (§ 300, subd. (g)). Natalie was detained in foster care.
Jurisdiction Report and Hearing
The jurisdiction report, filed February 25, 2015, indicated Mother had a history of suicidal and homicidal ideation, had been seen in crisis care multiple times, and hospitalized twice. Mother "often threaten[ed] to assault" her own mother (maternal grandmother), yet continued to reside on her parents' property. Mother said that, throughout her pregnancy, "she was sensing evil, she was sensing being touched inappropriately and was . . . hearing the voices of past family members." Mother was present at the jurisdiction hearing, signed a waiver of rights, and submitted on the report. The juvenile court found the allegations against Mother to be true.
Disposition Report and Hearing
In the disposition report, filed on April 8, 2015, the Department discussed Mother's history of drug and alcohol abuse that, in combination with her mental health issues, jeopardized Natalie's safety. During an interview, Mother told the social worker that "she has used 'crystal meth' since she was 21 years old but that she has not used any drugs for 2 years." However, in the period following Natalie's birth and removal, Mother had taken four drug tests. The first was positive for methamphetamine and alcohol. The three most recent tests had been negative. Mother consistently and attentively visited with Natalie, attended weekly therapy and parenting classes, and had completed an intake session with Alcohol and Other Drugs Services (AODS). She was assessed, by her counselor, to have a low probability of a substance use disorder.
Mother also reported living in a small trailer, without running water, on her parents' property. Mother initially denied having any mental health needs and claimed, "she did not know why people believed she did." However, Mother later admitted she had visions others could not see and explained she had seen "the end of the world" and "a whole bunch of meteors coming down on Earth." Mother reported that maternal grandmother told a nurse she was afraid of Mother, believing Mother would physically hurt her.
Despite Mother's continued denial of mental health issues and her refusal to take psychotropic medication, the social worker found Mother's mental health issues were being addressed in therapy and "no longer hinder[ed Mother's] ability to appropriate[ly] care for [Natalie]." The social worker recommended Natalie be returned to Mother's care and that Mother be provided family maintenance services.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered Natalie returned to Mother's care and ordered family maintenance services. Specifically, Mother was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and a medication assessment, follow any treatment plan identified, submit to random drug and alcohol testing, attend regular therapy and parenting classes, and participate in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program.
Six-Month Review Report and Hearing
On October 16, 2015, the Department filed a status review report stating Mother's overall participation in services had "mostly been adequate." She completed a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed with dissociative and schizoaffective disorders, methamphetamine abuse (in remission), and a personality disorder with passive and schizoid features. She had also completed a medication evaluation with a tele-psychiatrist, who recommended Seroquel, but she refused to take the prescribed psychotropic medication. She graduated from an outpatient substance abuse program (AODS) in July 2015, and consistently attended therapy and parenting classes. Mother's therapist reported Mother was stable, having suffered no additional suicidal episodes, but "was not engaged in therapy in any deep or meaningful way."
Other than one positive test for methamphetamine on May 6, 2015, Mother tested negative throughout her treatment program with AODS. After completing the AODS program, Mother reported drinking alcohol in August, and then tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines on September 4, 2015. On September 14, Mother admitted using methamphetamine on another recent occasion. As a result, Mother began a more intensive substance abuse treatment program—the Healthy Opportunities for Mothering Experiences (HOME) program. Meanwhile, Natalie appeared healthy, was meeting developmental milestones, and was described as a "cheery, smiling child," who looked to Mother for guidance and emotional cues.
The Department recommended an additional six months of family maintenance services. In making that recommendation, the social worker observed: "Although [Mother] may have tested . . . low on the addiction scale (as was reported by the intake worker with AODS), drug and alcohol use exasperates [sic] [Mother's] mental health condition . . . and emotional stability, which is the Department's primary concern." At the six-month family maintenance review, on October 26, 2015, six additional months of family maintenance services were ordered.
12-Month Review Hearing
On April 1, 2016, the Department filed a status review report, which indicated Mother was in "substantial" compliance with her case plan. She was expected to graduate from HOME and had tested negative for all nonprescribed drugs during this period. Natalie was healthy and developing appropriately. On the Department's recommendation, dependency jurisdiction was terminated on April 11, 2016.
Second Dependency Petition
Unfortunately, on June 23, 2016, the Department received a report that Mother tested positive for amphetamines when she took a pregnancy test at a health clinic. Mother also said she was hearing voices and "people [were] raping [her] all day long." Mother declined an offer for a psychological consult, stating, "They think I am crazy and they just want to lock me up."
On July 7, 2016, a social worker visited Mother and Natalie at their home. Mother met the social worker at the gate and led her back to her trailer, where Natalie had been playing unsupervised for an unknown period of time. Mother told the social worker she was "tired" of "dealing with what [she was] dealing with" and had almost called the social worker to "just come and get [Natalie]." When asked what she was "dealing with," Mother said she was " 'sick' of smelling like 'balls' and 'semen' all day long' " and she felt as if she was being molested by people she could feel and hear, but not see. Mother stated the voices began after Natalie was born and "maybe it is her fault." Mother confirmed she was not taking any psychotropic medication and was no longer receiving any behavioral health services. When asked about her willingness to participate in a mental health evaluation, Mother said she did not need any help and was "fine."
Mother was transported to a hospital for a section 5150 evaluation. During the assessment, Mother said she called police the previous day to report being raped "by a spirit." She also reported calling the Department and stating "come get my baby or else" she would hurt people. Mother admitted smoking methamphetamine several days earlier and appeared to be experiencing a drug-induced psychosis.
Natalie was once again removed from Mother's care and, on July 11, 2016, the Department filed a second section 300 petition. The petition alleged that, due to untreated mental health issues and substance abuse, Mother was unable to adequately supervise or provide appropriate care for Natalie. The petition also alleged that, despite knowledge of the maternal grandfather's history of sexually abusing minors, Mother left Natalie in his care. Natalie was detained in foster care.
Jurisdiction Report and Hearing
On July 27, 2016, the Department filed its jurisdiction report indicating Mother again tested positive for methamphetamine on July 15 and July 22. The jurisdiction report also stated, "[Mother's] history as a minor is particularly concerning and relevant because at the time of removal [Mother and Natalie] were living on the same property as [the maternal grandfather] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Additionally, [Mother] admitted to recent methamphetamine use and stated that, when she is using, she leaves her young child in the care of [the maternal grandparents], which is concerning due to the maternal grandfather's history of sexually abusing both [Mother] and her brother when they were minors." At the jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g).
Disposition Report and Hearing
On August 30, 2016, the Department filed its disposition report recommending reunification services be bypassed, pursuant to section 361.5(b)(13), based on Mother's resistance to court-ordered substance abuse treatment. Specifically, the Department asserted Mother failed to maintain sobriety despite her completion of two court-ordered treatment programs during the initial period of dependency jurisdiction—AODS and HOME. The matter was set for a contested disposition hearing.
Mother's counsel sought funds for appointment of two expert witnesses, one to assess Mother's amenability to drug treatment and another to assess the bond between Mother and Natalie. The juvenile court denied Mother's request. On November 14, 2016, the Department filed a supplemental disposition report, which disclosed that, in October, Mother stated, "I don't think I need rehab because I don't see myself as an addict." She also stated: "I could pick up and use and then put it down. . . . I am not in denial just because I state that I am not an addict." Mother went on to threaten, "if you don't give me my kid back I am going to hurt someone and end up in prison, so you can either save [two] lives by giving my kid back or save [one] life." The supplemental report also noted that, when asked to reflect on her triggers or reasons for using drugs, Mother said she did not want to talk about it and alternately "blamed the hospital for creating this problem" and "[the] spirits [who] were harassing her."
The contested dispositional hearing was held on November 17, 2016. The juvenile court admitted Department service logs reporting Mother's verbal abuse of the Department's office assistant, as well as additional statements Mother made to the social worker regarding "spirits" who were harassing her. On one occasion, Mother told the social worker she was sensing "a presence" and that she wanted it to leave her alone "or she was going to kill someone." The service logs also included evidence of positive and regular visits between Natalie and Mother, as well as complaints from the foster parent that "Natalie has some anger problems." Specifically, the foster parent reported Natalie hits herself and says "bad baby," when told "no." Mother also submitted evidence showing that, on the day after the Department made its bypass recommendation, she reenrolled in the HOME drug treatment program and had negative drug tests thereafter. The HOME program recommended Mother concurrently address her substance abuse and mental health issues.
Mother characterized her recent use of methamphetamine as a simple relapse, "followed by a prompt rededication to sobriety and to treatment." On this basis, she maintained the Department failed to meet its burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of her resistance to drug treatment. In the alternative, Mother argued reunification services should be granted, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c), because they were in Natalie's best interest. Natalie's counsel joined in the Department's recommendation that reunification services be bypassed. The Department also argued reunification services would not be in Natalie's best interest because Mother also had serious unaddressed mental health concerns.
Mother's counsel objected: "[The Department is] not attempting to bypass under a mental health provision of the bypass statute [(§ 361.5, subdivision (b)(2))]. They're attempting to bypass based on resistance to drug treatment. So the mental health issues which have been mentioned are not relevant in regards to resistance to drug treatment. If [the Department] wanted to bypass based on those, then [it] should have attempted to bypass based on that provision. [¶] However, in regards to the success of drug treatment, . . . the Home program has referred [Mother] to dual treatment for both substance abuse and co-occurring mental health issues."
On December 5, 2016, the juvenile court declared Natalie a dependent child, removed her from Mother's custody, and denied reunification services. The court ruled the Department had shown, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother resisted prior court ordered treatment, pursuant to section 361.5(b)(13). The juvenile court observed that Mother was in deep denial of her drug problem and had "not committed to getting away from methamphetamine." The court said, "When I look at all of this evidence and I put it together, this is not a mere relapse; rather, it's an indication of ongoing use." Additionally, the court found Mother had not shown it was in Natalie's best interest to provide reunification services. The juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for March 1, 2017. This writ proceeding followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In her writ petition, Mother argues evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's denial of reunification services pursuant to section 361.5(b)(13). Mother also maintains the juvenile court erred in declining to appoint an expert to assess her amenability to treatment and abused its discretion by declining to find that providing services would be in Natalie's best interest (§ 361.5, subd. (c)). Mother's arguments are not persuasive and we affirm the court's bypass order.
The propriety of an order denying reunification services is usually a factual issue reviewed for substantial evidence. (D.B. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 197, 203; Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) However, when the facts are essentially undisputed and the issue on appeal is primarily a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. (D.B., at p. 203.) "In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact." (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.) A. Bypass of Reunification Services
" 'It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the importance of reunification in the dependency system.' " (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217.) Thus, "[t]here is a presumption in dependency cases that parents will receive reunification services. [Citation.] Section 361.5, subdivision (a) directs the juvenile court to order services whenever a child is removed from the custody of his or her parent unless the case is within the enumerated exceptions in section 361.5, subdivision (b)." (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 95.)
"Section 361.5, subdivision (b) lists a number of situations in which reunification services are likely to be futile and need not be offered to a parent. [Citation.] These exceptions to the general rule reflect a legislative determination that in certain situations attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve the child's interests. [Citation.] When the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that one of the enumerated situations exists (§ 361.5, subd. (b)), reunification services shall only be ordered if 'the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child' (§ 361.5, subd. (c))." (D.B. v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 202.) "Section 361.5 reflects the Legislature's desire to provide services to parents only where those services will facilitate the return of children to parental custody." (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470.)
The section 361.5(b)(13) exception has multiple prongs. First, the parent must have "a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol." Second, the Department must also show the parent either (a) "has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court's attention," or (b) "has failed or refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan required by Section 358.1 on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available and accessible." (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
Mother does not deny that her drug use is extensive, abusive, and chronic and instead focuses on the sufficiency of the second prong evidence. However, numerous cases have held that "resist[ance] to prior court-ordered treatment" may be shown by evidence the parent participated in court-ordered treatment but then later, and within three years prior to the filing of the current petition, returned to substance abuse. (See, e.g., In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 382; In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1402-1403; Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1008; Laura B. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 776, 780; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73.) Resistance to treatment may be "easiest to prove if the facts demonstrated that the parent entered one or more available programs during the relevant period only to drop out repeatedly without completing them. But . . . the concept of resistance does not require opposition to treatment by direct action." (Laura B., at p. 780.) Although experiencing a brief relapse and immediately resuming treatment does not constitute resistance, evidence of resistance "may also come in the form of resumption of regular drug use after a period of sobriety." (Ibid.)
"The common definition of 'resist' . . . encompasses both active and passive behavior. Thus, a parent can actively resist treatment for drug or alcohol abuse by refusing to attend a program or by declining to participate once there. The parent also can passively resist by participating in treatment but nonetheless continuing to abuse drugs or alcohol, thus demonstrating an inability to use the skills and behaviors taught in the program to maintain a sober life. In either case, a parent has demonstrated a resistance to eliminating the chronic use of drugs or alcohol which led to the need for juvenile court intervention to protect the parent's child. In other words, the parent has demonstrated that reunification services would be a fruitless attempt to protect the child because the parent's past failure to benefit from treatment indicates that future treatment also would fail to change the parent's destructive behavior." (Karen S. v. Superior Court, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.)
Here, Mother's resistance to treatment within a three-year period prior to the July 2016 filing of the second dependency petition is shown by her participation in two court-ordered substance abuse treatment programs—AODS and HOME—followed by her documented use of methamphetamine in May and September 2015, and in June and July 2016. A rational fact finder could reasonably infer from this evidence that Mother did more than relapse, she returned to regular use. In fact, Mother does not argue that the timing and pattern of her documented drug use is inadequate to show resistance. Rather, she focuses on the actions she took after the August 2016 bypass recommendation and contends the section 361.5(b)(13) finding must be reversed because the Department "provided no expert testimony that [Mother] would not be successful" and "was unable to show clear and convincing evidence that services would be a fruitless attempt." This is not the standard. (See Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 164 [once the Department has established a parent is within one of the enumerated subdivisions of section 361.5, subd. (b), and has "present[ed] the court with information about the prognosis for a successful reunification, it is not required to prove the services will be unsuccessful"].) In any event, Mother's continued unwillingness or inability to admit that she even has any need for drug rehabilitation only bolsters the conclusion that further efforts are unlikely to be successful. Her return to HOME, in late August 2016, does not dispel that conclusion, as she only resumed treatment after the bypass recommendation was made. It is not unreasonable to infer that Mother's current compliance could merely be a repetition of her prior pattern of passive resistance. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding Mother has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs and has resisted prior court-ordered treatment during a three-year period immediately before the filing of the second dependency petition.
In an attempt to avoid this result, Mother also insists the court erred in applying section 361.5(b)(13) "when the core issue . . . is [M]other's mental health, not substance abuse." She suggests the bypass order fails because it was not supported by evidence satisfying the requirements of section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(2) and (c)(1). Mother did not raise this argument before the juvenile court and has therefore forfeited it. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) In any event, as her counsel explicitly argued below, the requirements of section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(2) and (c)(1) are irrelevant because the Department never recommended bypass under those provisions; the Department's recommendation and the court's order were clearly premised on section 361.5(b)(13).
Mother cites no authority supporting her implicit proposition—that because she suffered from both mental health and substance abuse issues, the Department had the burden to satisfy the requirements of both the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) and (b)(13) exceptions. The statute makes clear that reunification services are properly denied if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the circumstances in subdivision (b) applies. (§ 361.5, subd. (b) ["[r]eunification services need not be provided . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following [exceptions]" (italics added)]; Randi R. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 72 [reviewing court is not required to determine whether findings under alternate subsection of § 361.5, subd. (b) are correct where it upholds a juvenile court's determination that another subsection applies].) B. Appointment of Expert
Mother misplaces her reliance on Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, which addressed the reasonableness of services provided to a mentally ill parent. That case does not address section 361.5(b)(13) in any respect.
In a continuation of her attempt to merge subdivisions (b)(2) and (b)(13) of section 361.5, Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request for the appointment of an expert to assess her amenability to drug treatment. She asserts, "In a case such as [this], where [Mother]'s co-occurring mental illness is wholly intertwined with her substance use, the opinion of an expert is necessary to assess [her] ability to meaningfully participate in treatment." We have no quarrel with Mother's assertion that the two serious issues are likely linked, but we cannot agree with Mother's unsupported assertion that expert opinion was required to bypass services under section 361.5(b)(13).
Mother did not argue, either before the juvenile court or in her petition for extraordinary relief, that her proposed expert testimony would be relevant to the issue of Natalie's best interest. --------
Appointment of an expert to make a factual determination is unnecessary unless "it appears to the court . . . that expert evidence is or may be required." (Evid. Code, § 730.) Contrary to Mother's suggestion, Mother's amenability to treatment going forward is not directly at issue under section 361.5(b)(13). Rather, the Legislature has made clear that a parent's past resistance to court-ordered substance abuse "treatment," within the last three years, is a situation in which reunification services are likely to be futile and need not be offered to a parent. (§ 361.5(b)(13).) The statute " 'reflect[s] a legislative determination that an attempt to facilitate reunification between a parent and child generally is not in the minor's best interests when the parent is shown to be a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatment for drug abuse.' [Citation.] Experience tells us that such a parent has a high risk of reabuse." (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228.) The statute thus allows the court "to identify parents who, due to their history of substance abuse and resistance to treatment in the face of penal or other legal sanctions, are unlikely to benefit from reunification services." (D.B. v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 204, italics added.) The court had before it ample evidence of Mother's history with respect to prior substance abuse treatment attempts. Mother's proposed expert testimony was not required to assist the court and it was not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to deny Mother's request. C. Natalie's Best Interest
Mother also argues that, even if substantial evidence supports the section 361.5(b)(13) bypass, the court should have ordered services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c) because she resumed drug treatment, tested negative for several months, and has a positive bond with Natalie.
A juvenile court has broad discretion in determining whether further reunification services would be in a child's best interest. (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523.) An appellate court will reverse that determination only if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. (Id. at pp. 523-524.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
It is the parent's burden to "affirmatively show that reunification would be in the best interest" of the child. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66.) "The concept of a child's best interest 'is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.' " (Ibid.) The factors to consider include "a parent's current efforts and fitness as well as the parent's history"; "[t]he gravity of the problem that led to the dependency"; the relative strength of the bonds between the children and the parents and between the children and the caretakers; and "the child[ren]'s need for stability and continuity." (Id. at pp. 66-67.)
It is clear that Mother and Natalie have a strong bond. But even considering that bond and the most favorable evidence in the record regarding Mother's renewed efforts at sobriety, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining it would not be in Natalie's best interest to provide reunification services. The juvenile court cited many instances of Mother's recurring threats to harm Natalie and others, and there remains no indication Mother's mental health issues are being treated, or that Mother would accept treatment. The court also expressed concern that Mother had been leaving Natalie in the care of her maternal grandfather, despite the maternal grandfather's sexual abuse of Mother and her brother when they were minors in his home. Furthermore, the evidence showed Mother's pattern of failure to seriously address her significant, long-term, substance abuse problems. Finally, Natalie is only two years old.
Our legislature has recognized time is of the essence in establishing permanence for children under three years of age. (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846-847.) Given Mother's continuing denial of her significant substance abuse and mental health issues, the juvenile court reasonably could find Mother's recovery will be a lengthy process. Thus, the court could reasonably find that granting reunification services to Mother would be detrimental to Natalie, despite their apparent bond, because it is extremely unlikely Mother would be able to reunify with Natalie within an abbreviated timeframe. In reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining services were not in Natalie's best interest.
III. DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied on the merits. Because the section 366.26 hearing is set for March 1, 2017, our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
BRUINIERS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
JONES, P. J. /s/_________
SIMONS, J.