Opinion
No. 3D19-359
04-22-2020
Kenzie N. Sadlak, P.A., and Kenzie N. Sadlak, Coral Gables, for appellant. McGuireWoods LLP, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias and Emily Y. Rottmann and Brittney L. Difato (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Kenzie N. Sadlak, P.A., and Kenzie N. Sadlak, Coral Gables, for appellant.
McGuireWoods LLP, and Sara F. Holladay-Tobias and Emily Y. Rottmann and Brittney L. Difato (Jacksonville), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Creamer v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 159 So. 3d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Because the written agreements ... refer to costs and attorney's fees separately, the trial court properly denied the request for attorney's fees under rule 1.420."); see also Boxer Max Corp. v. Cane A. Sucre, Inc., 905 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion in not finding prevailing party and not awarding attorney's fees where parties entered into settlement agreement); Zhang v. D.B.R. Asset Mgmt., Inc., 878 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (determining record supported trial court's findings that parties agreed to resolution of disputed issues and affirming denial of fees finding there was no prevailing party for purposes of entitlement to fees); Kelly v. Bankunited, FSB, 159 So. 3d 403, 406-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (affirming denial of prevailing party attorney's fees under section 57.105, as statute's purpose is to deter misuse of judicial system and discourage needless litigation and declining to penalize lender with substantial attorney's fees for dismissing claims that had become moot for reasons unrelated to merits of litigation).