Opinion
(June Term, 1841.)
1. Where a sheriff or other officer sells under a valid execution, it is no objection to the little of the purchaser that, in his deed of conveyance, he mis-recites the execution.
2. Where a clerk issued an execution, tested on the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday of September, in the year of our Lord 1833, and in the fifty-seventh year of our independence, and indorsed thereon that the execution actually issued on 5 February, 1833, and the coroner also indorsed that it was levied on 21 February, 1833, the court must see that the dating of the writ, as to the Christian era, was a misprision of the clerk, and will correct it accordingly.
TRESPASS quare clausum fregit, tried at Spring Term, 1841, of BEAUFORT, before Bailey, J. On the trial it became necessary for the plaintiff to show title in himself to the locus in quo. In deducing his title he gave in evidence a judgment against one Stephen Owens, obtained at Fall Term, 1832, of Beaufort, an execution issued thereon to the coroner of Beaufort against Stephen Owens, who was then sheriff of that county, a levy on the land in question and a sale by the coroner to Benjamin Runyun, who received a conveyance from the coroner, and then conveyed to the plaintiff. The teste of the execution was as follows: "Witness, James B. Ellison, clerk of said court, at office, the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday of September, 1833, and the 57th year of our independence." Signed by the clerk. And the indorsement of the clerk of the writ, as required by law, "Issued 5 February, 1833." The levy of the coroner indorsed on the execution was dated "21 February, 1833." The coroner's deed of conveyance recited (439) a sale under an execution against Stephen Owens, corresponding as to amount with the judgment above mentioned, but "returnable to Spring Term, 1833." The defendant objected that the execution set forth in the coroner's deed did not correspond with the execution levied upon the land, which objection his Honor overruled, and under the instruction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. There was a rule for a new trial, which was discharged, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.
No counsel for either party.
The objection taken on the trial to the derivation of title on the part of the plaintiff is because of a supposed discrepancy between the execution, recited in the coroner's deed, and the execution under which the coroner made the levy and sale. This objection presupposes and admits that the officer had a valid authority to sell, but insists that his deed was invalid to convey the land sold, because in the deed his authority was inaccurately recited. The question presented by this objection is not with us an open question. The objection was deliberately considered by this Court in Hatton v. Dew, 7 N.C. 260, and overruled. His Honor, therefore, properly overruled it in this case.
But upon a comparison of the execution recited in the deed with that under which the officer sold, as they are both set forth in the transcript, the alleged discrepancy will be found not to exist. The execution under which the officer sold is tested the fifth Monday, after the fourth Monday of September, in the year of our Lord 1853, and in the 57th year of our independence, and is made returnable to the term of said court to be held on the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday of March next. This, it is said, must be the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday of March, 1834, whereas the coroner's deed recites the execution as returnable on the fifth Monday after the fourth Monday of March, 1833. But it is manifest that there is a clerical misprision in the date of (440) the execution with respect to the years of the Christian era. This appears not only from the year of independence thereunto subjoined, but from the indorsation of the clerk, that the execution actually issued on 5 February, 1833, and of the coroner, that it was levied on 21 February, 1833. Goodman v. Armistead, 11 N.C. 19, and Dowell v. Vannoy, 14 N.C. 43, are authorities to show that such a misprision will be corrected by these indicia of truth. Thus corrected, the execution is tested of the Fall Term, 1832, and the deed truly represents it as returnable to the Spring Term, 1833.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
Cited: Bailey v. Morgan, 44 N.C. 355.