Cherry v. Burnett

4 Citing cases

  1. Chaudhry v. Prince George's County, Md.

    626 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1985)   Cited 11 times

    This is not a case in which an employee of a state agency has alleged under § 1983 that he has not been hired or that he has been discharged because of the exercise by him of his First Amendment rights. See Cherry v. Burnett, 444 F. Supp. 324 (D.Md. 1977); Ollman v. Toll, 518 F. Supp. 1196 (D.Md. 1981). Plaintiff voluntarily resigned as Chairman of the Department of Internal Medicine.

  2. Ollman v. Toll

    518 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Md. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    It is well established that a state university may not refuse to employ a prospective member of its faculty if the decision is made by reason of the exercise by the applicant of constitutionally protected First Amendment rights. Cherry v. Burnett, 444 F. Supp. 324 (D.Md. 1977); see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Marxist or Communist beliefs, like other political beliefs, are protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and such beliefs or one's association with others holding them is protected activity for which a state may not impose civil disabilities such as exclusion from employment by a state university.

  3. University of Baltimore v. Iz

    123 Md. App. 135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)   Cited 34 times
    Recognizing that collegiality is a valid consideration for tenure review, but may not be used as pretext for discrimination

    Id. 504 A.2d at 256-57 (emphasis added); see also Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 875 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[T]he initial decision to grant tenure, like various other academic matters, typically calls for the exercise of subjective judgment, confidential deliberation, and personal knowledge of both the candidate and the university community."); Shaw v. Board of Trustees, 549 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1976) ("[W]e will not second guess [school boards] on matters within their discretion that do not rise to the level of constitutional deprivations."); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Of all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal court supervision."); Erickson v. New York Law Sch., 585 F. Supp. 209, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Cherry v. Burnett, 444 F. Supp. 324, 332 (D.Md. 1977) ("[I]t is not the function of a federal court to second-guess the decision of a school official on matters within his discretion which do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation."); Henry v. Delaware Law Sch., 1998 WL 15897, No. CIV.A. 8837, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1998) (noting reluctance of courts to become engaged in second-guessing an academic institution's decision to deny tenure).

  4. Charles Co. Empl. Loc. Un. v. Bd. of Educ

    427 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    I Although it is clear beyond peradventure that public employees have a First Amendment right to promote, associate with, and be represented by labor unions, Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 60 L.Ed.2d 360 (1979); see Cherryv. Burnett, 444 F. Supp. 324, 330 (D. Md. 1977), it is nevertheless equally plain that the First Amendment does not afford public employees a right of collective bargaining as such; that is, the Constitution does not impose an affirmative obligation on public employers to either recognize, bargain with, or otherwise respond to employee organizations. Smith, supra; see Newport News Fire Fighters Association Local 794 v. City of Newport News, Virginia, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972).