An alien who has suffered past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution and thus to be entitled to a grant of asylum. Chen v. Lynch , 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Singh v. Holder , 750 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2014) ). Morales contends that the BIA erred in concluding that the level of mistreatment he suffered—because it involved only a single beating followed by threatening phone calls—did not rise to the level of mistreatment that could qualify as persecution.
Gao's sole detention was neither systematic nor frequent, and "a single detention, even one accompanied by beatings and threats ... does not necessarily rise to the level of persecution." Jinan Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016) ; see Anacassus v. Holder, 602 F.3d 14, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[I]solated beatings, even when rather severe, do not establish systematic mistreatment needed to show persecution." (quoting Wiratama v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) )).
Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Vasiliv.Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2013)).
Further, this court has affirmed the BIA's finding of no past persecution on facts more egregious than these. In Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2016), this court upheld the BIA's determination of no past persecution even though the petitioner "was beaten and subsequently taken to the police station where he was placed in custody, interrogated, further assaulted, and threatened with forced sterilization." See id. at 42-43.
This injury required only outpatient medical treatment which does not indicate persecution. See Jinan Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2016) (whether the petitioner required hospitalization for his injuries "bears on the 'nature and extent' of his injuries and is certainly 'relevant to the ultimate determination.' ") (quoting Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2013)).
To qualify for asylum, an applicant "must demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group." Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (stating that establishment of past persecution on account of a protected ground creates a rebuttable presumption of well-founded fear of future persecution); Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2017) (explaining that a non-citizen "who has suffered past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution and thus to be entitled to a grant of asylum" (citing Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016))). "Where a private actor, rather than the government itself, is alleged to be the persecutor, the applicant must demonstrate 'some connection' between the actions of the private actor and 'governmental action or inaction.'
Because the petitioners have not met the standard for asylum, they "necessarily cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal." Jinan Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Attia v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2007)). As for the CAT claim, while the adverse credibility determination does not necessarily doom this claim, Wen Feng Liu v. Holder, 714 F.3d 56, 61 n.1 (1st Cir. 2013) ("[A]n adverse credibility finding that is fatal to an asylum application is not automatically fatal to a CAT claim."),
The petitioner " 'can meet this burden through proof of past persecution, which creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution' or by demonstrating 'a well-founded fear of persecution through an offer of specific proof that [her] fear is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.' " Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Singh, 750 F.3d at 86). The petitioner must also demonstrate that one of the five protected grounds is at least " 'one central reason' for the harm alleged."
The petitioners " 'can meet this burden through proof of past persecution, which creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution' or by demonstrating 'a well-founded fear . . . through an offer of specific proof that [their] fear is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.' " Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Singh, 750 F.3d at 86). Under either form of proof, the petitioners must demonstrate that one of the five protected grounds is at least "one central reason for the harm alleged."
Likewise, he has not adduced evidence that Chinese authorities are even aware of the articles' existence. See Jinan Chen v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner did not establish well-founded fear of future persecution, as he "was not an officer or a director in the CDP [USA] and, although he had attended rallies and classes, his only concrete links to the organization were a few pro-CDP [USA] articles posted on the group's website—a website that boasts thousands upon thousands of similar writings"). Plus, those view totals reflect the count as of November 2015, when Lin submitted a brief in support of his appeal to the BIA.