Opinion
For Junan Chen, Kelly Yao Wang, Changshuang Wang, Jinshuang Liu, Lichu Chen, Wenquei Hong, Plaintiffs: David M Angeloff, Patrick McNicholas, McNicholas and McNicholas LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Inna S Demin, Todd B Becker, Becker Law Group, Long Beach, CA.
For County of Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office, Defendants: Mary Pat Barry, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of County Counsel, Santa Barbara, CA.
For Capri Apartments at Isla Vista, Defendant: Christopher A Kanjo, Eugene J Egan, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Manning and Kass Ellrod Ramirez Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA.
For Asset Campus Housing, Defendant: Stephen Harold Fleischer-Ihn, William S Kronenberg, Kronenberg Law PC, Oakland, CA.
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING MOTION BY DEFENDANT HI DESERT MOBILE HOME PARK L.P. TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED MAY 20, 2015 [FILED 6/11/2015; DOCKET NO. 50]
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On June 11, 2015, Defendant Hi Desert Mobile Home Park L.P. (erroneously sued as " Capri Apartments at Isla Vista") (" Defendant") filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint Filed May 20, 2015 (" Motion"). On June 22, 2015, Plaintiffs Junan Chen, Kelly Yao Wang, Changshuang Wang, Jinshuang Liu, Lichu Chen, and Wenquei Hong (collectively, " Plaintiffs") filed their Opposition. On June 29, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court finds that this matter is appropriate for decision without oral argument. The hearing calendared for July 13, 2015 is hereby vacated and the matter taken off calendar. After considering the moving, opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. " A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a 'lack of a cognizable legal theory' or 'the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F.Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). However, " [w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations and alterations omitted). " [F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and must construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). " However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations." Summit Technology, 922 F.Supp. at 304 (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 567, 70 L.Ed.2d 474 (1981)).
" Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). However, a court may consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., id.; Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the Court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (" Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.").
The Court finds that the issues raised by Defendant are more appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.