Opinion
Civil No. 00-1623 ADM/AJB
August 20, 2001
John G. Shulman, Esq., Shulman Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, appeared for and on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Robert G. Haugen, Esq., Johnson Lindberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, appeared for and on behalf of the Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 19, 2001, Defendant Minar Ford, Inc., ("Defendant") argued before the undersigned United States District Judge its Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10]. Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Ira J. Chemers' ("Chemers") claims of discrimination based on religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.03. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied in part and granted in part.
The facts must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant on a summary judgment motion. Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 1998).
In July 1996, Defendant, a Twin Cities car dealership, hired Chemers as a lease renewal manager. Chemers Dep., at 25-26. His supervisors regarded Chemers as an outstanding employee and he received positive performance evaluations. See Sullivan Aff. Ex. H. Bob Lewis, who was Chemers' supervisor, believed that as a lease renewal manager, Chemers had "no equal in this town" and the high lease renewal rates at the dealership were largely due to Chemers' efforts. Lewis Dep., at 10-11. Cushman Minar, the owner of the car dealership, asserted that Chemers was one of the best lease managers he had ever seen. Minar Dep., at 58. Lewis elevated Chemers to sales manager, where he continued to receive positive performance evaluations. See Lewis Dep., at 12; Sullivan Aff. Ex. H.
On October 25, 1999, Defendant discharged Lewis from his position as general sales manager. Lewis Dep., at 4-5, 18. One month later, Defendant promoted Chemers to general sales manager, a position at the dealership that is second only to the owner. Minar Dep., at 7-8. Minar elevated Chemers to this rank after observing whom within the organization would best perform there. Id. at 65. Chemers' elevation to top management did not lack tribulation, however. Christian religious belief permeated the atmosphere at the car dealership. Minar is a devout Christian who held optional daily prayer sessions for employees. See Minar Dep., at 39-41. At the start of management meetings, Minar conducted a Christian prayer. Id. at 42. Minar encouraged his employees to attend the daily prayer sessions and convert to Christianity. See Hanft Decl. ¶ 3; Drews Decl. ¶¶ 7-9; Chemers Aff. ¶ 7.
Chemers was raised in a traditional Jewish household. Chemers Dep., at 4. He attended Hebrew school and was honored with a bar mitzvah. Id. Chemers has maintained his Jewish faith throughout his adult life and continues to attend synagogue. Id. at 20, 22-23. Chemers feels Minar felt contempt toward his Jewish faith and wanted him to abandon his Jewish faith and become a Christian. See Chemers Dep., at 51, 56, 59. Chemers objected to Minar's prayer sessions at management meetings and Minar's comments pressuring him to convert to Christianity. Id. at 50-52; Minar Dep., at 46.
During Chemers' employment, Minar announced, "I want everyone in the organization to do it for the glory of the Lord." Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., No. 8. In response to Chemers' complaints about the prayers beginning management meetings, Minar avowed, "It's my business; I'm going to do what I want." Chemers Dep., at 48-49. Minar also declared, "I'm going to do it for the glory of God — if it costs me my business, it costs me my business." Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., No. 9.
Minar fired Chemers on February 24, 2000. Minar Dep., at 98. One month earlier, Minar had said Chemers could return to his job as lease manager if he was dissatisfied with the general sales manager position. See Chemers Dep., at 33-35. Although other managers at the dealership complained to Minar about Chemers' diligence as general sales manager, Minar never informed Chemers of problems with his performance. See Warner Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Cozatt Aff. ¶ 7; Minar Dep., at 76-77, 84-85, 90-93, 96. Less than one week before terminating Chemers, Minar proclaimed, "I want everyone in this organization to be a Christian. Not all will be Christian but that will be their demise on Judgment Day." Def.'s Resp. to Req. for Admis., No. 7; Chemers Dep., at 47, 111.
III. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion. The Act states in part that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Chemers asserts that he has presented both direct and indirect evidence of religious discriminatory bias leading to his termination. He further alleges claims for retaliatory discharge and hostile work environment.
A. Direct Evidence of Discrimination
The direct evidence standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), requires a plaintiff to produce direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion, such as religion, "played a motivating part in [the] employment decision." Id. at 258. Proof by direct evidence requires evidence that Defendant's actual motive for the termination of Chemers' employment was discriminatory animus. Clearwater v. Indep. School Dist. No. 166, 231 F.3d 1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 2000). Evidence demonstrating discriminatory animus must be distinguished from "stray remarks in the workplace, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process." Fast v. Southern Union Co., 149 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 1998). Such statements "are not sufficient to establish a claim of discrimination." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277. Indeed, not all remarks that may reflect a discriminatory attitude are sufficiently related to the adverse employment action to support an inference of discriminatory animus. Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1999).
Minar's statements were not directed toward terminating employees based solely on the fact that they are not Christians. The exact context of the statements is unclear and the remarks were temporally remote from Chemers' termination. Because Chemers has failed to demonstrate a nexus between Minar's comments and his termination, Chemers' evidence is of a circumstantial nature, requiring inferences to be drawn before a discriminatory animus could be attributed to Defendant's decision to terminate his employment. See Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2001). Thus, Chemers lacks direct evidence of discrimination by Defendant sufficient to warrant analysis of his claim under the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework. See Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 1999); Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment on Chemers' direct evidence discriminatory discharge claim is appropriate.
B. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination
Where the plaintiff fails to produce direct evidence of discrimination, the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Euerle-Wehle v. United Parcel Serv., 181 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1999). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Cronquist, 237 F.3d at 924. Once a prima facie case is established, a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the employee. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption disappears and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Analysis of discrimination claims under the MHRA is the same as that under Title VII. See Scott v. County of Ramsey, 180 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1999); Todd v. Ortho Biotech. Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that Minnesota courts frequently look to Title VII cases when interpreting the MHRA); Smith v. Datacard, 9 F. Supp.2d 1067, 1078-79 (D.Minn. 1998); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l., Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he met applicable job qualifications; (3) he was discharged; and (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances that create an inference of unlawful discrimination. Rorie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1998). The parties do not dispute that Chemers has met the first and third elements. The second element is satisfied by evidence demonstrating that Chemers met the job qualifications. Minar promoted Chemers to general sales manager after observing which employee was best suited for the position. Previously, Minar stated that Chemers was one of the best lease managers he ever knew. Moreover, Chemers' performance evaluations were positive.
Chemers also raises a material question of fact on the fourth element. After the position remained vacant for one year, Chemers was replaced by a person who is not Jewish. See Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining that fourth element of prima facie case may be met by a showing that plaintiff's replacement was outside protected class or position remained open). Further, Defendant fired Chemers within a week of Minar's assertion, "I want everyone in this organization to be a Christian." This, coupled with Chemers' satisfactory performance throughout his tenure at the dealership and promotion to the top management position, creates the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination.
As a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Chemers, Defendant identifies several deficiencies in his performance. See Mem. in Supp., at 23-24. Defendant alleges Chemers' unprofessional behavior and abusive treatment of subordinate employees. Id. Defendant further notes Chemers' excessive absenteeism and lack of commitment to the job. Id. Once the employer advances a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if the evidence (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that an unlawful motive was a determinative factor in the termination. Cronquist, 237 F.3d at 926 (citations omitted).
Chemers has presented sufficient evidence to create a factual issue regarding pretext. See Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1135 ("it is possible for strong evidence of a prima facie case to also present a factual issue on pretext"). Minar never informed Chemers of any problems concerning his performance or absenteeism. Defendant did not document any such problems. When recording the basis for Chemers' termination, Minar selected "poor performance," but not "absenteeism," "tardiness," or "misconduct." See Separation Notice, Sullivan Aff. Ex. M. The evidence is subject to the interpretation that Chemers' alleged absences from the dealership, unprofessional conduct and abusive treatment of subordinates were not the real reasons he was fired, but merely ad hoc explanations. Moreover, there is evidence that the dealership performed relatively well during Chemers' time as general sales manager. See Financial Statements, Sullivan Aff. Ex. L. Considered in light of his successes at the dealership, the dearth of documentation of Chemers' performance problems creates a factual issue as to whether Defendant's reasons were pretextual. It is permissible for a jury to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation for the termination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
The dissonance between the two versions the parties have presented is considerable. Chemers describes a work environment dominated by an owner determined to convert his employees to Christianity, who ultimately discharged Chemers after his persistent refusal. Meanwhile, Defendant portrays Chemers as a surly employee, whose dilatory behavior as general sales manager was tolerated until other employees demanded his termination. The court "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. Crediting Chemers' allegation that religious considerations drove Defendant's decision to terminate him, what role his religion played in the discharge is a question that a jury must resolve. Summary judgment is denied on this claim.
C. Retaliatory Discharge
An employer may not discriminate against an employee because the employee "has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Chemers must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Booster Ass'n., Inc., 161 F.3d 1178, 1182 (8th Cir. 1998). The first element requires a plaintiff to show a good faith reasonable belief that his employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice. See Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. School Dist., 65 F.3d 98, 100 (8th Cir. 1995); Barnes v. Benham Group, Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d 1013, 1022 (D.Minn. 1998) ("Protected activity includes opposing employer conduct that is indeed unlawful."). Chemers cannot avoid scrutiny of his retaliation claim merely by claiming a belief that his employer's conduct was illegal. Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
To establish a prima facie case pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 181.932, a plaintiff must prove (1) good faith, statutorily-protected conduct; (2) an adverse employment action that results in a tangible job detriment; and (3) a causal connection between the two. See Michaelson v. Minnesota Min. Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991), aff'd., 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992).
Chemers' complaints about the optional prayer sessions did not constitute statutorily protected activity because the underlying conduct is lawful. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Minn. Const. art. I, § 16. Neither Title VII nor the MHRA require Minar, as owner of the business, to abandon his religious beliefs. See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g. Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 621 (9th Cir. 1988). The Constitution prohibits Title VII, and other anti-discrimination laws, from restricting an individual's religious proselytizing, witnessing, or counseling, whether in the workplace or elsewhere. See Brown v. Polk Co., 61 F.3d 650, 659 (8th Cir. 1995). Although Chemers may have viewed Minar's prayer sessions as impolitic, it is not an illegal practice. Summary judgment on his retaliatory discharge claim is granted.
Because Defendant is a private employer, the Establishment Clause is not at issue.
D. Hostile Work Environment
Title VII prohibits discrimination against an individual "with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a hostile work environment claim, Chemers must show: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment based on religion; (3) a causal nexus between the harassment and their membership in the protected group; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) his employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local No. 286, 253 F.3d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 2001). The harassment must be so "severe or pervasive" as to "alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). The conduct must be "extreme." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). It must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would consider it to be hostile or abusive. Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999). In determining whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, all the circumstances must be evaluated, including the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88.
Here, there is insufficient evidence of harassment on the basis of religion to support a claim. Minar held optional daily prayer sessions for employees at the dealership and opened meetings with a brief prayer. Minar's other comments about his commitment to his religious faith, made within earshot of Chemers, do not rise to the level of extreme, severe or abusive conduct. Nor does his giving Chemers a book advocating conversion to Christianity reach the level of hostility or abuse. Chemers' allegation that Cozatt, a co-worker, called him a religious epithet on one occasion is a stray remark. See Chemers Dep., at 79-80; Simmons v. Oce-USA, Inc., 174 F.3d 913, 915-16 (8th Cir. 1999). Chemers has not demonstrated any conduct that rises to the level of "an ongoing nightmare for the employee victim." Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is granted on his hostile work environment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 10] is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.