Opinion
A162322
01-24-2022
JASWINDER CHEEMA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.S. TRUCKING, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG12611230
POLLAK, P. J.
This appeal challenges an order modifying a judgment pursuant to directions set forth in this court's prior opinion in Cheema v. L.S. Trucking, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1142 (Cheema I). That opinion largely affirmed a judgment awarding damages to Jaswinder Cheema against L.S. Trucking, Inc. (LS) but held that the trial court had erred in denying Cheema prejudgment interest (Civ. Code, § 3287) and penalty interest (Civ. Code, § 3322). (Cheema I, supra, at pp. 1151-1153.) LS contends that the trial court's modified judgment on remand deviates from this court's directions in multiple respects. With one exception, however, the deviations from our instructions are both harmless and immaterial. We will remand the matter with an instruction to delete one sentence from the modified judgment, but otherwise affirm. 1
Factual and Procedural History
This court previously affirmed a judgment awarding Cheema damages of $19, 113.84, which comprised (1) amounts that LS had improperly withheld as "rental charges" from payments to Cheema for hauling services and (2) amounts of certain invoices that Cheema had submitted to LS but that LS had never paid. (Cheema I, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1145-1147.) We held that the court had erred in denying Cheema prejudgment interest on all his damages (id. at pp. 1151-1152) and penalty interest on the portion of those damages representing charges that LS had never paid (and also on charges that LS had paid after the statutory deadline). (Id. at pp. 1152-1153.) We remanded with directions "to determine the amounts of prejudgment and penalty interest to be added to the judgment in favor of Cheema." (Id. at p. 1154.)
In a consolidated appeal, we affirmed an order awarding Cheema attorney fees. (Cheema I, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1153-1154.)
Shortly before the case management conference that the trial court scheduled on remand, Cheema filed his "proposals for modified judgment on remand," setting forth his prejudgment and penalty interest calculations. The document also discussed past attorney fee and cost awards and costs incurred in postjudgment enforcement efforts. It set forth a total net sum that LS assertedly owed Cheema, and the daily interest accruing thereon. At the case management conference the court directed counsel to meet and confer about the judgment-modification request, and set a briefing schedule.
LS filed a response to the request asserting that "[t]he purpose of modifying the judgment is not to arrive at a final figure concerning the total amount of money owed by, or due to one party or the other as of the date of entry of the modified judgment," but only to add to the judgment the two 2 items-prejudgment interest and penalty interest-specified in this court's directions on remand. (Italics omitted.) LS thus objected to the discussion of the cost and fee awards and to any application of credits or offsets. LS did not dispute Cheema's calculation of the prejudgment interest due, but noted that his calculation of penalty interest included interest on the part of the late payments representing amounts withheld as "rental fees." Our prior opinion specifically held these amounts not subject to penalty interest, given the existence of a good-faith dispute. Cheema's reply acknowledged the error and modified the calculation of penalty interest.
A somewhat-confusing series of continuances ensued and, eventually, the second case management conference was vacated. In December 2020, evidently on his own initiative, Cheema filed a proposed order modifying the judgment in accord with the position set forth in his reply. On January 4, 2021, without receiving further filings, holding a hearing, or making any revisions, the court signed the proposed order. LS timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion
"Whether the trial court has correctly interpreted an appellate opinion is an issue of law subject to de novo review." (Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 306, 313.) If a party contends that a trial court failed to do so, we must examine our prior opinion and the action on remand to determine if the court departed materially from our directions. (In re Candace P. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131.) While at least one decision states that harmless-error analysis does not apply (ibid.), that opinion also emphasizes that a departure from appellate instructions warrants reversal only if "material." (Ibid.) 3
In this case, our disposition stated that "The judgment is affirmed as to the award to Cheema of $19, 113.84 in net damages . . . . The judgment is reversed as to the denial of prejudgment interest and penalty interest. The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to determine the amounts of prejudgment and penalty interest to be added to the judgment in favor of Cheema, consistent with this opinion. The order awarding attorney fees is affirmed." (Cheema I, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.)
The order modifying judgment on remand summarizes the results of the trial and the related awards of attorney fees and costs-some in favor of Cheema and some in favor of Leonel Serrato, LS's owner, whom Cheema had unsuccessfully sued on an alter ego theory. The order then quotes this court's disposition and describes some of the proceedings on remand regarding Cheema's request for entry of a modified judgment.
The last section of the document "Modification of the Judgment," reads as follows (with the passages challenged on appeal in italics): "Civil Code Section 3322 Interest: Added to the judgment is the 2% penalty interest due on the unpaid statements in the amount of $14, 587.11, to be added to the underlying judgment. Interest accrues at $7.31/day. [¶] Pre-judgment Interest: Added to the judgment is the amount of pre-judgment interest based on the principal amount due of $19, 113.14. The pre-judgment interest due on both the unpaid statements ($11, 312.08) and wrongfully withheld trailer rent ($4, 268.87) amounts to $15, 580.95, which is hereby added to $19, 113.84 entered on October 21, 2016. [¶] The total principal amount due to Cheema is the original principal amount of $19, 113.84, plus section 3322 penalty interest at $14, 587.11, plus $15, 580.95 for pre-judgment interest, totaling $49, 281.85, earning post judgment interest at the daily rate of $13.50 as of October 21, 2016. [¶] Attorney Fees and Costs. Also part of the 4 judgment and affirmed by the Court of Appeal in response to [LS's] appeal were the pre-judgment trial attorney fees awarded to Cheema in the amount of $100, 415, which were offset by the unchallenged award of attorney fees and costs . . . to Serrato as outlined in the above accompanying order, who has since assigned those fees to [LS] as an offset, as were Serrato's trial costs." (Italics added.)
LS contends that the statement in the first paragraph that "Interest accrues at $7.31/day" overstates the amount of postjudgment interest accruing on the judgment. As to the other challenged passages, LS contends the trial court exceeded the scope of our instructions by adding language to the judgment addressing topics not mentioned in the remittitur. LS asks us to direct the trial court either to "replac[e] the attorney-drafted version of the modified judgment . . . with a standard judicial council form judgment that simply adds, in the respective spaces provided, amounts certain for prejudgment interest and penalty interest" or to follow "procedures appropriate for attorney-drafted or court-drafted proposed judgments, allowing each party to be heard before finalizing the judgment."
The only part of the modification materially deviating from our instructions is the statement regarding penalty interest under Civil Code section 3322. Cheema's brief explains that $7.31 per day is the rate at which penalty interest accrued before judgment was entered. But the modification states that interest "accrues" at that rate, incorrectly indicating that it is currently doing so. Moreover, the rate at which penalty interest accrued before the entry of judgment is immaterial; the preceding sentence states the total amount of such interest that accrued through the entry of judgment. Postjudgment interest accrues at a different rate. (Compare Code Civ. Proc., 5 § 685.010 [10 percent per year] with Civ. Code, § 3322 [2 percent per month].) The misleading sentence in the first paragraph must be stricken.
LS does not contend that any of the other challenged statements included in the modification is inaccurate, but argues that it was improper to include them because they address topics not specified in our remittitur. While the passages do go beyond the literal specification in our instructions, the passages merely summarize other orders in the case, spell out the undisputed accrual of postjudgment interest, and record certain postjudgment assignments and offsets with undisputed accuracy. LS does not contend that the extraneous recitations have any prejudicial effect, but does correctly point out that harmless-error analysis does not apply. (In re Candace P., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.) However, LS does not dispute that the extraneous statements are immaterial, the correct standard, as they plainly are. LS also does not dispute that the trial court did everything the remittitur directed it to do-that is, "determine the amounts of prejudgment and penalty interest to be added to the judgment." (Cheema I, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) The unnecessary additions, other than the reference to the $7.31 daily accrual rate, are immaterial and provide no cause for reversal.
Disposition
The matter is remanded with the direction that the sentence, "Interest accrues at $7.31/day" be stricken from the Modification of the Judgment section of the Order Modifying Judgment And Modified Judgment On Remand entered on January 4, 2021. In all other respects, the amended judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal. 6
WE CONCUR: STREETER, J. BROWN, J. 7