Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2202-D
December 12, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Juan Rodriguez Chavez ("Chavez"), convicted and sentenced to death for capital murder, petitions the court for a writ of habeas corpus on 20 grounds. Respondent Janie Cockrell (the "State") moves for summary judgment. The court holds that Chavez's first claim is barred in part under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), and that he is not entitled to relief under the applicable standard prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and concludes that his remaining 19 claims are procedurally barred. The court therefore grants the State's motion, denies Chavez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and dismisses this action with prejudice.
I
Chavez was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for killing Jose Morales during the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. He appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed his conviction and sentence. See Chavez v. State, No. 72, 396, slip op. at 20 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 7, 1999) (en banc). Chavez did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.
While his case was on appeal, Chavez applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas state district court ("state habeas court"). The state habeas court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, but the same judge who presided at Chavez's trial heard the habeas petition. Based on extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, the state habeas court recommended that all relief be denied. See May 25, 2000 St. Hab. Order. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals thereafter denied relief in an unpublished order based on the state habeas court's findings and conclusions and its own review of the record. Ex parte Chavez, No. 45, 877-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 13, 2000) (per curiam).
On October 5, 2000 Chavez filed in this court a motion for appointment of counsel, which the court granted. On September 11, 2001 he filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Chavez seeks relief on the following 20 grounds:
1. He was denied his "presumption of innocence" and due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when a "stun belt" that he was forced to wear subjected him to a severe electrical shock during the trial and in the presence of the jury.
2. The trial court denied him procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments during the hearing to determine whether the trial court should permit the use of a stun belt on him during the trial.
3. The trial court denied him his right to confront and cross — examine the witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments during the hearing to determine whether the trial court should permit the use of a stun belt on him during the trial.
4. The trial court denied him substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when the trial court ordered him to wear a stun belt during his trial.
5. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of victim Morales.
6. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of victim Ferguson.
7. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of victim Briseno.
8. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of victim Contreras.
9. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of victim Delgadillo.
10. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting crime scene photographs of victim Ferguson.
11. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting crime scene photographs of victim Briseno.
12. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting crime scene photographs of victim Contreras.
13. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting crime scene photographs of victim Delgadillo.
14. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of Juan Hernandez during the sentencing hearing.
15. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of Antonio Rios during the sentencing hearing.
16. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of Manuel Duran during the sentencing hearing.
17. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of Antonio Banda during the sentencing hearing.
18. The trial court denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by admitting autopsy photographs of Juan Macias during the sentencing hearing.
19. The cumulative effect of the admission of the state's exhibits listed in claims 5 through 18 denied him his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
20. The cumulative effect of the admission of the state's exhibits listed in claims 5 through 18 subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The State answered and moved for summary judgment on October 24, 2001. Under the court's August 14, 2001 scheduling order, Chavez was entitled to file a reply brief no later than 30 days thereafter. He has not done so, and the petition is now ripe for adjudication.
Although the court customarily convenes oral argument in death penalty habeas cases, it is not doing so here. Nineteen of the 20 grounds on which Chavez relies are procedurally barred, petitioner has made no effort to establish cause and prejudice, and oral argument would not assist the court in applying procedural default jurisprudence. The remaining ground is in part Teague-barred. As to the part that is not, Chavez has made no attempt to address the merits of the claims under the applicable AEDPA standards of review, and argument would not be helpful in assessing whether the state courts' determinations of the claim were objectively unreasonable.
II
Chavez maintains in ground[1] that he was denied the presumption of innocence and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the stun belt he was required to wear was inadvertently activated during trial, subjecting him to a severe electrical shock in the jury's presence.A
The State contends this claim is barred under Teague. Because the application of the Teague bar is a threshold question in a federal habeas case, see Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 117 (1995) (per curiam), the court turns first to this issue.1
Under Teague, with two narrow exceptions, a court may not announce a new rule on federal collateral review of a habeas petition. Id. at 301, 310; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989). The first exception applies when a new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quotation and citation omitted). The second exception becomes effective when the new rule "requires the observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). A case announces a new rule "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997) (stating that Teague exceptions are narrow).
The Teague inquiry is conducted in three steps. First, the court determines the date on which the defendant's conviction became final. Second, the habeas court considers whether a state court considering the defendant's claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution. If not, then the rule is new. If the rule is determined to be new, the final step in the Teague analysis requires the court to determine whether the rule nonetheless falls within one of the two exceptions. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997).
Chavez's conviction and sentence became final on September 2, 1999, when the time for him to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States expired. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997).
2
The State argues that Chavez's first claim is Teague-barred because it would require the court to announce a new rule: that the inadvertent activation of a stun belt during trial itself amounts to a deprivation of the presumption of innocence. It posits that Chavez has offered no authority that demonstrates that the rule he seeks was compelled by precedent at the time, and that the general principles of law that he draws from other contexts do not involve the application of established general procedural principles to an analogous context. The court agrees.
Chavez appears to acknowledge that physical restraints used during trial are constitutional if they are not observable to the jury and thus are not prejudicial. See P. Br. at 22-23. Since Chavez concedes that the state trial judge intended that, so far as possible, the jury not know that he was wearing a stun belt, see id. at 23-24, he necessarily argues for a rule that the inadvertent disclosure of a physical restraint during trial is of itself sufficient to deprive a criminal defendant of the presumption of innocence. This is a new rule and is therefore barred under Teague.
The State invokes Teague as to the presumption of innocence component, but not the due process component, of Chavez's first claim. See R. Br. at 16. The court will therefore address the entire claim on the merits.
B
Chavez's habeas petition is governed by AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
This court's determination requires deference to the state court's adjudication of Chavez's claims unless the adjudication is flawed under at least one of these provisos. See Kutzner v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 2001); Wheat v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 2226 (2001).
"Under the `contrary to' clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant [a writ of habeas corpus] if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court of the United States] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "A `run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule' would not fit within this exception as `diametrically different' or `opposite in character or nature' from Supreme Court precedent." Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 256 (5th Cir.) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 329 (2001).
"Under the `unreasonable application' clause [of § 2254(d)(1)], a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. "A state court's decision will be based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it is objectively unreasonable." Kutzner, 242 F.3d at 608. "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411.
"Factual findings of the state court are presumed to be correct[.]" Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2001). A federal habeas court "must defer to them unless they were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) (quoting Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1002 (2000)). "When challenging a state court's factual determinations, a petitioner must rebut this presumption of correctness by `clear and convincing evidence.'" Barnes v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
C
Although Chavez's brief in support of his application devotes 37 pages to claim 1 of his petition, see P. Br. at 4-40, at no point does he explicitly address the applicable AEDPA standards of review. The court is therefore unaware whether he relies on the "contrary to" clause or the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), or maintains under § 2254(d)(2) that the state courts' rulings resulted in decisions that were based on unreasonable determinations of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.Chavez is not entitled to relief under the "contrary to" clause because there is no indication that the state courts arrived at conclusions opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court of the United States on a question of law or that they decided a case differently than had the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. He does not appear to argue, under § 2254(d)(2), that the state courts rendered decisions that were based on unreasonable determinations of the facts. This leaves as the only basis for federal habeas review a contention that the state courts' application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.
Even if he does, the court finds no basis in the record to hold that any material determination of fact was unreasonable.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed on direct review Chavez's assertion that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial because he was denied the presumption of innocence when the jury became aware that he was under physical restraint due to the accidental activation of the stun belt he was required to wear. See Chavez, No. 72, 396, slip op. at 5. The court pointed out that, the day following the incident, the trial court questioned each juror separately. Id. at 6. Four jurors assumed Chavez had been shocked by some type of electronic security device, four thought he had been shocked, but did not know why or how, and four knew there had been a commotion in court but did not know why. Id. at 6-7. Each juror advised the trial judge that the juror could remain fair and impartial. Id. at 7. The trial judge determined that what the jurors had observed and heard would not affect their impartiality and that Chavez's presumption of innocence was not infringed. Id.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the facts did not show that Chavez's presumption of innocence was infringed upon and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion for mistrial. Id. at 9. The jury did not actually see him in restraints because the stun belt was hidden beneath his clothing. The jurors only briefly saw his reaction when the belt shocked him. Within minutes of this event, they were ushered from the courtroom. Although a few jurors concluded that Chavez was probably shocked by some type of electronic restraining device, two thought he was being restrained because he might be a flight risk. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that this did not prove that the jurors no longer presumed Chavez was innocent, but showed only that jurors recognized that he might be a flight risk because he was charged with capital murder, "as arguably any defendant charged with such a serious offense would be." Id. The court also relied on the facts that (1) Chavez had offered no evidence that any juror discussed the incident with other jurors or that it influenced their decision to convict; (2) each juror testified under oath and unequivocally that the juror could remain fair and impartial; (3) the fact that four jurors testified they did not know Chavez had been shocked, and that jurors had different perceptions of what had happened, was further proof that they did not talk about the incident among themselves. Id.
On Chavez's post-conviction habeas application, the state habeas court surveyed federal and Texas constitutional, statutory, and common law concerning the presumption of innocence. See St. Hab. Find. Nos. 20-23. It then framed the controlling question as whether the jurors were able to abide by the law and presume that Chavez was innocent until the State proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. No. 24.
The state habeas court discussed this claim only in terms of whether there was a violation of Chavez's right to a presumption of innocence, not whether it violated his due process rights. See St. Hab. Find. Nos. 20-24, 29, 31-33, 35. This is so, however, because Chavez only relied on that right in asserting this ground for habeas relief. See Hab. Tr. 1:125, 127, 135. Likewise, Chavez's argument before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was based on a violation of the presumption of innocence and was addressed only in that context. See Chavez, No. 72, 396, slip op. at 5, 9. The State does not assert that the due process component of this claim is Teague-barred or procedurally barred or that Chavez failed to exhaust this claim. In view of Chavez's failure to present the due process argument in the state habeas court or on direct appeal, however, the court cannot say under the AEDPA standard that the state courts made objectively unreasonable determinations of such a claim.
The court first appears to have addressed Chavez's argument as presented on direct appeal. It noted the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that, although four jurors assumed Chavez had been shocked by some type of electronic security device, four others thought he had been shocked but did not know why or how, and the remaining four knew there had been a commotion in court but did not know why, all 12 testified that they could remain fair and impartial jurors in the case. Id. No. 25.
After addressing Chavez's contention that the trial court did not cure the error by adequate jury instruction — the state habeas court found that the reason the trial court did not give an instruction was because Chavez requested that it not be given, id. Nos. 27-28 — the court then turned to affidavit evidence that Chavez had obtained from two jurors in August 1998, over two years after his conviction. Juror Scott Deaso ("Deaso") testified that the decision as to guilt/innocence was hard for him and that he was convinced of Chavez's guilt based on his palm print. Id. No. 29. Juror Bruce Fenner ("Fenner") averred that he thought he was the last juror to vote to convict Chavez, and that one reason for his reticence was concern regarding the involvement of Joe Gonzales. Id. The state habeas court found that these affidavits demonstrated that the stun belt incident did not influence the jurors' decisions to convict. Id. No. 30. "Specifically, the affidavits establish that these two jurors did not convict [Chavez] based on the security belt incident, but instead they carefully considered the evidence presented at trial to reach a verdict." Id. The court also found that Chavez had adduced no evidence that, after the stun belt was activated, any juror no longer accorded him the presumption of innocence, and that he proffered no evidence that any juror had discussed the incident with other jurors or that the incident influenced any juror's decision to convict. Id. No. 31.
The state habeas court then turned to the affidavits of all 12 jurors that the prosecution had submitted in April 1996, shortly after Chavez was convicted. The court found the affidavits to be credible and believable. Id. No. 32. In them, each juror averred that the incident did not affect the juror's ability to presume Chavez innocent, that the jurors did not discuss the incident with each other, and that no juror recalled other jurors talking about the incident during the trial or deliberations. Id. The court found that the affidavits, produced in April 1996, refuted Chavez's claim that the jurors no longer presumed him to be innocent after the stun belt was activated. Id. No. 33. The court noted that, in the August 1998 affidavits of jurors Deaso and Fenner, each recalled giving an affidavit to the prosecution shortly after trial, but neither expressed a desire to retract or modify his prior statements regarding the incident. Id. No. 34. The court therefore found that Chavez had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurors did not presume him innocent after the stun belt activated inadvertently during trial. Id. No. 35.
The court holds that these determinations by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the state habeas court (which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in turn adopted) are not objectively unreasonable.
IV
The State asserts that grounds 2-20 of Chavez's petition are procedurally barred because the state habeas court explicitly relied on adequate and independent state-law grounds to dispose of these issues.
A
"Where a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, this court may not review the prisoner's habeas petition unless he can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)). "This `independent and adequate state law' doctrine applies to both substantive and procedural grounds and affects federal review of claims that are raised on either direct or habeas review." Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1995). "To satisfy the `independent' and `adequate' requirements, the dismissal must `clearly and expressly' indicate that it rests on state grounds which bar relief, and the bar must be strictly or regularly followed by state courts, and applied to the majority of similar claims." Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Amos, 61 F.3d at 338-39).
B
The state habeas court concluded that grounds 2, 3, and 4 of Chavez's petition, see St. Hab. Find. Nos. 39-41, and grounds 5-20 of the petition, see St. Hab. Find. Nos. 62-63, were procedurally barred because he had failed to raise them on direct appeal. The court therefore clearly and expressly indicated that its decision rested on a state procedural rule that bars relief. Under Texas law, "[i]t is well-settled `that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.'" Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 199 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (en banc) (on rehearing) (quoting Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). A claim that could have been raised and resolved on direct appeal, but that is not presented until a state habeas application is filed, will be found to have been procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., id. Texas courts thus strictly or regularly follow this rule and apply it to the majority of similar claims. Chavez has not filed a reply to the State's motion for summary judgment and therefore has made no attempt to show cause and prejudice. Nor has he addressed this issue in his brief in support of his habeas petition. Accordingly, these claims are procedurally barred.* * *
The State's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, Chavez's habeas petition is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.SO ORDERED.