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Chavez v. Chappell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Aug 4, 2014
No. C-14-2636 TEH (PR) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014)

Opinion

No. C-14-2636 TEH (PR)

08-04-2014

ROGER E. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. KEVIN R. CHAPPELL, Warden, Respondent.


ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition challenges a decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings ("Board") to deny his application for an expedited parole hearing. Petitioner has paid the $5.00 filing fee.

I

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder in 1993 and sentenced to a term of sixteen years to life in state prison. In 2010, he had his third parole hearing, and the Board decided that he was not suitable for parole and that it would hold his next parole hearing in seven years. In 2013, petitioner applied to advance his next parole hearing, but the Board denied that application. The Board's decision was unsuccessfully appealed to all three levels of the California courts.

II

A

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). An application for a federal writ of habeas corpus filed by a prisoner who is in state custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court must "specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the petitioner ... and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. 2254.

"'[N]otice' pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point to a 'real possibility of constitutional error.'" Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes (quoting Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)).

B

Petitioner claims that the Board violated due process when it denied his application to advance his parole hearing without providing a reason for the denial. The state courts rejected this claim.

The Court first notes that the exhibits to the petition show that the Board did provide a reason for the denial. See Petition, Dkt 1-3 at 8 (Board's denial stating "after conducting a review of the case factors and considering the new information or change in circumstances, the prisoner did not establish a reasonable likelihood that consideration of the public and victim's safety does not require additional incarceration.") The state superior court, in denying petitioner's state petition, found the Board's denial was supported by evidence. See Petition, Dkt. 1-7 at 2-10.

Further, a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Petitioner cites no federal law, let alone any Supreme Court precedent, and the Court is aware of none, providing that a parole board's decision to deny an inmate's request to advance a scheduled parole hearing implicates federal constitutional rights. There is federal authority that due process is implicated by a board's decision to deny parole itself. See, e.g., McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011). None of these decisions apply to a board's decision not to advance a scheduled hearing, however.

Petitioner also claims that the state superior court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's state petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the same denial of his application to advance his parole hearing. Again, in none of these claims does petitioner assert that his rights under the United States Constitution or laws of the United States were violated. The claims present only issues of state law, violation of which is not a basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 861-62.

III

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that a reasonable jurist would find this Court's denial of his claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted in this case.

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED 08/04/2014

/s/________

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge


Summaries of

Chavez v. Chappell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Aug 4, 2014
No. C-14-2636 TEH (PR) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014)
Case details for

Chavez v. Chappell

Case Details

Full title:ROGER E. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. KEVIN R. CHAPPELL, Warden, Respondent.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Aug 4, 2014

Citations

No. C-14-2636 TEH (PR) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014)