In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 402, 242 Ill.Dec. 606, 721 N.E.2d 1137 (1999). Where two legislative enactments allegedly conflict, this court has a duty to construe those statutes in a manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both enactments, if such a construction is reasonably possible.
We agree with Ellingson for the following reasons. In Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill. 2d 394, 403, 721 N.E.2d 1137 (1999), the supreme court discussed the general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is ordinarily not a final judgment and therefore is not appealable. The court also noted that an exception exists where the parties file opposing motions for summary judgment on the same claim and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other.
Because the purpose of the special legislation clause is to prevent the legislature from creating arbitrary classifications "that discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis," the law dictates that "a party raising a special legislation claim must, at the very least, prove the existence of an arbitrary legislative classification." Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 400, 721 N.E.2d 1137 (1999). We discern no legislative classification on the face of section 41, nor from its plain language.
¶ 28 We further note that a municipal enactment, such as the Ordinance in the instant cause, enjoys a presumption of validity. See Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill. 2d 394, 398 (1999); GreyhoundLines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d 718, 723 (1974); see also People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1998) (constitutionality is to be presumed). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the ordinance, namely, plaintiffs here, must show by clear and affirmative evidence that the Ordinance is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; that there is no permissible interpretation of the enactment that justifies its adoption; or that the enactment will not promote the safety and general welfare of the public."
We further note that a municipal enactment, such as the ordinance in the instant case, enjoys a presumption of validity. See Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill. 2d 394, 398 (1999); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d 718, 723 (1974); see also People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1998) (constitutionality is to be presumed). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the ordinance, namely, plaintiffs here, must show by clear and affirmative evidence that the ordinance is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; that there is no permissible interpretation of the enactment that justifies its adoption; or that the enactment will not promote the safety and general welfare of the public."
Because the purpose of this prohibition is to prevent arbitrary legislative classifications which discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis, "a party raising a special legislation claim must, at the very least, prove the existence of an arbitrary legislative classification." Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 400, 721 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (1999). First, we note that, because waivers under section 2-3.25g are not legislation and do not need to comply with constitutional legislative formalities, they also need not comply with the prohibition against special or local legislation.
In their appellate brief, defendants address the question of whether the trial court properly denied Wolfram's motion in its entirety and they urge this court to affirm that ruling. Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and, thus, not appealable. Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 403, 242 Ill.Dec. 606, 721 N.E.2d 1137, 1143 (1999); Pagano v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 257 Ill.App.3d 905, 909, 196 Ill.Dec. 24, 629 N.E.2d 569, 573 (1994). Yet, review of an order denying a motion for summary judgment is proper where the order also granted a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same claim or claims subject to the motion that was denied.
Municipal enactments enjoy a presumption of validity. Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 398 (1999); Rockford Blacktop Construction Co. v. County of Boone, 263 Ill. App.3d 274, 278-79 (1994). Evidence of the municipality's careful, comprehensive planning of development bolsters the validity of the zoning restrictions.
Therefore, we will address this issue on appeal. Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill.2d 394, 400, 242 Ill.Dec. 606, 721 N.E.2d 1137 (1999). ¶ 85 We disagree with Brewer's claim that Hewitt 's holding denies unmarried domestic partners the ability to bring common-law claims solely because they are in an intimate relationship with another.
That should particularly be the case here when the statements the majority quotes show that certain legislators may have been unaware of what the statute actually said. As the City points out, there is simply no way to know whether the dozens of other legislators voted on the bill based on these incorrect characterizations, or whether they understood what the bill actually said. I, for one, am unwilling to assume that the entire legislature was unaware of the language of the statute it was enacting. ¶ 55 Two cardinal rules of statutory construction are that: (1) when reasonably possible, legislative enactments should be construed so that they do not conflict (Chavda v. Wolak, 188 Ill. 2d 394, 402 (1999)); and (2) when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, resort to extrinsic aids of construction—such as legislative history—is improper (People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 214 (2005)). What the majority does here is to begin with clear, unambiguous statutory language that does not conflict with the ordinance, then turn to the legislative debates to manufacture a conflict where none exists, and then use that alleged conflict to invalidate the ordinance.