For nearly 90 years, appellate courts in Georgia have consistently held that an employee "acts only for h[er] own purposes"-and not for those of her employer-while she is going to or from work, so respondeat superior generally does not apply when an employee commits a tort during her work commute. Chattanooga Publishing Company v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 882 (114 S.E.2d 138) (1960) (explaining that "[a]s a general rule, a servant in going to and from his work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, and consequently the employer is not to be held liable for an injury occasioned while the servant is en route to or from his work," and holding that the trial court properly granted the employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence showed that the employee was in an accident while driving the employer's truck to work, because the employee was using the truck "for a purely personal mission of his own . . ., in no way connected with the business of the owner, and not within the scope of his employment") (citation and punctuation omitted). See also, e.g., Nguyen, 358 Ga.App. at 173 (explaining that "'[t]he law is clear that in the absence of special circumstances[,] a s
In total, this Court has cited Farr only six times in the 85 years since it was decided—the last time being in 1960—and in none of those cases did we rely on Farr to support an "in the course of" or "arising out of" analysis. See Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 882 (3), 114 S.E.2d 138 (1960) (analyzing the scope of employer liability in a general liability case, and citing Farr in support of a general proposition that an employer is not liable for an employee's negligence while the employee is acting only for his own purposes); Holman v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 201 Ga. 454, 459 (1), 39 S.E.2d 850 (1946) (discussed below; rendering a decision in tension with Farr in a general liability case, and attempting to distinguish Farr on the ground that it was a workers’ compensation case); Fried, 192 Ga. at 493, 15 S.E.2d 704 (discussed above; citing Farr only for the proposition that, "[o]n a contested question of fact, where there is evidence to support the finding of the Industrial Board, its finding of such facts is final and cannot be reviewed"); Skinner, 188 Ga. at 827 (1), 5 S.E.2d 9 (discussed above; not citing Farr in the analysis, but quoting the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals below in which the Farr decision was recounted); C
And see Jones v. Dixie Ohio Express, 116 Ga. App. 155, 156 ( 156 S.E.2d 388). 2. (a) In Count 2 the theory of the action is that of negligent entrustment, as to which see generally, Willis v. Hill, 116 Ga. App. 848 ( 159 S.E.2d 145), and citations (reversed on other grounds in 224 Ga. 263 ( 161 S.E.2d 281)); Young v. Kickliter, 213 Ga. 42 ( 96 S.E.2d 605); Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880 ( 114 S.E.2d 138); NuGrape Bottling Co. v. Knott, 47 Ga. App. 539 ( 171 S.E. 151); Ficklen v. Heichelheim, 49 Ga. App. 777 (6) ( 176 S.E. 540); Crisp v. Wright, 56 Ga. App. 338 ( 192 S.E. 390); Graham v. Cleveland, 58 Ga. App. 810 (2) ( 200 S.E. 184); Holt v. Eastern Motor Co., 65 Ga. App. 502 ( 15 S.E.2d 895); Burks v. Green, 85 Ga. App. 327 ( 69 S.E.2d 686); Gay v. Healan, 88 Ga. App. 533 (4) ( 77 S.E.2d 47); Windsor v.Chanticleer Co., 89 Ga. App. 116 ( 78 S.E.2d 871); Caskey v. Underwood, 89 Ga. App. 418 ( 79 S.E.2d 558); Medlock v. Barfield, 90 Ga. App. 759 ( 84 S.E.2d 113); Garver v. Smith, 90 Ga. App. 892, 896 ( 84 S.E.2d 693); Healan v. Powell, 91 Ga. App. 787 ( 87 S.E.2d 332); Mason v. Powell, 92 Ga. App. 496 ( 88 S.E.2d 734); Jones v. Dixie Drive It Yourself System, 97 Ga. App. 669 ( 104 S.E.2d 497); Hines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App. 76 (4) ( 120 S.E.2d 892); Marques v. Ross, 105 Ga. App. 133, 138 ( 123 S.E.2d 412); McKinney v. Burke, 108 Ga. App. 501 ( 133 S.E.2d 383); Roebuck v.
Sandford , 330 Ga. App. at 254 (1), 765 S.E.2d 420 (punctuation omitted); accordFarzaneh v. Merit Constr. Co. , 309 Ga. App. 637, 639, 710 S.E.2d 839 (2011) ; seeArcher Forestry, LLC v. Dolatowski , 331 Ga. App. 676, 679 (3), 771 S.E.2d 378 (2015) (noting that, as a general rule, a servant going to or from his work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer). SeeChattanooga Publ'g Co. v. Fulton , 215 Ga. 880, 882 (3), 114 S.E.2d 138 (1960) (reiterating the general rule that a servant in going to or from his work in an automobile acts only for his own purposes and not for those of his employer, and consequently the employer is not to be held liable for an injury occasioned while the servant is en route to or from his work). Graham maintains that Mann's commute in her personal vehicle constituted a "special mission," and so Mann was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident with Graham's husband.
When the collision occurred, Archer recounted, he was on his cell phone with his wife, discussing their son's doctor's visit.Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883(3), 114 S.E.2d 138 (1960) (citations and punctuation omitted); see Mastec North America, supra, 330 Ga.App. at 254(1), 765 S.E.2d 420 (“Generally, an employee traveling to or from work is not in the course of his employment but rather is engaged in a personal activity.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Jones v. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga.App. 581, 583(1), 373 S.E.2d 649 (1988).
Riel v. Paulding County Bd. of Ed., 206 Ga. App. 230, 231 (1) ( 425 SE2d 305) (1992). See Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883 (3) ( 114 SE2d 138) (1960). But if the employer owned the vehicle driven by the employee, a presumption arises that the employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The evidence clearly shows that Stasium was not on a special mission for his employer, Modern Continental, as he drove to work. See, e.g., Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 882 (3) ( 114 SE2d 138) (1960); Jones v. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga. App. 581, 583 (1) ( 373 SE2d 649) (1988). In opposition to summary judgment, however, Hunter came forward with evidence showing that Stasium may have been on his cell phone regarding company business when the accident occurred or that he might have been distracted by an incoming call from Campbell, whom Stasium knew was calling to tell him that he would be late or that he needed something for his work as a welder when he arrived.
Jones v. Aldrich Co., 188 Ga.App. 581, 583 (1) ( 373 SE2d 649) (1988). See also Chattanooga Publishing Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 882 (3) ( 114 SE2d 138) (1960) (employer was not liable for acts of employee delivery driver who had left his assigned delivery area to visit his wife's parents and was on his way back to work to pick up more deliveries when collision occurred). See Gassaway v. Precon Corp., 280 Ga. App. 351, 353 ( 634 SE2d 153) (2006).
Aubrey Silvey Enterprises v. Bohannon, 182 Ga. App. 738, 739 ( 356 S.E.2d 693) (1987). Since it is well established that an employee on the way to work is not in the course of his employment but rather is engaged in a personal activity, see Chattanooga Pub. Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883 ( 114 S.E.2d 138) (1960), any alleged contradiction in Barnes' deposition testimony regarding whether he intended to stop at his home before going to P. B. Rich School is immaterial, for under either version of the facts he had completed his first job and had not commenced the second, and either destination would place the trip in question outside the course of his employment. Appellants cite cases, typified by Barge v. City of College Park, 148 Ga. App. 480 ( 251 S.E.2d 580) (1978) and McDonald v. State Hwy. Dept., 127 Ga. App. 171 ( 192 S.E.2d 919) (1972), in support of their argument that Barnes was a "continuous" employee of appellee and thus was in the course of his employment when the collision occurred despite the personal nature of his trip.
Appellant has produced no evidence that Miller had received or was responding to any call to duty immediately prior to or at the time of the collision, or that he was in the performance of any duty as such employee at the time and place of the collision. See Chattanooga Pub. Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883 ( 114 S.E.2d 138) (1960). See also Collins, supra at 709.