Chastain v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. State

    135 Ga. App. 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 49 times
    In Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 203, 205 (2) (217 S.E.2d 343) (1975), we held "the presence of the [defendant] at the arraignment [could be] waived by failure of his counsel to object to proceeding in his client's absence at the arraignment."

    Language in Wells v. Terrell, 121 Ga. 368 ( 49 S.E. 319), that arraignment, or waiver thereof, in the prisoner's absence is illegal, appears to apply only where counsel attempts to enter a plea of guilty for his client. See also, Chastain v. State, 75 Ga. App. 880 ( 45 S.E.2d 81). 3. Enumeration of error 3 contends that appellant was not given a list of witnesses by the state as required by Code § 27-1403, as amended by Ga. L. 1966, pp. 430, 431 (Code Ann. § 27-1403).

  2. Hinton v. State

    195 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 11 times

    Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 398 ( 67 S.E.2d 124); Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630 (2) ( 68 S.E.2d 583); Code Ann. § 27-2502, supra. See also Chastain v. State, 75 Ga. App. 880 ( 45 S.E.2d 81). The only sentence brought to the attention of the defendant was the oral pronouncement in court.

  3. Fleming v. State

    147 S.E.2d 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 7 times

    Whether a sentence is to be served concurrently with or consecutively to another previously passed on the defendant and which he is engaged in serving at the time is, accordingly, a part of the second sentence, and where the court stipulates that it shall "run consecutively to any other sentence heretofore imposed upon this defendant in the State of Georgia" this provision, too, is a part of the sentence and should be pronounced in the presence of the defendant. See Chastain v. State, 75 Ga. App. 880, 884 ( 45 S.E.2d 81). 2.

  4. Stacey v. State of Oregon

    569 P.2d 640 (Or. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 7 times
    In Stacey v. State, 30 Or. App. 1075, 569 P.2d 640 (1977), we held that a probation order is within the meaning of the word "sentence" in ORS 138.530(1)(c) because ORS 138.040 so defined the term, and we could see no reason to construe the word more narrowly for post-conviction relief purposes.

    Only two courts have held that a defendant need be present at sentencing when only a fine is involved. In Chastain v. State, 75 Ga. App. 880, 45 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1947), the court held that a defendant's presence was necessary to yield the formality necessary for legal proceedings and to publicly establish the defendant as an example which might deter similar conduct on the part of others. In Gray v. State, 158 Tenn. 370, 13 S.W.2d 793 (1929), the court held, at least by implication, that a defendant has a due process right to be present at any sentencing proceeding.