" This Court in Chastain v. Mauldin, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 235, 237, speaking through its then Chief Justice McClendon, clearly, succinctly and correctly defined the general authority of administrative officials of our school laws and the limitations upon such authority as follows: "We have reached the conclusion that the court has jurisdiction and the relief was improperly denied.
Its enactment clearly indicates that the Legislature did not construe the granted authority for management and control to be broad enough to include the power to sell school properties. That the board of trustees of a rural high school district formed by grouping common school districts does not have the power to remove from its location a school building belonging to one of the common school districts composing the group has been held in Chastain v. Mauldin, Tex.Civ.App. 32 S.W.2d 235, 237. We quote from the opinion: "The trustees of the grouped district were invested with the power and charged with the duty of conducting schools and of administering all school property and funds of all the districts within the boundaries of the consolidated districts.
E.g.,Warren v. Sanger Indep. Sch. Dist., 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159, 160 (1926) (“It has been uniformly held that the resort to the school authorities must first be made before the courts will be authorized to hear any complaint as to a matter properly belonging to the administration of the school laws. It is a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the civil courts.”); Ollie v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 383 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2012, pet. denied) ; Gutierrez v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., 139 S.W.3d 363, 366 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2004, no pet.) ; Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ; Jackson v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ; Chastain v. Mauldin, 32 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin 1930, no writ). “It is a well-established rule that in all matters pertaining to the administration of school laws involving questions of fact ... resort must first be had to the school authorities and the method of appeal there provided for exhausted before the courts will entertain jurisdiction.”
When school boards are charged with acting without lawful authority and contrary to statutes in such a manner as to make such acts void, the courts may be appealed to directly without first exhausting the remedy of appeal through the school authorities. McLeod Independent School Dist. v. Kildare Independent School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 181 and other authorities there cited; State Line Consol. School Dist. No. 6 of Parmer County v. Farwell Independent School Dist., Tex.Com.App., 48 S.W.2d 616; Chastain v. Mauldin, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 235. Relators and respondents cite and rely upon the provisions of Article 6253, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, for authority and procedure in a quo warranto proceeding.
ayhurst or Taylor has the right to the office of superintendent of schools for the appellant district should be first submitted to the school authorities before resort may be had to the courts. Thomas et al. v. McGown et al., Tex. Civ. App. 94 S.W.2d 839; Temple Independent School Dist. et al. v. Proctor, Tex. Civ. App. 97 S.W.2d 1047 (Writ Refused); Miller v. Smiley et al., Tex. Civ. App. 65 S.W.2d 417 (Writ Refused); Martin v. Grandview Independent School Dist., Tex. Civ. App. 266 S.W. 607 (Writ Refused); South San Antonio Independent School Dist. et al. v. Martine, Tex. Civ. App. 275 S.W. 265, Writ Refused Tex.Sup., 277 S.W. 78; Moreland v. Wynne, Tex. Civ. App. 62 S.W. 1093; Harkness v. Hutcherson et al., 90 Tex. 383, 38 S.W. 1120; Kimmins v. Estes, Tex. Civ. App. 80 S.W.2d 387; Smith v. Morton Independent School Dist., Tex. Civ. App. 85 S.W.2d 853 (Writ Dismissed); State ex rel. Nevills v. Sanderson, Tex. Civ. App. 88 S.W.2d 1069; Chastain et al. v. Mauldin et al., Tex. Civ. App. 32 S.W.2d 235; State ex rel. Cosgrove et al. v. Perkins, 139 Mo. 106, 40 S.W. 650; McCollum et al. v. Adams et al., Tex. Civ. App. 110 S.W. 526; Moore Common School Dist. No. 2 of Frio County et al. v. Frio County Board of School Trustees et al., Tex. Civ. App. 90 S.W.2d 288. We think the rule is well settled by the above authorities that the aggrieved parties in the instant case may appeal from the action of the county school superintendent to the county board of school trustees, and from there they may appeal either to the courts or to the state superintendent.
See Laws of 40th Legislature, page 128, c. 83. However, without considering the effect of the amendment just referred to, the case of Chastain v. Mauldin, 32 S.W.2d 235, Chief Justice McClendon, of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals, points out exceptions to the rule now insisted upon as being those involving the constitutionality of a statute under which a school board acts, those in which no statutory authority is given for the act complained of, and those in which property or funds belonging to the school district are about to be diverted, citing the cases which so rule. See, also, Freeport Ind. School District v. Common School District, 115 Tex. 133, 277 S.W. 97; Henderson v. Miller (Tex.Civ.App.) 286 S.W. 501. County School Trustees are declared to constitute bodies corporate by article 2683, Rev.Civ.Statutes, and are charged by law with the management of the affairs of their districts and the protection of their best interests, and their right and duty to do so is distinctly upheld in the case last above cited.