Opinion
22-35084
11-16-2022
MICHAEL WAYNE CHASTAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted November 9, 2022 Portland, Oregon
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 6:20-cv-00814-MO
Before: BUMATAY and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and BAKER, International Trade Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
MEMORANDUM
Michael Chastain appeals the district court's order denying his motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a denial of an EAJA application for attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 2013). "A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the correct legal rule or its application of the correct legal rule is illogical, implausible[,] or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record." Id. at 869-70.
The EAJA provides that a district court "shall" award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified ...." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Chastain was the prevailing party. We must decide whether the district court erred in denying his EAJA motion for fees on the basis that the government's position was "substantially justified."
When a district court invokes "the substantial justification exception to the Act's provision for attorney fees," in order "[t]o determine whether the conclusion was an abuse of discretion, this court needs to know the basis for finding the exception." United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Circle, 732 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1984). If "[t]he district judge's finding shows only his conclusion," the order is in-sufficient-the district court's experience with the case "does not tell us how the government's position was substantially justified," and "[t]he judge must show us that he has considered the several factors relevant to his conclusion." Id. This requirement fully applies in Social Security cases. See Hayes v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The reasoning of First National Bank fully applies in the case at bench."); id. at 1456 ("The district court denied [the fee] motion on the grounds that the Secretary's position during the dispute was substantially justified. In its order, the court gave no explanation of the basis for its decision.").
In this case, the district court denied the fee motion via a paperless docket entry order that read, in its entirety: "ORDER: Application for Fees Pursuant to EAJA 20 is DENIED because the position of the United States was substantially justified. Ordered by Judge Michael W. Mosman." While the parties devote their briefing to analyzing "substantial justification," we cannot consider their argu-ments-"the parties' own contentions concerning whether the government's actions were substantially justified [are] no substitute for the district court's findings," and "we can review [the district court's] exercise of discretion only by evaluating what [the district court] considered, not what the parties tell us." Hayes, 785 F.2d at 1457 (quoting First Nat'l Bank, 732 F.2d at 1448). "It is impossible here to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when the order below contains no information or explanation concerning the basis for the district court's decision." Id.
Faced with similar situations, the Hayes and First National Bank courts both vacated the district court orders and remanded for the district courts "to articulate [their] reasons for denying recovery of EAJA fees." Hayes, 785 F.2d at 1457; First Nat'l Bank, 732 F.2d at 1448 ("Without implying that we disagree with the judge's conclusion, we remand this case for him to articulate his reasons for denying attorney fees under the EAJA."). It is appropriate for us to do the same. On remand, the district court must provide its analysis of the parties' arguments and an explanation for its rationale for denying Chastain's motion for attorneys' fees under the EAJA.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.