Opinion
02-19-00407-CR
08-26-2021
Christopher Chase, Appellant v. The State of Texas
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 431st District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. F19-546-431
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mike Wallach Justice
Appellant Christopher Chase appeals from his conviction and sentence for assault-family violence. We affirm.
A jury found Chase guilty of third-degree felony assault-family violence, which was enhanced by a prior felony conviction that increased the punishment range for the offense to that of a second-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.42(a), 22.01(a), (b)(2). The jury assessed Chase's punishment at five years' confinement, and the trial court sentenced Chase and entered judgment accordingly.
Chase's court-appointed appellate attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Counsel's brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders, which requires presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Id., 87 S.Ct. at 1400. Chase was provided a copy of the record and filed a pro se response, but his response does not show any arguable grounds for appeal. The State declined to file a brief.
We have independently examined the record, as is our duty upon the filing of an Anders brief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 351 (1988). After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals nothing further that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's judgment.