Chase v. Packing

3 Citing cases

  1. Zhaohong Wu v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc.

    No. 14-20-00765-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 25, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    A cause of action relating to mold exposure constitutes a toxic tort. See Chase v. Packing, No. 05-16-00620-CV, 2017 WL 2774449, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Starr, 2015 WL 4139028, at *7; Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 238-39 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).

  2. Chandra v. Leonardo DRS, Inc.

    No. 06-20-00056-CV (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Id. at 120-21 (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714); Neal v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 74 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (citing Praytor v. Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 237, 244 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("With regard to whether a plaintiff's injury was caused by exposure to a particular substance, a resident generally must prove both that the substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition and that the substance in fact caused the plaintiff's injury.")). "Havner also requires the plaintiff to present some evidence excluding other plausible causes of the injury with reasonable certainty." Chase v. Packing, No. 05-16-00620-CV, 2017 WL 2774449, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). As a result, "[e]xpert testimony is particularly necessary in toxic-tort and chemical-exposure cases, in which medically complex diseases and causal ambiguities compound the need for expert testimony."

  3. Gibson v. Stonebriar Mall, LLC

    No. 05-17-01242-CV (Tex. App. Feb. 8, 2019)   Cited 3 times

    In Dallas Independent School District. v. Finlan, 27 S.W.3d 220, 235-36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied), we held it is generally not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for continuance if the party has received the twenty-one days' notice required by rule 166a(c). Id.; see also Chase v. Packing, No. 05-16-00620-CV, 2017 WL 2774449, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Gibson has neither alleged that appellees failed to give her notice nor tried to explain why her motion should be an exception to the general rule we articulated in Finlan.