We explained in that case that we had granted certiorari “to provide guidance on an important, first-impression question of public law.” Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048. Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 795 P.2d at 1049.

The remaining three sentences in the 1997 version of 754(D), which provided the hearing request "shall operate to stay the revocation" unless the person is under suspension or revocation for other reasons, DPS could issue a temporary driving license pending disposition of the hearing, and that if the hearing request was not timely filed, the revocation order "shall be sustained," were slightly modified and kept in the 1999 version.He contends the court's interpretation of 754(D) as ambiguous is contrary to the section's "explicit" language and Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety , 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, which holds a sworn report with the officer's reasonable grounds statement is a statutory prerequisite for DPS authority to revoke a driver's license, and absent said statement, DPS' revocation order is subject to invalidation on timely appeal. The court did not find 754(D) is ambiguous, but the order's first and third rulings indicate agreement with DPS' arguments that it does not apply. ¶ 26 Interpretation and application of statutes presents a question of law, which is reviewed de novo . See In re City of Durant , 2002 OK 52, ¶ 2, 50 P.3d 218, 220. "The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent," which is "first divined from the language of a statute.

The sworn report of the officer, together with the results of any test or tests, shall be deemed true, absent any facial deficiency, should the requesting person fail to appear at the scheduled hearing. He contends the court's interpretation of § 754(D) as ambiguous is contrary to the section's "explicit" language and Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, which holds a sworn report with the officer's reasonable grounds statement is a statutory prerequisite for DPS authority to revoke a driver's license, and absent said statement, DPS' revocation order is subject to invalidation on timely appeal. The court did not find § 754(D) is ambiguous, but the order's first and third rulings indicate agreement with DPS' arguments that it does not apply. The remaining three sentences in the 1997 version of § 754(D), which provided the hearing request "shall operate to stay the revocation" unless the person is under suspension or revocation for other reasons, DPS could issue a temporary driving license pending disposition of the hearing, and that if the hearing request was not timely filed, the revocation order "shall be sustained," were slightly modified and kept in the 1999 version.

The “reasonable grounds” language is a statutory prerequisite for DPS revocation of the license. Chase v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1990 OK 78, ¶ 4, 795 P.2d 1048, 1049. Its absence from the report is a facial deficiency that renders the revocation order vulnerable to invalidation. Id. at ¶ 5.

¶ 9 The initial question before us is whether the “sworn report from a law enforcement officer” required by § 754(C) is a sworn report by the “arresting officer” mentioned in § 754(A), as opposed to simply an officer with personal knowledge of the events sworn to. In Chase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048. the Oklahoma Supreme Court confirmed that the “sworn report” of § 754(C) is a statutory requirement for a license revocation, stating: DPS concedes that the sworn report of an enforcement officer, which § 754(3) expressly mandates, is absent from the DPS paperwork and from the record in this case.

¶13 Under this administrative scheme, two statutory prerequisites are fundamental to DPS' power to revoke a license: 1) a blood or breath test report or the driver's refusal of such a test; and 2) the officer's sworn report that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was driving under the influence. See 47 O.S. 2011 §§ 753 & 754(C); See also Chase v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 1990 OK 78, ¶ 4, 795 P.2d 1048, 1049.Only upon receipt of both statutory prerequisites does DPS have the power to "revoke or deny the driving privilege of the arrested person." Upon a blood or breath test reflecting an alcohol concentration over the legal limit, or upon refusal of such, a driver's license stands revoked.

¶15 We are persuaded in this view by prior holdings of the Oklahoma appellate courts. In Chase v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the nearly identical statutory predecessor to §754(C) as describing the "administrative documentation" required to sustain a revocation, and held the failure of DPS to produce the proper "statutory materials" to support a revocation order in a timely direct appeal to the district court rendered an order of revocation subject to vacation: Two statutory prerequisites for DPS revocation of the license here in dispute are: (1) a written report that the driver's breath test showed an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10 and (2) the enforcement officer's sworn report "that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads . . . while under the influence of alcohol. . . ."

¶ 15 We are persuaded in this view by prior holdings of the Oklahoma appellate courts. In Chase v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the nearly identical statutory predecessor to § 754(C) as describing the “ administrative documentation ” required to sustain a revocation, and held the failure of DPS to produce the proper “ statutory materials ” to support a revocation order in a timely direct appeal to the district court rendered an order of revocation subject to vacation: Two statutory prerequisites for DPS revocation of the license here in dispute are: (1) a written report that the driver's breath test showed an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10 and (2) the enforcement officer's sworn report “that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads ... while under the influence of alcohol....”....

¶ 15 We are persuaded in this view by prior holdings of the Oklahoma appellate courts. In Chase v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the nearly identical statutory predecessor to § 754(C) as describing the “administrative documentation ” required to sustain a revocation, and held the failure of DPS to produce the proper “statutory materials ” to support a revocation order in a timely direct appeal to the district court rendered an order of revocation subject to vacation:Two statutory prerequisites for DPS revocation of the license here in dispute are: (1) a written report that the driver's breath test showed an alcohol concentration of at least 0.10 and (2) the enforcement officer's sworn report “that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public roads ... while under the influence of alcohol....”....

B. Who May Make the "Sworn Report"?¶9 The initial question before us is whether the "sworn report from a law enforcement officer" required by § 754(C) is a sworn report by the "arresting officer" mentioned in § 754(A), as opposed to simply an officer with personal knowledge of the events sworn to. InChase v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 1990 OK 78, 795 P.2d 1048, the Oklahoma Supreme Court confirmed that the "sworn report" of § 754(C) is a statutory requirement for a license revocation, stating: DPS concedes that the sworn report of an enforcement officer, which § 754(3) expressly mandates, is absent from the DPS paperwork and from the record in this case.