Declarations as to negotiability or the lack thereof are generally ineffective. See Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370. The acid test of negotiability is the declaration on the face of the instrument.
" In the case of Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370, 373, in re-affirming the Miami Beach case, supra, the Court said: "* * * The off-street and on-street parking facilities maintained by the City of Miami Beach are part of one general regulatory scheme to control and regulate the tremendous volume of traffic there, and the cost of improving and extending which necessitated the issuance of the bonds there involved. * * *"
We concluded that the record failed to establish that the majority of the improvements would make any significant contribution to traffic over the bridge, and thus using the toll to pay for the proposed bonds would place an undue burden on island residents and visitors. The trial court also relied upon Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1951), another bond validation case. In Chase, the bond issue was for the construction and operation of a port terminal facility and was authorized by Special Act 26466, Acts 1949, Extraordinary Session.
The appellant next contends that the fiscal program reflected by the proposed issue is not feasible. We have disposed of this contention contrary to the position of the appellant in Chase v. Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370; State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, Fla., 89 So.2d 653; Sanibel-Captiva Taxpayers Association v. County of Lee, Fla., 139 So.2d 334, and Town of Medley v. State, Fla., 162 So.2d 257, Opinion filed March 23, 1964. In addition, the record supports the conclusion that the new issue will result in a substantial reduction in interest rates and that the 1963 bonds are subject to much more attractive call provisions.
We are not persuaded that the evidence pertaining to certain alterations of District plans subsequent to its creation, and to the contracting procedures employed by it, amounted to such abandonment or breach as to invalidate either the initial district referendum or other actions controverted herein. As to scope of inquiry in bond validation proceedings, see 26 Fla.Juris. 477. Also see National Air Lines v. County of Dade, Fla. 1954, 76 So.2d 277; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Lakeland, 130 Fla. 72, 177 So. 206; Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla. 1951, 54 So.2d 370; State v. City of Miami, Fla. 1958, 103 So.2d 185. For the foregoing reasons, that portion of the decree excluding from District jurisdiction "all those lands within Section 2-30-15, Section 3-30-15 and Section 4-30-15" should be stricken.
It is defendants' position that parking meter fees collected under the police power can be used for the broader purpose of traffic regulation, and that the fact the fees provided exceed the cost of administering the Parking Meter Ordinance but do not substantially exceed the cost of traffic regulation generally, does not result in the ordinance establishing a tax, as for general revenue, rather than fees reasonably related to the police power exercised. See, Skidmore v. City of Elizabethtown, Ky. 1956, 291 S.W.2d 3; City of Hutchinson v. Harrison, 1952, 173 Kan. 18, 244 P.2d 222; Bellington v. Township of East Windsor, 17 N.J. 558, 112 A.2d 268; 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (3rd Ed.) Section 26.168; City of Rapid City v. Rensch, S.Dak. 1958, 90 N.W.2d 380; Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla. 1951, 54 So.2d 370; In re Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A.2d 836; 1 Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, p. 158 (1948); Wilhoit v. City of Springfield, 1943, 237 Mo.App. 775, 171 S.W.2d 95; Hickey v. Riley, 1945, 177 Or. 321, 162 P.2d 371; Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.Civ.App. 1937, 105 S.W.2d 743; Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W.2d 889; Board of Commissioners of City of Newark v. Local Government Board, 1945, 133 N.J.L. 513, 45 A.2d 139. Both plaintiffs and defendants are in accord that the City of St. Louis has no constitutional, statutory or charter power to levy parking fees under its taxing power.
All that it sought to do was to inject collateral matters that have no place in a bond validation proceeding. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Lakeland, 130 Fla. 72, 177 So. 206; Town of Riviera Beach v. State, Fla., 53 So.2d 828; Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370, 374. The decree appealed from should be affirmed.
We have carefully considered this question, in the light of briefs filed, and have concluded that both the notice of intention to apply for passage of the Act, and the title thereto, were sufficient within the meaning of Sections 21 and 16 of Article III of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. As to Section 21, it is well settled that so long as the law finally enacted accords in substance and in purpose and is germane to and within the scope of the subject matter of the published notice, the organic provision is complied with. See State ex rel. Watson v. City of Miami, 153 Fla. 653, 15 So.2d 481; Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370, 374. Similarly, as to the requirements of Section 16, "The test by which it may be determined whether the title of an act meets this requirement is met if its verbiage is sufficient to put one on notice and cause him to inquire into and ascertain the contents of the body of the act. If it does this, it is sufficient to correct the vice that section 16 of article 3 was designed to cure."
We are of the opinion and hold that the City of Panama City cannot by contract tie its hands and bind itself in such manner as to relinquish for a long, possibly indefinite, period of time its sovereign right and duty under the police power to regulate traffic. See Chase v. City of Sanford, Fla., 54 So.2d 370. We conclude that the learned Chancellor was eminently correct in dismissing the petition which sought the validation of parking revenue bonds which had as their purpose the acquisition of funds with which to reconstruct, pave, improve streets and roads in the City of Panama City and to provide parking meters in or upon said streets and roads.
Such governmental powers are by nature nondelegable and may not be contracted away or delegated to private persons, organizations, or corporations. See generally, Adoue v. State, 408 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla. 1981); City of Safety Harbor v. City of Clearwater, 330 So.2d 840, 841, 842 (2 D.C.A.Fla., 1976); Chase v. City of Sanford, 54 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1951); State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Tallahassee, 177 So. 719 (Fla. 1937); AGO 83-64, Question 13. Compare, Smith v. Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Hall County, 259 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. 1979), which concluded that a county commission had the authority to enter into a contract with an Arizona corporation to provide fire protection, first aid, emergency rescue and related services to a county fire district; City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1983), holding that providing day-care educational facilities served a valid municipal purpose rationally related to the health, morals, protection and welfare of the municipality, and that therefore, since no constitutional, general or special law provision prevented the city from contracting with a nonprofit organization to provide day-care service, the city was authorized to do so under its home rule powers. And see, Ch. 73-600, Laws of Florida, which created the Pinellas County Fire Protection Authority as a county-wide au