Opinion
12-26-1930
CHASE NAT. BANK et al. v. DEICHMILLER et al.
Jay B. Tomlinson, of Trenton, for complainants. Frank Transue, of Trenton, for defendants.
Syllabus by the Court.
The natural meaning of the word "home" is broader than that of the word "dwelling house."
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the language and circumstances of the instant case, a bequest of "the chattels used by my family in my home" includes automobiles, cows, chickens, agricultural machines and implements.
Syllabus by the Court.
A testamentary gift of property "which I now own and possess" refers to the date of testamentary execution and not the date of death.
Syllabus by the Court.
A testamentary gift of "800 of the shares of the F. W. W. Co. which I now own and possess" is a gift of the interest in the net corporate assets then represented by such 800 shares.
Syllabus by the Court.
After the execution of a will containing the above bequest, the corporation by a stock dividend and a stock "split-up" multiplied its outstanding shares without thereby increasing its assets, so that, at testator's death, the interest in the corporation formerly represented by 800 of its shares was represented by 3,000 of the new shares. Held, that the legatee is entitled to 3,000 of the new shares.
Suit by the Chase National Bank and others against Elizabeth H. Deichmiller and others for judicial interpretation of the will of Albert W. Satterthwaite, deceased.
Decree in accordance with opinion.
Jay B. Tomlinson, of Trenton, for complainants.
Frank Transue, of Trenton, for defendants.
BUCHANAN, Vice Chancellor.
The bill is filed for the judicial interpretation of the will of Albert W. Satterthwaite, deceased.
The first question arises under item third of the will, whereby testator gives to his trustee in trust for the use of his wife (and daughters, under certain circumstances) during her life or widowhood "any and all real estate which I may own in Crosswicks, Burlington County, N. J., and particularly my home known as Brookside Lawn, together with all the furniture, furnishings, household and kitchen utensils and all other chattels used by me and my family in said home."
Decedent's residence, Brookside Lawn, was a small farm or estate, having on it, in addition to the dwelling bouse, a barn, garage, and chicken houses, and also certain chattels not in the dwelling house itself, to wit, two automobiles, two cows, some chickens, and certain agricultural machines and implements.
The question is whether these lastmentioned chattels pass under the language of the gift above quoted. It is concluded that they do.
It appears that the decedent was retired; that he was engaged in no business, but farmed a small portion of the lands to raise produce for his home; that the home was in the county, at a considerable distance from town, and that the automobiles were used, and were necessary for that purpose, for the making of trips to town, to stores, to railroad station, and the like, in the usual life of the family at the home.
The words of the testator are "all other chattels used by me and my family in said home." The word "home" means not merely the dwelling house, but the entire residence estate. The words first used, "furniture, furnishings, household and kitchen utensils," certainly include all chattels in the house; hence "all other chattels" must mean chattels other than those in the house.
The remaining question arises under item fourth, of the will, whereby the testator gives to the trustee, in trust to pay the income to the wife for life, "eight hundred shares of the capital stock of the F. W. Woolworth Company which I now own and possess, or in case I shall not own and possess same at the time of my decease its equivalent in cash or securities at market value at the time of my decease."
The will was drawn and executed in March, 1926. At that time testator "owned and possessed" 4,200 shares of the stock in question, and had also some additional shares in the possession of a brokerage house. Unquestionably the bequest is of 800 of those 4,200 shares, not the shares he owned and possessed at bis death. Cf. Henderson v. Henderson, 77 N. J. Eq. 317, 77 A. 348.
In 1927 the Woolworth Company declared a stock dividend of 50 per cent. increasing testator's holdings (outside the brokerage account) of 4,200 shares, to 6,300 shares. In June, 1929, there was a "split-up" of the stock, whereby the company issued to stockholders 2 1/2 of new shares in place of each share theretofore held. This increased testator's 6,300 shares to 15,750 shares. Testator diedApril 8, 1930, still owning and possessing these 15,750 shares.
The issue is as to whether, under the clause of the will above quoted, the wife takes an equitable life estate in only 800 of these 15,750 shares, or in the 3,000 shares, to which the original 800 have now increased in the manner above described. It is concluded that the latter view is the correct one.
The bequest of "800 shares of the capital stock of the P. W. Woolworth Company which I now own and possess" is a specific legacy. Burnett v. Heinrichs, 95 N. J. Eq. 112, 122 A. 681. The direction for substitution of an alternative gift, if he does not own and possess at his death the shares bequeathed, is an additional evidence that the gift is specific (Blair v. Scribner, 65 N. J. Eq. 498, 57 A. 318, reversed Id., 67 N. J. Eq. 583, 60 A. 211, but not on that point), although in the present case such corroboration is not necessary.
A specific legacy is adeemed only when the subject is lost, destroyed, or subsequently disposed of by testator, or so altered in form, by testator's subsequent acts, as to indicate a change of testamentary intent on his part. Conversely, if the subject, although somewhat changed in form, be not sufficiently changed to indicate change of testamentary intent, there is no ademption. See In re Cooper, 95 N. J. Eq. 210, 123 A. 45, 30 A. L. R. 673.
Intent is therefore, under the law in this state at any rate, a material factor in an issue as to an ademption of a specific legacy. This is entirely logical, for a testator's whole will is simply an expression of his intent, as to the disposition of his property after his death. The one fundamental rule of testamentary interpretation is to give effect, if possible, to the testator's intent, if that intent can be determined from the whole will and the surrounding circumstances.
In the instant case, the legacy is given to the wife, as expressly set forth, for her maintenance and support. Obviously the thing which testator intended to give was not the mere paper certificates for 800 shares of stock, but the interest in the company which those shares represented. The evidence showed that at the date of the will those shares had a market value of $180 apiece; the 800 shares had an aggregate value of nearly $150,000. It was that interest, worth approximately $150,000, which testator bequeathed. At the time of testator's death, that interest was represented not by 800 of the total number of shares of stock then extant, but by 3,000 of such shares. At testator's death, the evidence showed, the value of a single share was only $68, the value of 800 of such shares only a little over $50,000.
It is clear that at the time of the making of the will the total net assets of the corporation were represented by the total number of shares of stock then issued and outstanding, and that each share of stock represented an aliquot part of the total net assets. The acts of the corporation in increasing the number of shares issued, not by selling additional shares in exchange for additional capital, but simply by multiplying the shares of stock outstanding by 3 3/4, without any increase in the net assets, had no other result than this, that the interest in the corporation which theretofore had been represented by one share of old stock was thereafter represented by 3 3/4 shares of the new stock.
The thing bequeathed, then, the interest in the corporation represented by 800 shares of stock at the time of executing the will, was still owned and possessed by testator at the time of his death, slightly changed in form (i. e., being then represented by 3,000 shares of stock), but not sufficiently changed to indicate a change of testamentary intent. The bequest in the will therefore must be deemed to carry the thing bequeathed, in its altered form (i. e., the 3,000 shares).
In Prendergast v. Walsh, 58 N. J. Eq. 149, 42 A. 1049, a similar result was reached in a case similar in principle. In Re Clifford, L. R. 1912, 1 Ch. 29, a like result was reached in a case similar in facts as well as principle. See, also, Pope v. Hinckley, 209 Mass. 323, 95 N. E. 798.