Opinion
2003-107 K C.
Decided December 17, 2003.
Appeal by defendant from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (M. Solomon, J.), entered November 25, 2002, denying his motion to vacate a settlement stipulation, the judgment entered pursuant thereto, and an income execution.
Order unanimously affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: ARONIN, J.P., GOLIA and RIOS, JJ.
In an action to recover the balances due on three revolving credit card accounts, defendant stipulated to settle the debt by monthly payments, and consented to the entry of judgment, on 10 days' notice, in the event of his default. Two years after such default and the entry of judgment thereon ( cf. CPLR 3215 [i] [1]), defendant moved to vacate the settlement stipulation, the judgment entered pursuant thereto, and the ensuing income execution, on the grounds that the default judgment was entered without proper notice and that he had neither read the stipulation he signed nor agreed to its terms. The court denied the motion and on the appeal therefrom defendant now insists, for the first time, that he lacked sufficient competence in the English language to understand the settlement's terms.
We find no error with respect to the judgment. The stipulation expressly provided for the entry of a judgment upon defendant's default of its terms 10 days after service of a notice of default. Plaintiff proved proper service and thereafter properly invoked the "uniform and simplified procedure" authorized by CPLR 3215 (i) (1) for the entry of such judgments ( see 7 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 3215.42).
We also find no ground to vacate the stipulation. Although not properly before us, defendant's explanation for his purported failure to understand and assent to the stipulation's terms, his inadequate grasp of English, is without merit.
The signatory to a contract is "presumed to know its contents and to assent to them" ( Imero Fiorentino Assoc. v. Green, 85 AD2d 419, 420 [1982]), a rule that is not avoided by an inability to understand the English language ( Maines Paper Food Serv. v. Adel, 256 AD2d 760, 761). A party whose mastery of English is imperfect must make reasonable efforts to have the document made clear to him ( Shklovskiy v. Klhan, 273 AD2d 371, 372), and an action to set the contract aside will not succeed absent a valid explanation for the absence of such effort ( Kassab v. Marco Shoes, 282 AD2d 316; Kenol v. Nelson, 181 AD2d 863, 866; Soflo v. Hughes, 162 AD2d 518, 519). Defendant admits he understood the stipulation's salient terms, and, it was incumbent upon him to determine whether said terms expressed the entire agreement, and if not, to have the remainder interpreted or explained ( e.g., Curanovic v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 307 AD2d 435, 437). We further note that defendant's pro se documents display a reasonably fluent command of English ( Kenol v. Nelson, 181 AD2d at 865-866). In any event, defendant failed to raise any factual basis in the court below to justify the stipulation's vacatur ( Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau Klimpl, 82 NY2d 375, 383; Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143, 149-150; Town of Clarkstown v. M.R.O. Pump Tank, 287 AD2d 497, 498).