"Assuming the facts are not in dispute—and in this case they are not—an order on a motion for summary judgment is subject to the de novo standard of review." Chase Bank of Tex. Nat'l Ass'n v. State, Dep't of Ins. , 860 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). "A summary judgment is appropriate where the material facts are not in dispute and the judgment is based on the legal construction of documents."
The trial court correctly recognized that subject matter jurisdiction is not determined by the decedent's domicile; rather, it is based on the power of the court over the class of cases to which the controversy belongs. See Ruth v. Department of Legal Affairs, 684 So.2d 181, 185 (Fla. 1996); Chase Bank of Texas Nat'l Ass'n. v. Department of Ins., 860 So.2d 472, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). We recognize that in other contexts, such as marriage dissolution, residency has been associated with subject matter jurisdiction.
Based on my review, it appears that a district court of appeal's right to consider a case en banc must be considered a jurisdictional power, notwithstanding that its authority in such respect is derived solely from the rule, and despite the well recognized principle that a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is given it by substantive law, i.e., by either the Florida Constitution or by statute. Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2003); Chase Bank of Texas Nat'l Ass'n v. Dep't of Ins., 860 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Despite the absence of any statutory or constitutional provision creating in the district courts the power to proceed en banc, I regard the appellate courts' authority to so act as a substantive power, and, as such, part of their subject-matter jurisdiction.