First, this court has considered and rejected the contention that the Board is required to make specific written findings when it issues a permit. In Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 983, 991, 542 N.E.2d 82 (1989), the permit letters stated that the Board considered the Department's report, the application materials, and the applicant's testimony. The letters stated the Board's approval was "based on the project's substantial conformance with the applicable standards and criteria," and that "the applicants had documented and justified the need to establish freestanding acute mental health facilities."

See 77 Ill. Adm. Code 1130.660(a), amended at 30 Ill. Reg. 14852 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). No single criterion is more important than any other (Mercy Crystal Lake Hospital, 2016 IL App (3d) 130947, ¶ 22, 405 Ill.Dec. 734, 59 N.E.3d 27 ), and the Board uses its judgment and expertise to consider and balance the applicable criteria (Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill.App.3d 983, 989, 134 Ill.Dec. 82, 542 N.E.2d 82 (1989) ). ¶ 23 The Board ultimately determined that ManorCare's application did not meet the "service accessibility," "unnecessary duplication/maldistribution," and "impact on other area providers" criteria.

See 77 Ill. Adm. Code 1130.660(a), amended at 30 Ill. Reg. 14852 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). No single criterion is more important than any other (Mercy Crystal Lake Hospital, 2016 IL App (3d) 130947, ¶ 22), and the Board uses it judgment and expertise to consider and balance the applicable criteria (Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 983, 989 (1989)). ¶ 24 The Board ultimately determined that ManorCare's application did not meet the criteria relating to "service accessibility," "unnecessary duplication/maldistribution," and "impact on other area providers." At the hearing before the ALJ, ManorCare attempted to demonstrate why a certificate of need should be issued despite the fact that the project did not comply with all applicable criteria.

Moreover, our courts have held that the Board is not required to make specific written findings when it approves an application. Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 983, 991 (1989); Access Center for Health, Ltd. v. Health Facilities Planning Board, 283 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237 (1996) (Board required to specify findings and conclusions only when it denies an application). To the extent that the court in Medina Nursing Center required the Board to articulate specific reasons for its decision on an application, we decline to follow the holding in that case.

Moreover, our courts have held that the Board is not required to make specific written findings when it approves an application. Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill.App.3d 983, 991, 134 Ill.Dec. 82, 542 N.E.2d 82 (1989) ; Access Center for Health, Ltd. v. Health Facilities Planning Board, 283 Ill.App.3d 227, 237, 218 Ill.Dec. 525, 669 N.E.2d 668 (1996) (Board required to specify findings and conclusions only when it denies an application). To the extent that the court in Medina Nursing Center required the Board to articulate specific reasons for its decision on an application, we decline to follow the holding in that case.

¶ 25 The Board cites some cases holding the boilerplate “substantial compliance” language to be sufficient for purposes of judicial review of the Board's decisions. See Access Center for Health, Ltd. v. Health Facilities Planning Board, 283 Ill.App.3d 227, 237, 218 Ill.Dec. 525, 669 N.E.2d 668 (1996); Charter Medical of Cook County, Inc. v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill.App.3d 983, 991, 134 Ill.Dec. 82, 542 N.E.2d 82 (1989). We disagree with those decisions because, under binding supreme court precedent, the grounds of the administrative decision must be adequately sustained ( Reinhardt, 61 Ill.2d at 103, 329 N.E.2d 218) and the robotic declaration of “substantial conformance with the applicable standards and criteria of Part 1110 and 1120” is worthless for purposes of judicial review.

In addition, nowhere does it state that "any person affected" may not seek an extension, nor does the District point us to any case that so holds. As noted above, administrative agencies such as the Board are given substantial deference in construing their own statutes and rules (District No. 155, 247 Ill. App.3d at 344, 617 N.E.2d at 274), and the role of a reviewing court is limited to "determining whether the Board's construction and application [are] plainly erroneous or inconsistent with long-settled construction" (Charter Medical of Cook County v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, Inc., 185 Ill. App.3d 983, 987, 542 N.E.2d 82, 84 (1989)). Although Bove is not the party that brought the unfair labor practice charge, he is clearly the person on behalf of whom the Union's exceptions were filed, and hence is something more than merely "any person affected" by the decision.

North Carolina appellate courts have not yet addressed the question of whether or not consideration of the actual need may be made when the applicant for a Certificate of Need appears to violate numerical projections such as those contained in the 1987 SMFP. Other jurisdictions have addressed this question and have concluded that the state plan may not be used as the sole determinant of the need for a proposal, even though consistency with the plan was one of the statutory review criteria. Balsam v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 486 So.2d 1341 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986); American Medical Int'l v. Charter Lake Hosp., 186 Ga. App. 204, 366 S.E.2d 795 (1988); Charter Medical of Cook County v. HCA Health Services of Midwest, 185 Ill. App.3d 983, 542 N.E.2d 82 (1989); Martin County Nursing Center v. Medco Centers, 441 N.E.2d 964 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982); Irvington General Hosp. v. Dep't of Health, 149 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 461, 374 A.2d 49 (1977); Sturman v. Ingraham, 383 N.Y.S.2d 60, 52 A.D.2d 882 (1976); Roanoke Memorial Hospitals v. Kenley, 3 Va. App. 599, 352 S.E.2d 525 (1987). The Agency cites two cases in which the courts held that the State did not err in refusing to deviate from its regulatory bed need methodology.