Opinion
No. 78783
December 17, 1996
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE PATRICIA S. JOYCE.
Kenneth G. Charron appeals from the dismissal of his petition against Dave Dormire, the assistant superintendent of Jefferson City Correctional Center (JCCC). The circuit court dismissed his petition because the claim was barred by: (1) § 516.145 RSMo 1994, the one-year statute of limitations governing inmate claims, (2) the official immunity doctrine, and (3) the public duty doctrine. This Court has jurisdiction as Charron challenges the constitutionality of § 516.145. We affirm.
All statutory references are to RSMo, 1994.
I.
On October 19, 1992, Charron received by prison mail a special order that he had purchased through an approved vendor. The order consisted of one leather vest, one pair of leather pants, and one leather weight belt, totaling $600.00. After repackaging the items in a box addressed to his mother, Charron brought the box and some stamps to the prison law library to weigh the box and determine the necessary postage. Apparently Charron left the box in the library overnight, as the leather items and sixteen twenty-nine-cent stamps were seized in a routine sweep of the library for contraband. Thirty-three other items were seized in the sweep. Most of these items were articles of clothing lacking inmate identification numbers.
All of the seized items were brought to the prison property room. The next day an officer from the property room forwarded a complete list to the assistant superintendent and requested permission to dispose of the items "per policy." The assistant superintendent's written response was "Dispose or Donate." The property room officer shredded the leather pants, vest, and belt with a knife. He then placed the items in trash bags, sealed the bags, and disposed of the bags through the institutional trash.
After exhausting the required portion of the administrative remedies available to him, Charron filed a petition in small claims court. Judgment was entered against Dave Dormire "in his official capacity" for $600.00 and court costs. Judgment was entered in favor of Correctional Officer I (C.O.) Thompson, who Charron claims actually seized the items in the library. Pursuant to § 482.365, the assistant superintendent asserted his right to trial de novo. The trial court dismissed Charron's petition for failure to state a claim.
In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of Charron's petition, we treat the facts alleged as true, construe the allegations in favor of the appellant, and determine whether the allegations invoke principles of substantive law.
Hagely v. Board of Educ., 841 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Mo. banc 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979)).
II.
Charron argues that the assistant superintendent is not protected by the doctrine of official immunity. The doctrine of official immunity shields officials from liability for injuries arising out of their discretionary acts or omissions. An official may be held liable, however, for torts arising out of ministerial acts.
Charron has abandoned his arguments concerning C.O. Thompson.
Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985).
Id.
Charron further argues that the assistant superintendent, by instructing the property room officer to dispose of or donate all of the items seized in the library, caused him a loss of $600.00. He asserts this action was discretionary, but in bad faith, and therefore, not protected. In the alternative, Charron contends that the act was ministerial and that the assistant superintendent breached a duty to him by ordering that his property be disposed of or donated, allegedly contrary to policy.
Whether a function is discretionary or ministerial is a case by case determination to be made after weighing "such factors as the nature of the official's duties, the extent to which the acts involve policymaking or the exercise of professional expertise and judgment." "'[C]ourts should not construe the term 'discretionary' too narrowly' lest they frustrate 'the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation.'"
Id. at 836.
Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Mo. banc 1983) (citing Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.App. 1979)).
A ministerial function is one which a public officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to [an employee's] own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed."
Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 769 (Mo. banc 1984) (quoting Jackson, 581 S.W.2d at 43).
Section 217.197.1 states that "[t]he amount and type of personal property an offender housed in a correctional center may possess shall be established by policy. Control and disposition of offender[s'] property as related to value and volume shall be set by policy." Instead of imposing a mandatory statutory procedure to be followed by each correctional center, the legislature chose to delegate the responsibility of developing inmate property control procedures to prison officials. Developing these procedures is more than a ministerial task as it "necessarily involve[s] the exercise of a substantial degree of judgment and require[s] consideration of the manifold aspects of prison operation."
(emphasis added).
Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836.
Once a policy is instated, an official's discretion does not end. "'Discretion' relates not so much to the exercise of naked and unrestrained power as to the exercise of judgment." The assistant superintendent, with the superintendent, can update and change the policy as deemed appropriate to meet changes in security concerns and prison population. Also, the policy itself may require a prison official to make a judgment call in certain situations, as does the JCCC policy. It states in pertinent part:
Id.
[III.] A. . . . clothing items should be marked with the inmate's registration number by the property room staff. Inmates will request through the property room to bring clothing items to the property room to be marked and added to the inmate's inventory. Unidentifiable property is subject to confiscation and loss.
. . .
[B.] 3. When property belonging to an inmate is found out of his assigned living area, except as noted in III.B.[1], it should be processed as contraband, and disposed of per established procedures for unauthorized property unless extenuating circumstances exist.
The exceptions are:
a. walkman radio to recreation area for recreational purposes only,
b. leisure library books to and from cell and library,
c. legal work in folder to and from cell and library — must have valid pass in hand,
d. school books/supplies to and from cell and school,
e. canteen items from canteen to cell, cell to yard, and
f. religious paraphernalia to and from religious services.
g. appliance repair outside the institution
h. clothing out to institutional laundry.
§ III.B.1, No. 22-1.2 Inmate Property Control Procedures, Jefferson City Correctional Center Standard Operating Procedures, Division of Adult Institutions.
The correct way to send items through the mail is covered by § III.B.2, "To remove any other items from cell/cubicle specific written permission will be required from the housing unit supervisor or higher authority."
. . .
[H. 2.] d. Items that are deemed useful and in working order should be donated to a local charitable organization . . . .
. . .
f. Items determined to be dangerous or of no use to a charitable organization should be documented on the Property Disposition form and disposed of through the landfill.
Id. at §§ III.A-H (emphasis added).
The assistant superintendent used his judgment when he and the superintendent instated the procedure that they decided was the safest, most efficient procedure for processing inmate property. He used his judgment in deciding that extenuating circumstances did not exist for any inmate to be storing unidentifiable clothing in the library overnight and that all of the clothes seized in the sweep should be processed as contraband. Finally, the assistant superintendent used his judgment in instructing the property room officer to decide what contraband could be used by local charities. The decisions that the JCCC policy calls for, in addition to the initial statutory delegation of policymaking authority, demonstrate the discretionary nature of the assistant superintendent's decisions.
We hold that the assistant superintendent's actions were discretionary functions, not ministerial functions; and therefore, he is protected under the doctrine of official immunity. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose behind the doctrine. "[S]ociety's compelling interest in vigorous and effective administration of public affairs requires that the law protect those individuals who, in the face of imperfect information and limited resources, must daily exercise their best judgment in conducting the public's business."
Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836 (citing Jackson, 581 S.W.2d at 42).
III.
Charron argues that even if we decide that the assistant superintendent's decisions were discretionary, he is not protected because he made them "maliciously, willfully, corruptly, and in bad faith." Taking all the facts that Charron pleads as true, he concedes that he left personal property in the library overnight. He alleges no facts that demonstrate that he was maliciously singled out in any way, or that the assistant superintendent departed from policy directives. The record shows that the assistant superintendent instructed the property room officer to dispose of or donate every item seized, not just those left behind by Charron. In any case, Charron's inmate identification number was not on his items. Even accepting as true that the box in which he left the clothes was addressed to his mother, the assistant superintendent made his judgment based on the list forwarded to him from the property room, which did not list the addressed box.
Charron's conclusions are insufficient to support his allegation that the assistant superintendent's discretionary decisions were made in bad faith. The trial court properly dismissed his petition for failure to state a claim.
As we have disposed of this case on other grounds, we do not address the constitutionality of § 516.145. The judgment is affirmed.
State v. Rector, 40 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo. 1931).
All concur.