We do not agree with Brite that the prior act, which was committed in 1997, was too remote in time to be admissible. See Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20 ( 262 SE2d 789) (1980); Charo v. State, 206 Ga.App. 297 (3) ( 424 SE2d 900) (1992) (four or five years not too remote). Focusing on the similarities, not the differences, between the charged crimes and the prior independent offense, see Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345 (6) ( 541 SE2d 357) (2001), the State's evidence showed that both crimes were revenge or "grudge" killings; both victims were shot in the head at point blank range; Brite used cunning and stealth to lure both victims to the location where he killed them; both killings involved the use of a handgun; and both show a propensity to resort to deadly force with little or no provocation.
In four decisions after Gilstrap, this Court and the Court of Appeals have found no abuse of discretion in permitting introduction of a single similar transaction prior to the introduction of evidence of the crime for which the defendant was being tried. Blackburn v. State, 266 Ga. 541 (3) ( 468 S.E.2d 381) (1996); Cowan v. State, 243 Ga. App. 388 (2a) ( 531 S.E.2d 785) (2000); Curtis v. State, 212 Ga. App. 237 (4) ( 441 S.E.2d 776) (1994); Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297 (1) ( 424 S.E.2d 900) (1992). The similar transaction presented first in the present case was a robbery committed earlier the same evening as the attempted robberies and murder involved in the present case, less than 10 miles away. Under those circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in permitting the State to begin its introduction of evidence with the single similar transaction.
" (Citation omitted.) Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 299 (4) ( 424 SE2d 900) (1992). And the lapse of approximately 15 years between the offenses does not render the similar transaction inadmissible.
Little v. State, 278 Ga. 425, 426 (2) ( 603 SE2d 252) (2004).Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 299 (4) ( 424 SE2d 900) (1992). 3. Lewis contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to: (a) cross-examine the stepdaughter regarding certain diary entries made by her; and (b) present previous "false" allegations from the stepdaughter.
Johnson, P.J., and Eldridge, J., concur. See Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 299(4) ( 424 S.E.2d 900) (1992) (similar transaction victim's recantation of her allegation of child molestation went only to the weight and credibility of her testimony but did not render the similar transaction evidence inadmissible). See Anderson, supra (evidence of robbery admitted as a similar transaction in an armed robbery case); Nelson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 63, 64-64(3) ( 528 S.E.2d 844) (2000) (evidence of robbery by force admitted as similar transaction evidence in an armed robbery case); Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 140(3) ( 453 S.E.2d 110) (1995) (evidence of robbery admitted as a similar transaction in an armed robbery case).
Id. See Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 298 ( 424 S.E.2d 900) (1992). (b) Cowan contends that the trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence although the State had not complied with Williams v. State, asserting that at the pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, the State did not articulate the purposes of the evidence.
This factual distinction alone is sufficient to remove the case sub judice from the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Gilstrap. Accord Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 298 (1) ( 424 S.E.2d 900). Additionally, we note that prior to admission of the similar transaction evidence, the trial court conducted a hearing in compliance with the requirements of Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (b) ( 409 S.E.2d 649). Also, the trial court determined that the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support admission of the similar transaction under the limited evidentiary purpose for which the jury may consider it.
Glisson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 342, 343 ( 301 S.E.2d 62) (1983). Even if Curtis had not waived his objection to the introduction of the first similar transaction evidence, in Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 298 ( 424 S.E.2d 900) (1992), we specifically held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of one similar transaction prior to introducing evidence of the offense charged. 5. Curtis contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue matters outside the evidence of this case.
In Gilstrap, "the Supreme Court expressly declined to determine the limits on the trial court's discretion as to the order of the admission of evidence." Charo v. State, 206 Ga. App. 297, 298 (1) ( 424 S.E.2d 900) (1992). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim to testify in chronological order about her abuse even though such a presentation resulted in the admission of some similar transaction evidence prior to the evidence on the crimes charged.