1991), decided subsequently to the trial court's ruling in this case. See also Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1991).The case was initially filed in the Court of Appeals but subsequently transferred to this court in view of the constitutional issues present.

Section 12-17-801, also known as the dram-shop-liability statute, provides the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff injured by an intoxicated person against a vendor of alcohol beverages. Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 951 (Colo. 1991) (discussing the enactment of section 12-17-128.5, C.R.S. (1986), the predecessor to section 12-47-801). In enacting the statute, the General Assembly expressly abolished any common law cause of action against a vendor of alcohol beverages, making the liability of alcohol vendors "strictly a creature of statute in Colorado."

5 apply both to the words "sold or served" and to the phrase "to such person who was under the age of twenty-one years." A different interpretation would render the "willful and knowing" language meaningless since it is difficult to imagine any sales or service of alcohol by a licensee which are not deliberate. See Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1991) (statute should be construed, if possible, to every word therein). The rule of construction governing culpability requirements of criminal statutes provides a useful analogy: "When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears."

Colorado courts broadly interpret the term "social host" to include employers who provide alcohol to their employees and homeowners who serve alcohol to guests. Charlton v. Kimata , 815 P.2d 946, 949–50 (Colo. 1991) ; Rojas v. Engineered Plastic Designs, Inc. , 68 P.3d 591, 593–94 (Colo. App. 2003). The result of shielding a party host who directly supplies alcohol from liability while not protecting the seemingly less-culpable host who does not, even if both do not prevent drinking, would be contrary not only to logic and common sense, but to the stated purpose of the Act, which was "to shift the responsibility for drinking alcohol from the vendor or provider to the consumer of alcohol beverages."

The Act abolishes common law actions against liquor licensees and social hosts who sell or serve alcoholic beverages and makes the liability of alcohol vendors a creature of statute. See § 12–47–801(1) ; see, e.g., Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 948–49 (Colo.1991) (stating that the liability of alcohol vendors and social hosts “has been strictly a creature of statute” since the Act's passage). It “provides the sole means for someone injured by an intoxicated person to obtain a remedy from the vendor who sold or provided alcohol to the intoxicated person. ” Build It & They Will Drink, 253 P.3d at 303 (emphasis added).

The Act abolishes common law actions against liquor licensees and social hosts who sell or serve alcoholic beverages and makes the liability of alcohol vendors a creature of statute. See§ 12–47–801(1); see, e.g., Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 948–49 (Colo.1991) (stating that the liability of alcohol vendors and social hosts “has been strictly a creature of statute” since the Act's passage). It “provides the sole means for someone injured by an intoxicated person to obtain a remedy from the vendor who sold or provided alcohol to the intoxicated person.” Build It & They Will Drink, 253 P.3d at 303 (emphasis added).

Where possible, courts must give effect to every word in a statute. Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo. 1991) ( citing Johnston v. City Council of Greenwood Vill., 177 Colo. 223, 228, 493 P.2d 651, 654 (1972)). Section 24-10-103(2) of the CGIA defines "injury" as including death:

If possible, we must give effect to every word of an enactment. See Zamarripa v. Q T Food Stores, Inc., 929 P.2d 1332, 1341 (Colo. 1997); Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo. 1991). The word "consumer" and the phrase "any person" are each used intermittently throughout the statute.

The Colorado legislature's amendments of the dram shop statutes were premised on a recognition that it is not the sale or service of alcohol, but the consumption of alcohol that proximately causes injuries that result from intoxication. Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. PartnershipI, 817 P.2d 527, 531 (Colo. 1991); Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 951 (Colo. 1991). [¶ 24.] The Colorado Court of Appeals has upheld this legislative exercise by making it explicitly clear that the civil liability of alcohol vendors is "strictly a creature of statute in Colorado."

We must construe the statute as a whole "so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts," People v. Andrews, 871 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Colo. 1994), and, if possible, give effect to every word in the statute, Charlton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 949 (Colo. 1991). The ALJ was correct in determining that the perceived character disqualification must reasonably relate to the purposes of the Lottery as articulated by the Lottery statute itself.