Opinion
1:21-cv-01280-GBD-GRJ
05-02-2022
CHARLIE R., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
GARY R. JONES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In December of 2017, Plaintiff Charlie R. applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by Osborn Law, P.C., Daniel Adam Osborn, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
This case was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on March 24, 2022. Presently pending are the parties' Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 21, 23). For the following reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion should be denied, the Commissioner's motion should be granted, and this matter should be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for benefits on December 25, 2017, alleging disability beginning December 24, 2017. (T at 253-58). Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. He requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on July 2, 2019, before ALJ Sheena Barr. (T at 101). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 108-118). A further administrative hearing was held on March 10, 2020. (T at 86). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney. (T at 86). The ALJ received testimony from Dennis J. King, a vocational expert. (T at 90-96).
Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 16.
B. ALJ's Decision
On March 25, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying the application for benefits. (T at 7-25). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 25, 2017 (the application date). (T at 12). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's depressive disorder and anxiety disorder were severe impairments as defined under the Act. (T at 13). Under the five step sequential analysis the ALJ then found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 403, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 13).
At step four the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the following non-exertional limitations: he is limited to simple, unskilled tasks; can maintain attention and concentration up to 2 hours at a time with normal breaks; needs a low contact position (only occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and general public); low stress (only occasional changes in the work setting); and needs to be permitted to be off-task up to 5% of the workday due to difficulties maintaining wellbeing, regulating emotions, and controlling behavior. (T at 14).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (T at 19). Considering Plaintiff's age (32 on the application date), education (at least high school, able to communicate in English), work experience (no past relevant work), and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 19). As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined under the Social Security Act, and was not entitled to benefits for the period between December 25, 2017 (the application date) and March 25, 2020 (the date of the ALJ's decision). (T at 20-21).
On December 14, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (T at 1-6).
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through her counsel, by filing a Complaint on February 12, 2021. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, supported by a memorandum of law, on December 24, 2021. (Docket No. 21, 22). The Commissioner interposed a cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, supported by a memorandum of law, on February 22, 2022. (Docket No. 23, 24). On March 9, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a reply memorandum of law in further support of her motion and in opposition to the Commissioner's cross-motion. (Docket No. 25). The matter was assigned to the undersigned for a report and recommendation on March 24, 2022
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). The court's review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings, which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard,” or when the ALJ's rationale is unclear, remand “for further development of the evidence” or for an explanation of the ALJ's reasoning is warranted. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant's eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work activities.
3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to perform his or her past work.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F.Supp.2d 496, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises one main argument in support of her challenge to the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately address the medical opinion evidence “Regardless of its source, the ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in determining whether a claimant is disabled under the [Social Security] Act.” Pena ex rel. E.R. v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-1787 (KAM), 2013 WL 1210932, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(d) (2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In January of 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated new regulations regarding the consideration of medical opinion evidence. The revised regulations apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Because Plaintiff's application for benefits was filed in December of 2017 (T at 10, 13), the new regulations apply.
The ALJ no longer gives “specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions,” but rather considers all medical opinions and “evaluate[s] their persuasiveness” based on supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (a), (b)(2). The ALJ is required to “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” and state “how persuasive” he or she finds each opinion, with a specific explanation provided as to the consistency and supportability factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (b)(2).
Consistency is “the extent to which an opinion or finding is consistent with evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources.” Dany Z. v. Saul, 531 F.Supp.3d 871, 882 (D. Vt. 2021)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2)). The “more consistent a medical opinion” is with “evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources,” the “more persuasive the medical opinion” will be. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
Supportability is “the extent to which an opinion or finding is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the medical source's supporting explanations.” Dany Z, 531 F.Supp.3d at 881. “The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
In the present case, Dr. Eleanor Murphy performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation in August of 2019. Dr. Murphy diagnosed major depressive disorder (recurrent, severe, without psychotic features) and unspecified anxiety disorder. (T at 524). She opined that Plaintiff had no limitation as to his ability to understand, remember, and apply simple directions; moderate limitation with respect to understanding, remembering, and applying complex instructions; mild limitation as to using reason and judgment to make work-related decisions, sustaining concentration and performing a task at a consistent pace; moderate limitation in interacting adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; moderate limitation with regard to sustaining an ordinary routine and regular attendance at work; and marked limitation with respect to regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being. (T at 523).
Dr. Murphy completed a medical source statement, which accompanied her evaluation report. In the medical source statement, Dr. Murphy described Plaintiff as having “[i]mpaired attention and concentration due to severely depressed mood and anxiety symptoms,” along with “low motivation,” which “limits [his] ability to perform complex tasks.” (T at 526). She also reported that Plaintiff experienced “mood and anxiety symptoms resulting in social withdrawal, inability to hold a job for more than 3 [months] at a time, [and] no social relationships outside of [his] parents.” (T at 527). Dr. Murphy also noted “severe, recurrent depression,” causing low motivation, decreased energy levels, and impaired memory. (T at 527).
The ALJ found Dr. Murphy's opinion partially unpersuasive. (T at 19). The ALJ incorporated numerous limitations into the RFC determination (e.g., only simple, unskilled tasks; only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and public; low stress; ability to off-task up to 5% of the workday) but did not accept Dr. Murphy's opinion that Plaintiff had marked limitation in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining well-being. (T at 14, 19).
This Court finds the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Murphy's opinion supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law.
When the record contains competing medical opinions, it is the role of the Commissioner, and not this Court, to resolve such conflicts. See Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 2002)(“Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.”). The ALJ may reach a determination that “does not perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources,” provided the ALJ's overall assessment is supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable law. See Trepanier v. Comm'r of SSA, 752 Fed.Appx. 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2018).
Here, the ALJ's decision to reject the more extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Murphy was supported by other medical opinion evidence and a reasonable reading of the record.
Dr. Kristina Reihl performed a comprehensive clinical psychological evaluation in February of 2018. Dr. Reihl diagnosed major depressive disorder, recurrent, mild. (T at 416). She observed no difficulties in Plaintiff's ability to understand, follow, and retain instructions and described Plaintiff as able to focus, maintain concentration, and perform tasks during the evaluation. (T at 417). Dr. Reihl opined that Plaintiff could tolerate the stress and pressure associated with day-to-day work with mild difficulty. (T at 417).
The ALJ did not consider Dr. Reihl's opinion persuasive, as it did not include an assessment of Plaintiff's vocational abilities and the ALJ found Plaintiff more limited than Dr. Reihl believed. (T at 18). Dr. Reihl's conclusion that Plaintiff could tolerate work stress, however, does provide support for the ALJ's decision not to accept the more extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Murphy.
Further support for the ALJ's reconciliation of the competing opinion evidence is found in the assessments of the State Agency review consultants. Dr. Bonny Gregory opined that Plaintiff had mild limitation with respect to understanding, remember, or applying information; moderate impairment in interacting with others; moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace; and moderate impairment in adapting or managing himself. (T at 124). Dr. Darolyn Hilts affirmed this assessment on reconsideration. (T at 140-41).
“‘[S]tate agency physicians are qualified as experts in the evaluation of medical issues in disability claims,' and as such, ‘their opinions may constitute substantial evidence if they are consistent with the record as a whole.'” Distefano v. Berryhill, 363 F.Supp.3d 453, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)(quoting Leach ex rel. Murray v. Barnhart, 02 Civ. 3561, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 668, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004)); see also Ortiz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 309 F.Supp.3d 189, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)(“Moreover, the opinion of a non-examining medical expert ... may be considered substantial evidence if consistent with the record as a whole.”).
Additional support for the ALJ's decision is found in the documented clinical examinations, which generally described Plaintiff as coherent and cooperative and able to attend to his activities of daily living, albeit with depressed mood. (T at 394, 408, 466-67, 414, 417, 522-23).
An ALJ can account for moderate work-related psychiatric limitations by limiting the claimant to unskilled, low stress work involving limited contact with others. See McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2014); Sanchez v. Saul, No. 18CV12102 (PGG) (DF), 2020 WL 2951884, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020); Miller v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-CV-06467(MAT), 2017 WL 4173357, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017); Sophie H. v. Saul, No. 5:18-CV-375 (CFH), 2019 WL 3975455, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2019)
“Substantial evidence is “a very deferential standard of review - even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous' standard." Brault v. SSA, 683 F.3d 443, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [a court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The role of the reviewing court is therefore quite limited and substantial deference is to be afforded the Commissioner's decision.” Johnson v. Astrue, 563 F.Supp.2d 444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, “[i]f the reviewing court finds substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's final decision, that decision must be upheld, even if substantial evidence supporting the claimant's position also exists.” Id. (citing Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.”)(citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ's RFC determination, and concomitant conclusion that the more extreme aspects of Dr. Murphy's opinion were unpersuasive, was supported by substantial evidence, including other medical opinion evidence and a reasonable reading of the record.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 21) should be DENIED; that the Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 23) should be GRANTED; and this case should be DISMISSED
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to the District Judge. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).