Opinion
# 2017-018-849 Claim No. 122504
11-29-2017
SAELON CHARLESTON a/k/a HAROLD H. PARKER v. STATE OF NEW YORK
SAELON CHARLESTON a/k/a HAROLD H. PARKER Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant alleged he was wrongfully held in prison beyond his conditional release date.
No evidence was presented that the Tier III Hearing or the Rescission Hearing failed to comply with the governing rules and regulations. Claimant's confinement was privileged and the claim is dismissed.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-018-849 |
| Claimant(s): | SAELON CHARLESTON a/k/a HAROLD H. PARKER |
| Claimant short name: | CHARLESTON |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | The Court has amended the caption sua sponte to reflect the State of New York as the only proper Defendant. |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 122504 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DIANE L. FITZPATRICK |
| Claimant's attorney: | SAELON CHARLESTON a/k/a HAROLD H. PARKER Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | November 29, 2017 |
| City: | Syracuse |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, Harold Parker a/k/a Saelon Charleston, appearing pro se, alleges that he was wrongfully held in prison by the State beyond his conditional release date. A trial was held in the Syracuse District on June 6, 2017. At the end of Claimant's testimony, the Court allowed each party 30 days to advise if either wished to produce additional witnesses or make a dispositive motion. Thirty days have expired and neither party has contacted the Court regarding any further proceedings.
At trial, Claimant told the Court his correct name is Harold Parker, and Saelon Charleston is an alias, however, all the documents in the record refer to him as Saelon Charleston.
At the close of trial, the Judge gave the parties additional time for post trial submissions. No submissions were received and on June 6, 2017, the Judge closed the proof.
In reviewing the claim in this matter, the Court notes that it fails to comply with Court of Claims Act section 11 (b). The claim fails to set forth any factual allegations as to the date, time, and description of the State's wrongdoing. Failure to comply with Court of Claims Act section 11 (b) is a jurisdictional defect (Kobrin v State of New York, 144 AD3d 1542 [4th Dept 2016]).
Defendant did not file an Answer to the claim.
Even if the Court were to consider Claimant's proof at trial, the claim would still be dismissed.
Claimant was the only witness on June 6, 2017, and six exhibits were received. From the evidence, in May of 2012 Claimant was interviewed by the Parole Board. The board authorized his scheduled release from Five Points Correctional Facility on June 21, 2012. In keeping with protocol, Seanean Courtwright, acting SORC, presented Claimant's written parole conditions to Claimant in his cell for his written agreement. There were special conditions for release including mandating that Claimant have no contact with his mother, Jessica Parker, or the mother of his child, Shamika Dixon. Upon release, it was also planned for Claimant to live in a men's shelter.
It is unclear what the acronym SORC represents.
Ms. Dixon's name was spelled "Shamika" on one exhibit and "Shameka" on a second exhibit. For purposes of this Decision, the spelling "Shamika" will be used.
Claimant testified that the conditions precluding contact with Jessica Parker and Shamika Dixon were unacceptable. He also would not agree to the living arrangement. He requested that Ms. Courtwright remove those conditions as Claimant felt she had the authority to do so. According to the Rescission Notice, Claimant was presented with the conditions for his release three times on June 19, 2012 in an attempt to get him to agree and sign the release paperwork. Claimant was advised his release would be denied, and he would face a Rescission Hearing on July 31, 2012, before the Parole Board if he refused. Claimant continued his refusal and became aggressive and hostile. He also refused, on June 28, 2012, to sign the Notice of Temporary Suspension of his parole. On that date, Claimant was argumentative and uncooperative with ORC Gronau and ORC Courtwright. Claimant refused to sit and hand back paperwork as ordered. Claimant asked to be taken to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). Two other officers attempted to speak with him, but he became hostile, refusing to return to his cell as directed. As a result, he was issued a ticket and on July 12, 2012 was found guilty of a Tier III infraction.
Exhibit 2.
Because of his Tier III violation for refusing a direct order, Claimant was placed in the SHU on July 13, 2012. The Rescission Hearing was rescheduled. Claimant testified at trial that it was adjourned multiple times, and he was not informed of the adjourned dates. Ultimately, a hearing was commenced on January 29, 2013. Claimant testified at trial that he was issued several tickets and housed in the SHU which necessitated delaying the hearing. A memo dated November 26, 2012, from the Parole Board's counsel stated the Rescission Hearing was adjourned to secure an attorney for Claimant to appear at the Rescission Hearing, however, Claimant discharged that attorney and appeared pro se.
Exhibit 6 contains a portion of the hearing minutes.
Exhibit 4.
At the Rescission Hearing, Claimant again argued that the conditions for his release should be modified. Ms. Courtwright recommended immediate release if he would agree to the conditions as written. Commissioner Smith explained to Claimant that it was his right not to agree to conditions for the release but that would result in his retention in prison. Claimant was found guilty of four out of five misbehavior charges, including his refusal to sign his parole conditions, and his parole was rescinded for 12 months.
A cause of action for wrongful confinement, is a "species" of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is Claimant's burden to show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." (Broughton v State of New York,, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975] cert denied sub nom., Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Typically, the primary issue in contention is privilege. The State's restrictive confinement of an inmate is privileged if it was done in accordance with DOCCS regulations (Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d 305, 307 [3d Dept 1986]; Gittens, 132 Misc 2d at 402). Where DOCCS employees have conducted the disciplinary process in accordance with the governing statutes and regulations, their actions involve discretionary conduct that is quasi-judicial in nature and absolutely immune from liability (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]). This immunity attaches even if later the hearing examiner's determination is reversed by administrative appeal or after an Article 78 proceeding (Id., at 215). There is no immunity, however, where there is a violation of an inmate's nondiscretionary due process rights which effect the outcome of the hearing causing actual prejudice or injury (Id., at 221; Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
There was no evidence presented that the Tier III Hearing or the Rescission Hearing failed to comply with the governing rules and regulations. As a result, Claimant's confinement was privileged. The actions of the parole officers and the Parole Board are governed by statute and regulations.
9 NYCRR 8002.1 - 8002.6. --------
"Determinations pertaining to parole and its revocation, however, are deemed strictly sovereign and quasi-judicial in nature and, accordingly, the State, in making such determinations, is absolutely immune from tort liability."
(Semkus v State of New York, 272 AD2d 74, 75 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 761; Lublin v State of New York, 135 Misc 2d 419, 420 [Ct Cl 1987] affd 135 AD2d 1155 [1st Dept 1987] appeal denied 71 NY2d 802 [1988]; Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511 [1986]). This immunity attaches even if the determination is wrong or negligent.
The claim is DISMISSED. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
November 29, 2017
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims