Summary
denying summary judgment where issues of fact existed as to whether defendant unreasonably increased risk by failing to provide head and face protection to plaintiff lacrosse player
Summary of this case from Duchesneau v. Cornell Univ.Opinion
2012-01-24
Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan, Reid, Donlon, Travis & Fishlinger, Uniondale, N.Y. (Gregory A. Cascino of counsel), for appellant. Bisogno & Meyerson, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Elizabeth Mark Meyerson of counsel), for respondent.
Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan, Reid, Donlon, Travis & Fishlinger, Uniondale, N.Y. (Gregory A. Cascino of counsel), for appellant. Bisogno & Meyerson, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Elizabeth Mark Meyerson of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), dated July 8, 2011, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
By engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation ( see Morgan v. State of New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471, 484–486, 662 N.Y.S.2d 421, 685 N.E.2d 202; Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d 964; Maddox v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 270, 277–278, 496 N.Y.S.2d 726, 487 N.E.2d 553). Participants properly may be held to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-causing events which are known, apparent, or reasonably foreseeable consequences of participation, but not to unassumed, concealed, or unreasonably increased risks ( see Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650, 658, 543 N.Y.S.2d 29, 541 N.E.2d 29; Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d at 439, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d 964; Weller v. Colleges of the Senecas, 217 A.D.2d 280, 283, 635 N.Y.S.2d 990).
Here, the defendant failed to satisfy its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Schmidt v. Massapequa High School, 83 A.D.3d 1039, 921 N.Y.S.2d 547; Hubbard v. East Meadow Union Free School Dist., 277 A.D.2d 353, 716 N.Y.S.2d 599). Although being struck with a passed ball is a known risk inherent in the sport of lacrosse ( see Godwin v. Russi, 62 A.D.3d 945, 879 N.Y.S.2d 567; Fithian v. Sag Harbor Union Free School Dist., 54 A.D.3d 719, 720, 864 N.Y.S.2d 456), the defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether it unreasonably increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff by failing to provide him with head and face protection during preseason high school lacrosse practice ( see Hubbard v. East Meadow Union Free School Dist., 277 A.D.2d at 353, 716 N.Y.S.2d 599). Since the defendant did not establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers ( see e.g. Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).