Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9623.
November 28, 2007.
Appeal from the District Court, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, Kevin G. Miller, Judge, Trial Court No. 1KE-05-765 CR.
Michael J. Zelensky, Ketchikan, for the Appellant. James Scott, Assistant District Attorney, Ketchikan, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Byron E. Charles was convicted of second-degree failure to register as a sex offender for supplying a false address when he registered. On appeal, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knowingly provided false information. He also claims that District Court Judge Kevin G. Miller erred by excluding testimony that would have established his state of mind when he registered. For the reasons explained here, we affirm Charles's conviction. Facts and proceedings
AS 11.56.840(a)(2).
Charles is required to register annually as a sex offender. That means he must, among other things, provide the State with written notice of the address where he resides or plans to reside.
AS 12.63.010(b)(1)(A).
In the summer of 2005, Ketchikan police were checking the accuracy of information provided by registered sex offenders living in Ketchikan. When Charles registered in January 2005, he indicated that his residence was 621 Jackson Street #2 in Ketchikan. On August 2, 2005, Ketchikan Police Officer Ryan Hanis checked the address provided by Charles. When he did so, he discovered that the address did not exist.
Because the address Charles provided when he registered did not exist, he was charged with second-degree failure to register as a sex offender. Following a bench trial, Judge Miller convicted Charles of knowingly failing to provide an accurate address.
During trial, Charles testified that he had been required to register annually as a sex offender since 1994. He said that every year since 1999 he had received notice in the mail informing him of his duty to register and instructing him to provide the information required by the registration form. He said that he had never before had any problems with the State regarding his registration.
He also explained that in January 2005, he was in an in-patient alcohol treatment program in Sitka. He said that he changed his sex offender registration to reflect that he would be living at the treatment facility in Sitka for approximately forty-five days. In late January 2005, when he had nearly completed the treatment program, he updated his registration to show that he would be living in Ketchikan at 621 Jackson Street #2.
Charles testified that he made a mistake in January 2005 when he gave his address as "621 Jackson Street." He told Judge Miller that he made the mistake because he had once lived at 628 Park, the homeless shelter in Ketchikan, and that he had once stayed with a nephew who had lived on Jackson Street. He also testified that when he registered he was distracted because he was thinking about completing his treatment, going home to Ketchikan, getting a job, and getting on with his life. He added that he sometimes has difficulty reading because he has "attention deficit."
Charles acknowledged under cross-examination that he knew that the purpose of the registration statute was to ensure that the State knew where sex offenders were living. He also acknowledged that he did not spend much time filling out the form, and that he did not check the information he provided. He agreed that under those circumstances there was a substantial probability that the information he provided was inaccurate.
Although Charles explained at some length how he had been confused by his various prior addresses, he did not claim that, at the time he registered, he actually intended to reside at the Ketchikan homeless shelter or at his nephew's place on Jackson. He simply asserted that it was not unreasonable for him to have confused his prior addresses on Park and on Jackson when he registered. He argued that he made a good faith mistake when he completed the registration form, and that his good faith mistake was a defense to the "knowingly" element that the state had to prove.
Judge Miller rejected this argument. Based on the evidence presented at trial, Judge Miller found that Charles wrote down "621 Jackson" knowing that he did not intend to live at the homeless shelter at 628 Park or at his nephew's place on Jackson Street. Judge Miller ruled that Charles was aware of his duty to provide an accurate address and knowingly failed to do so. This appeal followed.
Why we find the evidence sufficient to uphold the conviction
To convict Charles of violating AS 11.56.840, the State had to prove that Charles knowingly gave false information concerning his address. That is, the State had to prove (1) that the information Charles was required to supply concerning his address was false, and (2) that Charles knew that this information was false, or that he was aware of a substantial probability that this information was false.
See AS 11.81.900(a)(2).
Charles does not contest that the evidence at trial showed that he was aware that he was required to provide an accurate address. But he does claim that, because Judge Miller made no adverse findings regarding his credibility, the State did not rebut his testimony that he made a good faith mistake when filling out the registration form. He argues that the evidence shows that he inadvertently confused the street addresses of two of his past residences when he filled out the registration form, and that this good faith mistake proved that he did not "knowingly" provide inaccurate information.
But Judge Miller's ruling forecloses Charles's argument. Judge Miller found that even if Charles had in good faith confused the addresses of the places where he used to live, that mistake was no defense because at the time he registered he had no intention of living at those addresses. In other words, Judge Miller found that Charles would have violated the statute even if he had provided the correct address of the homeless shelter or his nephew's residence.
As already mentioned, this was a bench trial. When a defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict in a judge-tried criminal case, the test is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficient to convince a reasonable judge that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Judge Miller's verdict, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Charles knowingly provided false information concerning his address (or, more precisely, his intended address).
Helmer v. State, 608 P.2d 38, 39 (Alaska 1980); Y.J. v. State, 130 P.3d 954, 957 (Alaska App. 2006).
Why we do not reach Charles's claim that evidence was wrongly excluded
Charles also claims that Judge Miller wrongly excluded evidence that would have shown his state of mind at the time he was completing the registration form. But on appeal, Charles does not identify where in the record Judge Miller made the ruling or rulings that Charles now challenges. Nor does Charles direct us to where he made an offer of proof explaining what the excluded evidence or testimony would have revealed about his state of mind.
Under Alaska Evidence Rule 103(a)(2), Charles was required to make known to the trial court the substance of the omitted evidence. By not making an offer of proof, Charles failed to preserve this claim of error for appellate review. Conclusion
See Walden v. Dep't of Transportation, 27 P.3d 297, 304 (Alaska 2001).
We AFFIRM the district court's judgment.