Opinion
04-CV-1428 (FB).
August 11, 2004
STEVE CHARLES, Pro Se, Dannemora, NY, for the Petitioner.
RICHARD A. BROWN, ESQ., District Attorney for Queens County, BY: ELLEN C. ABBOT, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY, for the Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se petitioner Steve Charles ("Charles") seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his convictions in the New York Supreme Court, Queens County. Charles presents two claims: (1) that the New York court that accepted his guilty plea failed to follow New York's statutory competency procedures, and (2) that his attorney was ineffective. Both claims were rejected on the merits by the state courts during post-conviction proceedings and are fully exhausted. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
I.
Only federal issues can be raised on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief may not be granted for claims that were adjudicated on their merits by the state court unless the state court decision (1) was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "A state-court decision is `contrary to' [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedents if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.'" Early v. Packer, 123 U.S. 362, 365 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). Factual determinations made by the state court "shall be presumed to be correct" and the presumption can be overcome only by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Whitaker v. Meachum, 123 F.3d 714, 715 (2d Cir. 1997).II.
A. Competency Procedure
Charles asserts that his competency was not evaluated by two independent physicians, as required by Article 730 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. This claim fails both legally and factually.
The claim fails legally because it alleges a procedural violation of state law by state authorities. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) ("we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
Charles attempts to skirt the federal courts' limitation on habeas review by arguing that the State's alleged failure amounts to a due process claim, a federal issue which the Court could address. This argument fails. In rejecting a similar argument, the Supreme Court noted in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992), that "The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a State to adopt one [competency] procedure over another. . . . [I]t is enough that the State affords the criminal defendant on whose behalf a plea of incompetence is asserted a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he is not competent to stand trial." Article 730 affords criminal defendants that opportunity. See Bisnett v. Kelly, 221 F. Supp. 2d 373, 385-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("While due process does require that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that he is not competent, it does not mandate any particular procedures for resolving the issue. Thus, the trial court's failure to follow the procedures outlined in Article 730 raises, at most, an issue of state law.").
In addition, Charles' claim that he was examined by only one psychiatrist does not withstand scrutiny. As noted, factual determinations are statutorily presumed correct and can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The state court found, and the record supports, that Charles was examined by two psychiatrists, not one, as Charles contends. See People v. Charles, Indict. No. 3870/00 at 4 (June 4, 2003) ("As to his claim that the proper number of doctors did not evaluate him, the Court finds that this allegation is contradicted by the court records, and that Article 730 was scrupulously followed. [T]wo doctors [evaluated] . . . the defendant[.]"). To the extent Charles asserts that he was erroneously found to be competent, the Court observes that whether a defendant is or is not competent "has generally been held to be an issue of fact, entitled to deference by a federal habeas corpus court." Davis v. Keane, 2001 WL 23288 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2001) (quoting Francis S. v. Stone, 331 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2000)). The record reflects that the state court shared the psychiatric evaluations with the prosecution and defense counsel and questioned the defendant extensively regarding his competence prior to accepting his guilty plea and sentencing him. The Court discerns no basis upon which to disturb the state court's competency determination.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Charles argues that his attorney was ineffective for (1) permitting him to plead guilty when he had not been evaluated by two psychiatrists, as required by state law, (2) advising him to plead guilty even though he was incompetent, (3) failing to move for dismissal in light of his incompetency, and (4) promising him that he would be sent to a psychiatric hospital rather than to prison.
As addressed above, arguments (1), (2) and (3) are based on the untenable contention that Charles was incompetent and that the state competency procedures had not been followed. Accordingly, any claims of ineffective assistance based on such arguments necessarily fail. As for Charles' argument that his attorney promised him hospital time rather than jail time, Charles offers no evidence in support of this bald claim. In addition, his allocutions bely it. At the plea allocution, the court informed the parties that it had agreed to a term of "fifteen years," even though the prosecutor had advocated a sentence of twenty-two years; in explaining its decision to impose only a fifteen year term, the sentencing court stated that it was "a substantial imprisonment[;] by no stretch of the imagination is that sentence a slap on the wrist[.]" Plea Transcript (June 5, 2001) at 7. At sentencing, the court asked if Charles had anything he wished to say; he replied, "the last time I signed the papers, I pleaded guilty to fifteen." Sentencing Transcript (August 16, 2001) at 8. In short, the record simply does not support Charles' claim that his attorney promised that he would serve his time in a mental hospital.