Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-1133
09-20-2022
ALLEN L. ST. CHARLES, Plaintiff, v. AMRHEIN; ZELAPOS; T. LANEY; CAPTAIN WISEMAN; EAST; LT. KOSLAWSKI; MAJOR VANCHIERI; ORLANDO HARPER; RUSH; HOLLAND; TOOMEY; BURNS; MS. J. BROWN; and SGT. SARVER, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 51. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed and the motion be denied as moot.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Allen L. St. Charles (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Frackville. He brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleges that his rights have been violated because of the conditions of his confinement as a pretrial detainee at the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”). ECF No. 12-2. The Court has granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint has been filed as the operative complaint. ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff has captioned his initial pleading as his “Amended Complaint.”
Plaintiff brings claims against the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”) Warden and several named and unidentified supervisors and corrections officers, as follows:
(1) Denial of “due process in a disciplinary action effecting (sic) classification, bail and/or parole eligibility[;]”
(2) Plaintiff was “put in danger of serious physical harm[;]”
(3) Denial of “meaningful access to the courts[;]”
(4) A claim that Plaintiff was “[p]sychologically harassed and maintained at inhumane levels of tension” as follows:
a) “witnessed serious abuse and harassment of other inmates with zero accountability[;]”
b) “immersion in an addict culture cultivated by guards profiting from drug sales and favoritism based on involvement[,]”
c) “complete disregard of facility policy, publishing of entirely contradictory policies simultaneously, and maliciously selective enforcement of petty policies to harass specific inmates[;]”
d) “deliberate resistance/outright refusal to attend to facility grievance procedures[;]”
e) “stolen mail, returned mail without notification, attorney/client outgoing mail read by guards[;]”
(5) Plaintiff was denied mental health treatment in deliberate indifference to his mental health needs;
(6) Plaintiff was exposed to “guards instigating violence by giving out charges or pointing out snitches (East)[;]”
(7) Plaintiff suffered the “deprivation of rights in protective custody[.]”
ECF No. 12-2 at 2.
The rest of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint consists of a narrative that sets forth supporting facts and asserts additional claims, as follows:
(1) Plaintiff suffered retaliation for complaints to criminal counsel concerning the conditions of his confinement and for submitting grievances in the form of “threats, harassment, ridicule, and deliberate endangerment.” ECF No. 12 at 7; ECF No. 12-2 at 7. Retaliation included destruction of personal property and being threatened with or receiving false misconducts.
(2) Plaintiff was denied access to mental health treatment, including psychological intervention by providers not affiliated with or employed by ACJ, despite the obvious need for treatment given Plaintiff's refusal of 52 meals and complaints of depression and anxiety. Id. at 8; ECF No. 12-2 at 2, 4, 7.
(3) Plaintiff was denied due process when all inmates on his pod were issued a group misconduct for “rioting” despite evidence that Plaintiff was sitting in his cell working on his tablet. Plaintiff alleges his rights were further violated when ACJ officials failed to investigate the propriety of the misconduct, and placed him in the Restricted Housing Unit for “hours”, without regard to the potential impact of the misconduct on possible bail or parole eligibility. ECF No. 12-2 at 2, 7-8.
(4) Plaintiff was exposed to potential danger from “PK” gang members after being identified as a snitch for complaining about drug trafficking by guards and inmates at ACJ. Id. at 3, 8-9. Plaintiff states that after complaining to guards, he was not placed in protective custody but was moved to a different unit and assigned a corner cell with a broken toilet and no wi-fi. Id.
(5) Prison officials did not respond to Plaintiff's repeated complaints and grievances regarding prison conditions, and certain grievances were reclassified to hinder a “paper trail” to establish that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 9.
(6) Plaintiff's specific grievance regarding the PK gang was resolved unsatisfactorily. Id.
(7) After Defendant East identified Plaintiff as a snitch, Plaintiff was moved to Protective Custody. While in Protective Custody, Plaintiff experienced reduced wi-fi. He was then moved to Administrative Custody after receiving a false misconduct as retaliation for submitting grievances about his reduced wi-fi and complaining about “malicious treatment.” His new cell was next to an inmate known to be a sexual predator. Defendant Rush again identified Plaintiff as a snitch and Plaintiff was placed in danger when his cell door was opened at the same time as the predatory inmate. Plaintiff's misconduct was dismissed and he was returned to Protective Custody. Id. at 11. Plaintiff states that aftersubmitting several additional grievances related to drug trafficking by guards and inmates in his unit, he was again retaliated against when he was placed in a corner cell that lacked wi-fi access. Id. at 11-12.
(8) Plaintiff's mail to his criminal counsel, the ACLU, the PA Prison Society, and the Jail Board was not sent out. Id. at 12.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations as to many of the individual Defendants, and the availability of relief for other claims. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 57 and 66. The Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “‘only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim.”). Id. at 233, 234.
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dept. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
However, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility - “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim ....they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over this action. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks only prospective relief and an award of costs and fees. Plaintiff requests: (1) Court-ordered mental health treatment from an outside provider “without being punished for it”; (2) a declaration that the misconduct issued by T. Laney on “1/20” will not impact him; (3) the promulgation of new policies requiring ACJ to provide a paper copy of all incoming mail for prisoner use; (4) policies for the use of tablets and wi-fi access; (5) policies requiring retention of facility closed-circuit video records; (6) policies requiring speedy grievance resolution; and (7) a “serious investigation of drug traffic involving ranked staff.” ECF No. 12 at 5, 6; ECF No. 12-1 at 13.
The public dockets of Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings and this federal civil action reflect that Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of confinement for three to nine years on March 16, 2022, and transferred to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections not later than May 2, 2022. Thus, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff's claims for prospective equitable relief are moot. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003). This is because “a federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Id. (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975), and citing Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206
See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-02-CR-0003578-2020&dnh=IjX50vtHWVM6wmllA7Vkg%3D%3D; see also 64,70, 72.
(3d Cir. 1993)).
This limitation “‘derives from the requirement of Art. III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.'” DeFunis [v. Odegaard], 416 U.S. [312, 316], 94 S.Ct. at 1706 (quoting Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 391, 394 n. 3, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1966)). See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 201, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (“a present, live controversy ... must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law”); 13A C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533, at 261 (1984) (central question in mootness problems is whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the outset of litigation “have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief”).
Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206. The Third Circuit therefore vacated an order providing injunctive relief because from the date Abdul-Akbar left the facility, “it [was] plain that [Abdul-Akbar could] have no interest [in the challenged conditions],” and thus the district court could not provide him with meaningful relief. Id.; see also Banks v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 601 Fed.Appx. 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2015) (plaintiff “no longer presents a live case or controversy for injunctive relief” regarding the policies or practices at SCI-Retreat because an injunction where he is no longer imprisoned would not provide him meaningful relief); Griffin v. Beard, 401 Fed.Appx. 715, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding moot all claims for prospective relief that require prison defendants to correct allegedly unconstitutional conditions).
An exception to mootness is presented when a plaintiff alleges conditions capable of repetition. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206. Yet in this action, there is no indication that Plaintiff will be transferred back to ACJ. Thus, absent a claim for retrospective relief, the Court is without a “case or controversy” upon which to exercise jurisdiction and dismissal is warranted. In light of this disposition, the Court need not address the arguments presented in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
When a civil rights complaint is subject to dismissal, the district court “must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 246 (3d. Cir. 2008). Because it cannot be said that a curative amendment would be futile, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed without prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). As a result, Plaintiff should be granted a reasonable time to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, his claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice as moot and, therefore, also deny the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 51, as moot.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,